

An Analysis of Recent Developments in the War in Yemen

(Translated)

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The dust of battle finally settled on Yemen's West Coast on Thursday, September 10, revealing a resounding defeat: the withdrawal of the so-called National Resistance Forces—led by Tariq Mohammed Abdullah Saleh—from the city of Al-Mukha in the south in the face of the Houthis. Appeals made by Tariq Saleh to Aden proved futile; these included two separate, direct calls on Friday, September 4—one involving Tariq Saleh and the other involving Prime Minister Shaya al-Zindani and Rashad Al-Alimi, head of the eight-member Presidential Council. These appeals followed a surprise Houthi offensive on Thursday, September 3, involving dozens of ballistic missiles and drones. The attack coincided with clashes on the Al-Kadha, Maqbanah, Al-Barh, and Al-Waz'iyah fronts in western Taiz Governorate. The Houthis aimed to isolate Al-Mukha from Taiz, and their attacking forces managed to advance at multiple locations amidst the confusion and disarray within Tariq's forces—which are affiliated with the Yemeni government and possess superior manpower and weaponry compared to the Houthis. The Houthis succeeded in recapturing battlefield positions they had previously lost—a situation described by former Minister of Local Administration Abdul-Raqib Fath as the temporary loss of certain positions for a period of hours. These communications culminated in the announcement on Friday, September 4, of the arrival of military reinforcements—comprising Giants Brigades (Al-Amaliqah) and Nation's Shield Forces (NSF) —to areas along the West Coast and western Taiz Governorate, accompanied by the commander of the Fourth Military Region, Hamdi Shukri. So, what happened, and how did it unfold? The Houthis rapidly seized control of Al-Waz'iyah, Al-Barh, Maqbanah, Al-Kadha, and the Khalid Camp—capitalizing on withdrawals by government forces, comprising of the National Resistance Forces, the Giants Brigades, and the Nation's Shield Forces —thereby strangling the city of Mocha and cutting it off from Taiz. This left the city caught in a pincer movement from the north and south. Compounding the situation were incidents of betrayal in the neighboring areas of Hays and Khokha, as well as assassinations within the ranks of Tariq Saleh's forces. These setbacks were further aggravated by a devastating blow delivered through targeted, concentrated attacks using ballistic missiles and drones—attacks whose impact Saleh could not deny, despite his attempts to downplay their effect on his troops. On the morning of Thursday, September 3, Tariq Saleh had no choice but to surprise his forces with orders to withdraw from their positions toward Dhubab, abandoning the territory behind them to the Houthis. Consequently, the Houthis entered Mocha, effectively handed to them on a silver platter, as there was no significant resistance in the city—not even from Saudi air power.

The Houthis seek to portray themselves as the architects of victory on the West Coast; as Mohammed Ali al-Houthi stated—while clarifying Sana'a's political and military stance—the battle Sana'a is waging is not arbitrary. Rather, it is part of a push to achieve key demands, including lifting the financial and military blockade, ending the air and naval embargo, and securing a comprehensive cessation of military

operations against Yemen (Al-Thawra Newspaper, September 10, 2026). Abdulaziz bin Habtoor echoed this sentiment.

Is it now the turn of the remaining parts of Marib and Taiz, and will the Houthis crown their efforts by seizing control of the entire northern sector of Yemen? Was the fiery statement made by Al-Alimi—conveyed on June 11 by former Minister of Local Administration Abdul-Raqib Fatah during a meeting with UN Envoy Grundberg—merely a ruse? In that statement, Al-Alimi asserted that “peace begins with restoring the state, not sharing power with the Houthis.” Yet, was this declaration not a genuine objection, but rather dust thrown in the eyes of the Yemeni people—a way to condition them to accept a power-sharing arrangement with the Houthis, thereby legitimizing the latter and breaking the public's resistance to such a deal?

Not long ago, the National Resistance Forces—formed in 2017—stood at the gates of Hodeidah. They were halted only by the December 2018 Stockholm Agreement, alongside humanitarian concerns and threats of UN action against the Aden-based government. Today, however, Mocha is being handed over to the Houthis. We are witnessing a repeat of the scenario where advancing forces—poised to march on Sana'a—are forced to retreat, and military positions and cities are once again surrendered.

As for the relationship between Sana'a and Riyadh, what provoked the Houthis to strike Saudi military and economic targets—both at sea and on land—was the strike on the Sana'a Airport runway last July to prevent the Iranian Mahan Air flight from landing. This was compounded by Riyadh's procrastination and stalling regarding the settlement of war-related issues, the payment of civil servant salaries, and the release of funds for Yemen's reconstruction.

The United Nations has played a prominent political role throughout the years of the war in Yemen, effectively controlling the negotiation file and steering it however it sees fit. Its envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, addressed the Security Council on Friday, September 10, stating, “Yemeni demands can be addressed at the negotiation table, and in the lead-up to the escalation, I tabled proposals that offered a credible alternative. I will continue to engage the Government of Yemen and Ansar Allah to identify feasible ways forward and to keep open options for off-ramps. I will work in close partnership with regional actors, whose engagement is indispensable to help contain the situation.” He added, “What is negotiated, and what is ultimately agreed, is for the Yemenis to decide,” noting, “For years, my Office has consulted Yemenis in all their diversity.”

Beyond its economic role—having provided \$33 billion between 2015 and 2024—will the people of Iman simply stand watching amidst the international struggle over their country and its wealth? Working with Hizb ut Tahrir to establish the Second Khilafah Rashidah (rightly-guided Caliphate) has become an imperative Shariah obligation and an unavoidable necessity. The Prophet (saw) said, **«ثُمَّ تَكُونُ خِلَافَةً عَلَىٰ مِنْهَاجِ النَّبُوَّةِ»** **“Then there will be a Khilafah (Caliphate) on the Method of the Prophethood.”**