Ghanim ‘Abduh

نقضُ الاشتِرَاكيّةِ الماركسِيّة

Refuting Marxist Socialism

1383 AH – 1963 CE

Reviewed 1448 AH – 2026 CE

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1

During the early latter half of the nineteenth century, precisely during the lifetime of Karl Marx, who died in 1883, Marxist socialism was merely a philosophical conception of life. Today, however, in the early latter half of the twentieth century, it occupies a massive presence in the world. A major world power, Russia, is founded upon its principles, and alongside it, several nations comprising hundreds of millions of people are attempting to proceed with the application of this Marxist socialism. Furthermore, it possesses extensive global propaganda and widespread adherents, to the extent that one can hardly find a nation devoid of Marxist socialists. Throughout the Islamic lands—particularly in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Indonesia, and India—socialism has intellectually captivated many Muslims, though only a small fraction have embraced it ideologically. Consequently, it became imperative to pause for a moment of debate to uncover the truth regarding it and present the correct viewpoint with profound clarity and enlightenment, so that the facts may be laid bare and the falsehood of this deception may be exposed. Perhaps those who have embraced this ideology, which poses a severe danger to humanity, will see the light, return to the truth, walk upon the path of guidance, realize the profound depths of the delusion in which they were immersed, and recognize that their obligation is to combat such disbelief and atheism.

Marxist socialism emanates from a comprehensive idea regarding the universe, man, and life. Thus, it stems from a creed capable of being embraced as a belief, because it is a fundamental idea. It is also applicable in practice, as injunctions

for solving life’s problems emerge from it, and upon which further thoughts about life can be built. Furthermore, it constitutes both an idea and a method; meaning, it is a rational doctrine accompanied by rules to address life's problems, alongside mechanisms that dictate how to execute this doctrine and implement its practical solutions. Its terminology possesses a tangible reality that one can point to directly. For this reason, it has the capacity to generate public opinion, and herein lies its most catastrophic danger. However, the fact that it can generate public opinion and can be practically applied does not imply its validity. Rather, it simply signifies that it is a genuine socialism, not a nominal one like what is termed "state socialism," and that it is an ideology of disbelief exactly as capitalism is an ideology of disbelief. Just as Christianity is a religion of disbelief—exactly like Judaism and paganism—so too is socialism an ideology of disbelief, identical to capitalism. It is undeniably an ideology, yet it is fundamentally false in concept and method.

In order to comprehend this with absolute clarity, it is first necessary to present a lucid picture of the reality of this Marxist socialism precisely as it is formulated in socialist and communist literature, and subsequently refute Marxist socialism from its very foundations.

2

The Marxist socialist ideology is founded upon what are termed Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism. Dialectical Materialism serves as the general theory of socialism, including communism. It is designated as “dialectical materialism” because its approach to observing the phenomena of nature is dialectical; that is, its method of inquiry and epistemology relies on discovering the contradictions of thought and the collision between opposing views through debate—

hence, it is dialectical. Furthermore, its explanation and conceptualization of natural phenomena are strictly material; thus, its outlook is materialistic. As for Historical Materialism, it broadens the scope of the principles of Dialectical Materialism to encompass the study of societal life, applying these concepts to the phenomena of life within a society. In other words, it applies the tenets of Dialectical Materialism to the study of society and societal history.

Dialectical Materialism signifies the materialist theory, asserting that life, mankind, and the universe are merely matter evolving intrinsically through self-development; thus, there is neither a Creator nor a created being, but rather a self-contained evolution within matter itself. This materialism—specifically, Marx's materialism—proceeds from the premise that the world is inherently material, that the manifold phenomena of the world are but various manifestations of matter in motion, and that the reciprocal relations among these phenomena and their mutual conditioning, as determined by the dialectical method, constitute necessary laws for the development of matter in motion, concluding that the world develops according to the laws of the movement of matter and stands in no need of any Universal Mind. Engels states, "The materialist worldview means simply the comprehension of nature as it is, without any alien addition." Regarding the materialist conception of the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who posited that "the world is one, created neither by any god nor by any man, but was, is, and ever shall be an eternally living fire, kindling and extinguishing according to specific laws," Lenin wrote, "A very good exposition of the principles of dialectical materialism." This, then, represents the materialist theory, or Marx's materialism. However, this theory elaborates on these concepts dialectically, which is why it is termed "dialectical," a word derived from the Greek word διαλέγω "dĭălégō," meaning to converse or debate. In antiquity, dialectic denoted the art of arriving at the truth by uncovering and overcoming the inherent contradictions in an opponent's

argument. Some early philosophers considered the discovery of conceptual contradictions and the clash of opposing views to be the optimal method for discovering the truth. This dialectical method of thinking, later applied to natural phenomena, became the dialectical method for understanding nature. According to this method, the phenomena of nature are perpetually in motion and constantly changing, and the evolution of nature is the result of the development of its internal contradictions, born of the reciprocal action between opposing forces within it; dialectical materialism thus contends that the world evolves in accordance with the laws of the movement of matter, that it requires no Universal Mind, and that it is a single entity uncreated by any deity. This, however, is categorically false. The fact that perceptible, tangible objects exist is an absolute certainty, as they are witnessed through the senses; equally absolute is the certainty that these perceptible, tangible objects are contingent upon other things—meaning they possess the attribute of dependency—because observation evidences that they cannot act or transition from one state to another independently. Fire, for instance, burns only if the other substance possesses combustibility; absent this combustibility, it cannot ignite it. Certain acids dissolve specific elements but fail to dissolve others. Some elements unite and react exclusively with particular elements, ignoring the rest, and two atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen produce water, yet to obtain heavy water, it is strictly necessary to combine two atoms of heavy hydrogen with one atom of oxygen. These entities, therefore, are incapable of unconditional action or of transitioning into any alternate state except within a restricted framework of specific conditions, nor can they affect anything else without inducing a change within themselves, within the other entity, or via an external agent; thus, they are inherently contingent, even if one assumes they are only contingent upon these specific factors and conditions. Fire cannot burn without the presence of a combustible substance; hence, to burn, it is

reliant upon that combustible material. Acids cannot dissolve unless they interact with specific elements susceptible to dissolution; therefore, they are dependent on these dissolvable elements to initiate the process, and elements cannot unite or react except in the presence of other elements possessing the capacity for such reaction and union; thus, they are contingent upon these susceptible elements to achieve reaction and combination. Even to obtain heavy water, the union of two atoms of heavy hydrogen—known as deuterium—with an oxygen atom is compulsory; meaning, it requires the combination of the two heavy hydrogen atoms with an oxygen atom to yield heavy water. It cannot be argued that it needed what was already within it; rather, it required a quantitative addition to its existing composition, and it required an agent to provide this specific quantity—ergo, it is contingent. This serves as conclusive evidence that perceptible, tangible objects are dependent upon entities other than themselves, which is to say, they possess the definitive attribute of contingency.

Furthermore, it cannot be argued that while perceptible, tangible objects may be contingent upon one another, in their totality, they are independent of anything else. Such a claim is invalid because dependency (contingency) is demonstrated and clarified only in relation to a single entity; it is apprehended tangibly and cannot be theoretically posited for a non-existent entity by merely assuming its existence. Therefore, one cannot assert that fire needs a combustible body, and if they were to unite, they would become self-sufficient and no longer need anything else, for this is purely a theoretical postulation. The need of the fire and the combustible body is a need for a tangibly existing entity, perceived by one of the senses or apprehended by the intellect—which, naturally, requires the senses to perceive its referent before it can be intellectually grasped; thus, the need is for an existent entity. From the union of fire and a body, no new entity emerges wherein independence or contingency is actualized. Similarly, the objects within the

universe do not yield an entity through their aggregation wherein independence or contingency is actualized. Contingency and independence are embodied within a single entity, and there exists no single entity formed from the sum total of the universe that can be characterized as either independent or contingent. If it is claimed that the totality of objects in the universe is independent or contingent, this would be characterizing an imaginary entity, not an existent one. The rational evidence rests upon the contingency of a specific, existing entity within the universe, not upon a collection of objects imagined to coalesce into a singular entity to which the attribute of contingency or independence is then assigned. Therefore, this objection is dismissed because it poses a hypothetical, imaginary scenario rather than a realistic or even theoretically valid one.

Moreover, it cannot be argued that the mere fact that objects are mutually contingent upon one another does not constitute evidence of their need for a Creator, since the rational evidence establishes mere contingency, not necessarily the contingency upon a Creator. The mere existence of contingency within everything fundamentally evidences the attribute of contingency in everything.

Additionally, it cannot be argued that every part is contingent upon another part, meaning that all parts are mutually interdependent, and therefore, what is evidenced is only that every object is contingent upon another object, which does not prove absolute contingency. Such an argument is invalid because the contingency of an object, even if it is reliant upon only a single thing in the world, evidences that there is nothing in the universe that possesses absolute independence. This means it is contingent—even if upon a single entity in existence—which establishes the attribute of contingency for it. This is akin to one who takes a single step; the attribute of walking is established for him, just as one who speaks a single

word is characterized by the attribute of speaking. Contingency, walking, speaking, and similar attributes denote a genus—that is, an essence (quiddity); thus, the occurrence of a single instance of it affirms the descriptive attribute of its essence. Hence, the mere substantiation of contingency upon a single object—and contingency being indicative of genus, or essence—establishes the attribute of contingency for every object in the universe; consequently, the contingency of every part upon another part definitively establishes the attribute of contingency on the whole.

All of this is tangibly and sensibly evident concerning all existing objects on the surface of the Earth; as for the universe, mankind, and life, the universe is a collection of celestial bodies, each of which moves according to a specific system (order) that it cannot alter. This system must be either a part of it, an inherent property of it, or something entirely external to it; it is absolutely impossible for it to be anything other than one of these three. The proposition that it is a part of it is false, because the movement of the planets occurs in a specific orbit that it does not transgress, and the orbit—like a pathway—is distinct from the entity traversing it. Furthermore, the system by which it moves is not merely its motion alone, but rather its restriction to moving within this particular orbit. Therefore, this system cannot possibly be a part of it. Additionally, the act of moving itself is not a part of the planet's essence, but rather an action it performs, making it impossible to be a part of it. The proposition that the system is an inherent property is also false, because the system is not merely the planet's movement, but its movement within a specific orbit. The focal point is not the movement alone, but the movement within a specific parameter. It is not like the faculty of sight in the eye, which is one of its properties; rather, it is the fact that the eye's sight only functions under specific conditions. Similarly, the transformation of water into steam only occurs at a specific ratio. The core issue is not the

planet's movement, the eye's vision, or the water's transformation, but rather the planet's movement in a specific orbit, the eye's vision under specific conditions, and the water's transformation at a specific ratio. This parameter imposed upon the planet, the eye, and the water is the system itself. Even if movement were one of its properties, the fact that this movement only occurs under a specific parameter is not one of its properties; otherwise, it would have been within its properties to organize its own movement, and consequently, it could organize a different system as long as organization was an inherent property, but in reality, it cannot do so; therefore, it cannot be one of its properties. Since it is neither a part of it nor an inherent property of it, it is definitively something external to it. Thus, it required an external entity, meaning the universe is contingent upon the system.

It cannot be argued that the movement of a planet in a specific orbit is a property resulting from the convergence of planets into a single body, of which it is an integral part, thus generating the property of moving in a specific orbit—just as hydrogen alone possesses a property, and oxygen alone possesses a property, yet when combined, they acquire a different property, and similarly with the planets. This argument is invalid because hydrogen and oxygen, upon combining, form an entirely different entity and thereby acquire a new property; thus, it is the property of the newly formed body, not the property of their individual existence in the universe, which starkly contrasts with the case of the planets. The planets did not individually possess a property only to acquire a new one by merging into a single body; rather, this property remained exclusive to each individual planet, as they never merged to form a single body. Therefore, the property belongs to the individual planet and does not arise from the merging of two or more planets into a single body, for the convergence that would form another body never occurred.

As for life, its dependence upon water and air is a palpable and tangible reality. Regarding man, his dependence upon life, and subsequently upon food and other necessities, is equally palpable and tangible. Consequently, the universe, life, and man are definitively contingent.

It cannot be argued that the entities within the universe, which are mutually dependent, are merely diverse manifestations of a single essence—that they are all matter taking on various forms, but in reality, they are one entity: matter. Hence, matter is dependent upon itself and not upon anything else, rendering it non-contingent. This argument is invalid because matter, in order to assume various forms, can only do so according to a specific proportion imposed upon it by an external agent. Water, for instance, requires a specific proportion to transform into steam; an egg requires a specific proportion of heat to develop into a chick, and so forth. The shaping of matter is impossible except under a specific proportion and a determined condition. This proportion or condition does not emanate from the matter itself; otherwise, it could manifest it at will without it being externally imposed. The fact that it is externally imposed means it originates from something else; therefore, it is dependent upon this proportion or condition to complete its formation, and it is dependent upon the entity that establishes this proportion for the formation to occur. Accordingly, it is dependent upon an external agent, definitively affirming its attribute of contingency upon another.

The implication of the term “contingent” signifies that it is “created,” for its mere dependency indicates its inability to bring anything into existence *ex nihilo* (from nothing); meaning, it is incapable of creating that which it needs, and thus it is not a creator. Since it is not a creator, it is necessarily a created being. This is because all of existence is strictly confined to either a Creator or a created being, with no third possibility. Furthermore, a contingent being cannot be eternal, because the

essence of “eternal” implies being completely independent of anything. If a being requires an external agent for its actions and transformations, its dependency upon an external agent for its very existence is true *a fortiori* (all the more so). Moreover, had it relied upon an external agent for its existence, that agent would have preceded it, thus negating its eternality. The definition of the Eternal is that which relies on nothing and requires nothing. Since the contingent being is not eternal, it is definitively a created being. Therefore, the contingency of perceptible, tangible objects is an absolute certainty, which necessarily means that their creation by a Creator is also an absolute certainty. Consequently, the world is contingent, and it is a created entity brought into existence by a Creator.

This Creator must necessarily be uncreated, and He must be Eternal. As for being uncreated, if He were created, He would not be a Creator, because there exist only a Creator and a created being, and they are two fundamentally distinct entities; one is definitively not the other. Therefore, one of the inherent attributes of the Creator is that He is uncreated; that which is not created is the Creator. It cannot be posited that He is the creator of one thing and the creation of another, because the inquiry here is not concerning a specific object, such as a man or a machine, but rather concerning the “created being” *qua* created being, not a specific creation, and concerning the Creator in terms of His attribute of bringing things into existence *ex nihilo* – out of nothing. An entity cannot simultaneously be a creator and a created being. The Creator is that which is distinct from all creations.

As for His being Eternal—meaning He has no beginning—if He had a beginning, He would be a created being, as His existence would have commenced from a specific point. His status as the Creator dictates that He must be Eternal. For it is the Eternal upon which all things depend, while He depends

upon nothing. This Eternal Creator is the exact denotation of the word “Allah”; that is, He is Allah, the Exalted.

Furthermore, the entities that the intellect comprehends are man, life, and the universe; these entities are finite, and thus, they are created. Man is finite because he grows in all aspects up to a certain limit which he does not surpass; therefore, he is finite. Moreover, man constitutes a genus manifested in every single one of its individuals. Every individual is a human, and there is no difference whatsoever between one individual and another in essential human properties. Consequently, what is true of one human individual is true of another, just like any other genus, such as gold in its pure nuggets, the lion among animals, or an apple within its genus of fruits, and so forth. A genus—any genus—is entirely subject to whatever applies to each of its individuals. The simplest observable fact is that the individual dies, and that man dies; thus, the human genus definitively dies. This implies that this genus is definitively finite. The mere acknowledgment that man dies equates to acknowledging that man is finite. It cannot be argued that it is the individual human who dies while the human genus does not, citing the evidence that in every epoch millions die, yet in the subsequent epoch, instead of man being annihilated over time, we empirically observe him multiplying; thus, concluding that he does not die as a genus but only as an individual. This argument is invalid because the human genus is not a composite of an aggregate of individuals such that one could claim the individual dies while the aggregate does not, thereby concluding that the genus does not die. Rather, man is a specific essence manifested completely in individuals without any distinction between one individual and another, akin to water, petroleum, wheat, and any other genus. Therefore, a judgment concerning it must not be directed at an aggregate, because its genus is not composed of an aggregate; rather, the judgment must be directed at its essence—that is, its genus. Whatever is true of the essence in one individual is true of the entire genus, regardless of the

multiplicity of its individuals. Since the essence is entirely actualized in a single individual and in every individual, and the single individual dies, it signifies that the human genus dies. As for empirical observation, it is impermissible to use it as a decisive criterion, because it is an observation of something other than what requires evidence; it is an observation of the aggregate, which is distinct from the genus. Thus, besides being a deficient observation, it cannot be a decisive criterion because it does not represent the genus. Do you not observe that the waters in the seas are not depleted regardless of how much you take from them? This does not mean they are infinite. Similarly, petroleum is not depleted regardless of how much is extracted, but this does not mean it is infinite. Do you not see that wheat increases with heavy consumption? If we look solely at its aggregate, it implies it is inexhaustible, even though the reality is that its genus is exhaustible, meaning it does deplete. Since the human genus, manifested in the single individual, dies, it signifies that the human genus *qua* genus dies, and accordingly, man is finite.

Life is finite because its manifestation is exclusively individual, and it is tangibly observable that it terminates in the individual; hence, it is finite. For life in man is the precise equivalent of life in an animal; it does not exist outside this individual but rather within him. It is something perceived, even if it cannot be touched, and through the senses, one distinguishes between the living and the dead. Thus, this perceptible entity, which resides within the living organism and whose manifestations include growth and movement, is completely and partially represented in the single individual and is absolutely unconnected to anything else. It exists in every single living individual exactly as it does in any other. Therefore, it is a genus manifested in individuals, much like man. As long as this life terminates in the single individual, it signifies that the genus of life terminates, and thus, it is finite.

The universe is finite because it is an aggregate of celestial bodies, each of which is finite, and an aggregate of finite entities is self-evidently finite. This is because every single one of these bodies has a beginning and an end; therefore, no matter how much these bodies multiply, they ultimately conclude in finitude. Finitude is not determined by the number of bodies, but rather by the fact that they have a beginning and an end; indeed, it is established the very moment a beginning exists. The mere assertion of “more than one” dictates finitude at that point, because what is added is a finite entity, meaning the addition continues to occur from one finite entity to another, leaving the entirety finite. Consequently, the universe is finite. Based on this, man, life, and the universe are definitively finite.

Furthermore, when we observe the finite, we find that it is not eternal; otherwise, it would not be finite. This is because this perceptible, tangible object either has a beginning, in which case it is not eternal, or it has no beginning, in which case it is eternal. It has been evidenced that the finite has a beginning; therefore, it cannot be eternal, because the definition of the eternal is that it has no beginning. That which has no beginning definitively has no end, because the existence of an end necessitates the existence of a beginning. This is because the mere initiation of existence can only occur from a specific point, which means that an end is inevitable as long as a beginning has occurred from a point, whether in time, space, objects, or otherwise. This is imperative in the realm of tangibles (sensible), and equally imperative in the realm of intelligible, because intelligible are originally rooted in sensible, and whatever is not first sensible cannot become intelligible. Accordingly, everything that has a beginning has an end. The meaning of the eternal is that it has neither a beginning nor an end; thus, it is infinite. Therefore, the finite is not eternal. The fact that the universe, life, and man are finite means they are not eternal; otherwise, they would not be finite. Since they are not eternal,

they are created by another. The universe, man, and life must necessarily be created by another. This 'other' is their Creator; that is, the Creator of the universe, life, and man. Consequently, the world is created by a Creator, created by the Eternal, created by Allah the Exalted. The world does not evolve intrinsically according to the laws of the movement of matter; rather, it is definitively contingent, definitively finite, and definitively not eternal. It is, therefore, created by the Eternal. This Eternal is the exact denotation of the word ‘Allah’; that is, He is Allah ﷻ.

Attention must be drawn to three matters:

First: The assertion that existence does not extend beyond a Creator and a created being is not a mere hypothesis, but rather an absolute truth. This is because the discourse did not approach this statement as an assumption upon which the rational evidence was constructed. Instead, the discourse examined perceptible, tangible objects, and established the tangible evidence that they are created by a Creator. Through tangible apprehension of the existence of creations belonging to a Creator, it arrived via tangible evidence at this conclusion; thus, the statement was the conclusion of the evidence, not its premise. In other words, we did not say, “Since existence does not extend beyond a Creator and a created being, and since it is evidenced that the perceptible and tangible is created, then that which is imperceptible and intangible must be the Creator.” We did not posit the hypothesis first and arrange the evidence upon it, such that the hypothesis would require validation for the evidence to be sound. Rather, we placed the perceptible, tangible objects under scrutiny, drawing attention to the fact that their existence is absolute—a visible, tangible reality—and we established the evidence that they are definitively contingent. This means they are contingent upon One who brings them into existence; hence, they are created. Thus, the evidence established that perceptible, tangible objects are created. That is, it rested upon an absolute truth, not a hypothesis. Consequently,

the existence of the created being was definitively established, which in turn evidences the existence of the Creator. For this created being must either be created by itself or created by another, and there is definitively no third possibility. This is not a hypothesis; the tangible reality of the created being indicates it. The notion that it is created by itself is false, as it would be both a creator of itself and a creation of itself simultaneously, which is absurd. It must, therefore, be created by another, and this 'other' is the Creator. By this, the existence of a Creator is evidenced. That is, proving that perceptible, tangible objects are created by a Creator, and that this Creator is distinct from them, evidences the existence of the Creator. Based on this validation, via tangible evidence, of the existence of the created being and the existence of a Creator who is distinct from the created being, the absolute truth was comprehended: that existence does not extend beyond a Creator and a created being. Therefore, this assertion was never a hypothesis, but an absolute truth established by conclusive tangible evidence.

Second: The concept of contingency (dependency) in perceptible, tangible objects is entirely distinct from the concept of Marxist Conditionality. Marxist Conditionality dictates that everything is encompassed by conditions consisting of phenomena and objects surrounding it, and a thing cannot be separated from its surroundings. Any natural phenomenon cannot be understood if observed in isolation—that is, apart from its surrounding phenomena—because any phenomenon in any realm of nature can turn into an empty, meaningless absurdity if viewed apart from the conditions enveloping it, and if separated from these conditions. Every natural phenomenon must be observed precisely as it is determined and conditioned by its surrounding phenomena. Conditionality, in their view, is the indissoluble interconnection of things with one another, such that all of them, and each one of them, constitutes a condition for the existence of what they encompass, for its production, and

for the comprehension of its reality. That is, all phenomena of nature mutually condition one another, and this is what it means for them to be ‘conditions’; this is the meaning of conditionality. It is, therefore, an explanation of the interconnection of things with one another, wherein one affects and is affected by another; it is not an explanation of the meaning of contingency. What logically follows from it is not what follows from contingency. What follows from conditionality is that if things in nature are reciprocally interconnected and one is a condition for the other, then a system can only be judged by basing this judgment on the circumstances that engendered this system, and nothing can be judged except on the basis of what surrounds it. However, if things in nature were separate from one another, the system could be understood without any regard to circumstances—that is, without regard to time or space. The concept of conditioning or Marxist Conditionality is a concept related to the interconnection of things, not the contingency of things. For this reason, the concept of contingency is distinct from the concept of Marxist Conditionality, because the concept of contingency is related to the absence of self-sufficiency (independence), whereas the concept of conditioning is related to the impossibility of separating things from one another.

It might be argued that the meaning of a thing being reciprocally interconnected with another, where one is a condition for the other, implies that it is contingent upon it. Thus, the entity cannot dispense with these things encompassing the phenomenon or the entity; therefore, it is contingent upon them. This would mean that contingency is identical to conditioning—that is, identical to the concept of Marxist Conditionality. The response to this is that this is not the intended meaning of Conditionality, even though affirming Conditionality logically necessitates affirming contingency. That is, the communists did not assert that everything is contingent upon another; rather, they stated that everything is reciprocally

interconnected with another, serving as a condition for it. They intended to prove the mutual influence of things upon one another, not their mutual contingency. However, affirming contingency is a logical consequence of their assertion, though their assertion itself is not contingency. Meaning, contingency follows from this assertion and is derived from it, but it is not the assertion itself. This can be used as evidence against the communists that phenomena and things in nature are not Eternal. Their reciprocal interconnection, such that one is a condition for the other, means that every single one of them is contingent. Consequently, none of them are eternal because they are contingent; for the Eternal is independent of anything else, as it has no beginning. If it were contingent, it would have a beginning—meaning something else existed before it—thus negating its eternality. Therefore, Marxist Conditionality serves as evidence that phenomena and things in nature are not eternal, because they are contingent by their own admission, and the contingent cannot be eternal. This demonstrates that the concept of Marxist Conditionality is distinct from the concept of contingency. Nevertheless, affirming conditioning—i.e., Marxist Conditionality—necessitates that everything in the world is contingent, which definitively means it is not eternal.

As long as Marxism concedes that everything in nature is contingent—by way of asserting Conditionality—all that remains to prove that things are created by a Creator is to establish that their contingency is upon something other than themselves, not merely upon themselves. Acknowledging that they are contingent is an acknowledgment that they are not eternal, which in turn is an acknowledgment that they are created. All that remains is to prove that they are contingent upon another, which would prove they are created by a Creator distinct from them. Proving this is extremely simple. When things are mutually contingent—or, in their terminology, when a thing is reciprocally interconnected with another, with one being

a condition for the other—this occurs strictly in accordance with specific laws and specific proportions, such that one affects the other only in accordance with these laws or proportions. Neither of them can deviate from these laws or proportions, as they are imposed upon them. These laws originate neither from them together nor from either one individually. If they originated from one of them, it would be able to deviate from them and alter them. If they originated from both, they would be capable, by their combination, of deviating from them and altering them. However, the reality is that they are subjugated to them and compelled to proceed according to them; it is impossible for them to deviate from or alter them. This evidences that something else imposed this proportion upon them and compelled them to proceed accordingly. Thus, they are contingent upon another; meaning, perceptible, tangible objects are contingent upon another. For water to transform into steam, it requires a specific proportion of heat. This proportion originates neither from the water nor from the heat; otherwise, each would be able to manifest it at will, or both together could manifest it as they please, and it would not be imposed upon them. Yet, the reality is that it is impossible for them to deviate from this proportion, as it is unequivocally imposed upon them. The fact that it is imposed upon them means it originated from an external agent. Therefore, water and heat individually and collectively required this proportion for steam to be produced from them, and they required an agent to establish this proportion for them so the generation of steam could occur. Likewise, all perceptible, tangible objects are contingent upon another, which means they are created by a Creator distinct from them. This is an irrefutable evidence. The fact that things in their totality, and every single thing individually, are contingent upon a specific proportion or a specific condition to be formed, to initiate anything, or to undergo any change, is an absolute certainty verified by sensation and observation, conceded by all people. Furthermore, the fact that this specific proportion or

specific condition did not originate from the things themselves but from something else is equally an absolute certainty verified by sensation and observation. This means that things in their totality, and every single thing individually, definitively had the attribute of contingency upon another established for them by tangible evidence. Thereby, it is definitively evidenced that perceptible, tangible objects are contingent upon another. Since it is evidenced that they are contingent upon another, it is thereby evidenced that they are created by a Creator. For their contingency means they are not eternal; it is impossible for the Eternal to be contingent, as the mere existence of contingency negates eternality. Since they are not eternal, they are created by a Creator. Consequently, the Marxist assertion of Conditionality in nature logically necessitates the assertion that nature is contingent upon another, which means it is created by a Creator. This implies that the doctrine of Conditionality inevitably necessitates acknowledging the existence of the Creator. Even though the claim that all objects and phenomena in the world are indissolubly interconnected is a false claim—because there are things in nature connected to certain things but unconnected to others, and phenomena connected to certain phenomena and objects but unconnected to others—the fact that everything is contingent is an absolute certainty. Establishing the attribute of contingency for it is sufficient to prove that it is not eternal, and therefore, it is created by a Creator.

Third: What has been stated regarding the finitude of the universe and its eternality—that is, the assertion that the universe is finite and not eternal—is not based upon definitions, nor is it a linguistic inquiry or a lexical exposition of the word. Rather, it is an elucidation of a tangible reality. Finitude and eternality are not mere technical terms for which a conventional definition has been coined, nor are they merely the semantic signification of a word assigned in language to denote them; rather, they represent a specific reality, exactly akin to the

inquiry into thought itself. When we assert that the universe is finite, we are simply referring to a specific reality: the fact that it possesses a beginning and an end. The inquiry, therefore, concerns this reality, not the word “finite.” Furthermore, the fact that it possesses a beginning and an end has been established by tangible evidence; thus, the evidence addresses a specific reality, not the linguistic meaning of the word. In other words, when it is stated that the universe is an aggregate of celestial bodies, regardless of their multiplicity—meaning the universe is composed of these bodies, and each of these bodies, no matter how numerous, is finite, and an aggregate of finite entities is self-evidently finite, rendering the universe finite—when this is stated, the evidence is not constructed upon the word “finite.” Instead, the evidence is constructed upon the fact that the universe has a beginning and an end, commencing from a point and concluding at a point. It is this very reality upon which the evidence is established. This reality—whether denoted by the word “finite” in Arabic, or by equivalent terms in English, French, Russian, or German—remains the reality upon which the evidence is established. Therefore, affirming the finitude of the universe and establishing the evidence for it is neither based upon definitions, nor is it a linguistic inquiry, nor a lexical exposition of the word; rather, it is the elucidation of a reality and the establishment of evidence concerning a reality. Similarly, the assertion that the universe is not eternal, and that perceptible, tangible objects are not eternal, is not based upon definitions, nor is it a linguistic inquiry or a lexical exposition of the word; rather, it is the elucidation of a reality and the establishment of evidence concerning a reality. Likewise, the assertion that a certain entity is “eternal” is not an exposition of the word “eternal” as a mere lexical term, but rather the elucidation of a reality and the establishment of evidence concerning a reality; it is the elucidation of that which has no beginning—that is, that which has no starting point. This reality is the Eternal. The inquiry is strictly concerned with this reality,

and the evidence is founded entirely upon this reality, whether it is denoted by the word “eternal” in Arabic or by equivalent terms in English, French, Russian, or German. The discourse is not concerned with the linguistic signification of the word, but rather with a specific reality that does not alter regardless of the varying expressions applied to it across languages. Thus, when it is stated that the finite is not eternal because it has a beginning, and the eternal has no beginning because the definition of the eternal is that it has no beginning—when this is stated, it is not said to explain the linguistic signification of the word so as to serve as a definition, a linguistic inquiry, or a lexical exposition. Rather, it is stated to elucidate a specific reality: the entity that has no beginning. The reality of the finite is that it has a beginning and an end, while the reality of the eternal is that which has no beginning; thus, the reality of the finite is distinct from the reality of the eternal. This is precisely the meaning of our statement that the finite is not eternal; the discourse, therefore, pertains to a specific reality, not to the linguistic signification of the word.

These are the three matters that must be brought to attention when studying the rational evidence for the existence of the Creator—that is, the existence of Allah. Attention is drawn to these three matters because the fact that the universe, man, and life are finite and not eternal is an absolute certainty, and the evidence for it is an irrefutable evidence that leaves no room for rebuttal. Thus, some might resort to claiming that this is merely a linguistic inquiry into the signification of words, and therefore cannot serve as a valid evidence for the existence of the Creator. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify that it is an inquiry into a reality, proving that the universe, man, and life possess this reality—namely, that they have a beginning and an end, and that they do not belong to that which has no beginning; hence, they are created by a Creator. Furthermore, because the fact that perceptible, tangible objects are contingent is likewise

an absolute certainty, and the evidence for it is an irrefutable evidence that leaves no room for rebuttal, some might resort to claiming that their contingency is indeed true—and that communists concede this when they assert Conditionality—but that they are merely contingent upon one another, and thus, their mutual contingency cannot serve as a valid evidence for the existence of the Creator. Hence, it is necessary to clarify that the Conditionality asserted by the communists is distinct from contingency. This is evidenced by their statement that the world evolves according to the laws of the movement of matter and is in no need of any Universal Mind; thus, despite their assertion of Conditionality, they deny that the world is contingent. Therefore, the Conditionality they assert is not contingency, yet asserting it logically necessitates asserting contingency. The mere assertion of contingency is an acknowledgment that it is created, because being contingent means it is not eternal, and thus it is created. Moreover, their claim that the world evolves according to the laws of the movement of matter signifies that it is contingent upon these laws. These laws did not originate from matter itself, because matter is subjugated to these laws, cannot deviate from them, and is utterly incapable of altering them. Rather, they are unequivocally imposed upon it, and it possesses no power to deviate from or alter them; thus, they are imposed by another. Consequently, matter requires an agent to establish these laws for it, meaning it is contingent upon another. It is contingent, and being contingent upon another, it is created. This constitutes an acknowledgment that the world is created; meaning, the doctrine of Conditionality inevitably necessitates the acknowledgment that the world is created by a Creator. Additionally, since the fact that the world is contingent and incapable of bringing into existence that which it needs is an absolute certainty, and its evidence is irrefutable leaving no room for rebuttal, some might resort to arguing that the world being created does not necessarily mean there is a Creator. They might argue that the premise that all of existence does not

extend beyond a Creator and a created being is merely a theoretical hypothesis, and thus cannot serve as a valid evidence for the existence of the Creator. Therefore, it was necessary to clarify that the fact that existence does not extend beyond a Creator and a created being is not a hypothesis, but rather an absolute truth. This is because the evidence established that the world is created by a Creator, meaning it established the existence of a Creator for these creations. Thus, the evidence served as a demonstration that existence does not extend beyond a Creator and a created being. For all these reasons, attention must be drawn to these three matters.

Furthermore, the existence of the Creator is a palpable, tangible reality that can be directly pinpointed. Thus, the existence of the Creator is identified through sensation, and the apprehension of it is a direct sensory apprehension rather than an apprehension derived from logical propositions. Rather, the sensation of this existence of the Creator is what yields this apprehension, just like the apprehension of any tangible object. This does not mean that the Creator Himself is sensible and tangible; rather, it is the *existence* of this Creator that is sensible and tangible. The rational evidence for this is profoundly simple, even if it is also profoundly complex. As for its profound simplicity, man lives in the universe, and he observes within himself, in the life lived by living beings, and in everything within the universe, a perpetual change and transition from one state to another. He observes the coming into existence of things and the annihilation of things, and he observes precision and organization in everything he sees and touches. From this, through sensory apprehension, he arrives at the conclusion that there is an Originator for this perceptible, tangible existence. This is an exceedingly natural matter. For instance, a person hears a loud noise, and he assumes it is the noise of an airplane, a car, a mill, or anything else, but he is certain that it is a noise resulting from something; thus, he becomes certain of the

existence of something from which this noise emanated. Therefore, the existence of the thing that produced the noise becomes an absolute certainty for the one who heard it. Tangible evidence has established its existence, and it is a profoundly simple evidence. Consequently, the belief in the existence of something that produced the noise is a resolute belief established by conclusive evidence. This belief is entirely natural as long as tangible evidence has established it. Similarly, man observes the change in things, observes the annihilation of some and the emergence of others, and observes the precision and organization within them. He observes that all of this does not emanate from the things themselves, and that they are completely incapable of bringing it into existence or repelling it. Thus, he becomes certain that all of this originates from something other than these things, and he becomes certain of the existence of a Creator who created these things, who changes them, annihilates them, and organizes them. Consequently, the existence of this Creator—indicated by the existence of things, their change, and their organization—is an absolute certainty for the one who observes their change, existence, annihilation, and precise organization. Tangible evidence, through direct sensation, has established His existence, and it is a profoundly simple evidence. Therefore, the belief in the existence of a Creator for these created things—which are annihilated and changed, possessing no power to bring this upon themselves nor to repel it from themselves—is a resolute belief established by conclusive evidence. For this reason, it is natural that whoever observes perceptible, tangible objects, and what occurs to them and within them which they can neither initiate nor repel, arrives through sensory apprehension at the conclusion that there is an Originator for this perceptible, tangible existence. This is a universal phenomenon encompassing all of humanity, with absolutely no exceptions. Therefore, the acknowledgment of the Creator's existence has been universal among all human beings across all epochs. The disagreement among them merely

concerned the multiplicity of deities versus monotheism, but they are absolutely unanimous on the existence of the Creator. This is because the slightest application of the intellect to the existing entities it senses reveals that they are created by a Creator and that there is indeed a Creator. Hence, the evidence is profoundly simple, as it merely draws attention to the existing entities that fall under sensation. Merely contemplating them, and observing that they undergo conditions they can neither bring upon themselves nor repel, leads to the conclusion that they are created by a Creator and that there is a Creator who created them. Therefore, the majority of the Quranic evidences draw attention to that which falls under human sensation to use as evidence for the existence of the Creator,

﴿أَفَلَا يَنظُرُونَ إِلَى ٱلْإِبِلِ كَيْفَ خُلِقَتْ ۝١٧ وَإِلَى ٱلسَّمَآءِ كَيْفَ رُفِعَتْ ۝١٨ وَإِلَى ٱلْجِبَالِ كَيْفَ نُصِبَتْ ۝١٩﴾

"Will they not regard the camels, how they are created? And the heaven, how it is raised? And the hills, how they are set up?" [TMQ Surah Al-Ghashiyah 88:17-19],

﴿فَلْيَنظُرِ ٱلْإِنسَٰنُ مِمَّ خُلِقَ ۝٥ خُلِقَ مِن مَّآءٍ دَافِقٍ ۝٦ يَخْرُجُ مِنۢ بَيْنِ ٱلصُّلْبِ وَٱلتَّرَآئِبِ﴾

"So let man consider from what he is created. He is created from a gushing fluid. That issued from between the loins and ribs" [TMQ Surah At-Tariq 86:5-7]**,**

﴿أَفَرَءَيْتُم مَّا تُمْنُونَ ۝٥٨ ءَأَنتُمْ تَخْلُقُونَهُۥٓ أَمْ نَحْنُ ٱلْخَٰلِقُونَ ۝٥٩﴾

"Have you seen that which you emit? Do you create it or are We the Creator?" [TMQ Surah Al-Waqi'ah 56:58-59]**,**

﴿أَفَرَءَيْتُم مَّا تَحْرُثُونَ ۝٦٣ ءَأَنتُمْ تَزْرَعُونَهُۥٓ أَمْ نَحْنُ ٱلزَّٰرِعُونَ ۝٦٤﴾

"Have you seen that which you cultivate? Is it you who make it grow, or do We make it grow?" [TMQ Surah Al-Waqi'ah 56:63-64],

﴿أَفَرَءَيْتُمُ ٱلنَّارَ ٱلَّتِى تُورُونَ ۝ ءَأَنتُمْ أَنشَأْتُمْ شَجَرَتَهَآ أَمْ نَحْنُ ٱلْمُنشِـُٔونَ﴾

"Have you observed the fire which you strike out; Was it you who made the tree thereof to grow, or were We the grower?" [TMQ Surah Al-Waqi'ah 56:71-72]**,**

﴿إِنَّ فِى خَلْقِ ٱلسَّمَـٰوَٰتِ وَٱلْأَرْضِ وَٱخْتِلَـٰفِ ٱلَّيْلِ وَٱلنَّهَارِ لَـَٔايَـٰتٍ لِّأُو۟لِى ٱلْأَلْبَـٰبِ﴾

"Lo! In the creation of the heavens and the earth and (in) the difference of night and day are tokens (of His Sovereignty) for men of understanding" [TMQ Surah Aal-i Imran 3:190],

﴿إِنَّ فِى خَلْقِ ٱلسَّمَـٰوَٰتِ وَٱلْأَرْضِ وَٱخْتِلَـٰفِ ٱلَّيْلِ وَٱلنَّهَارِ وَٱلْفُلْكِ ٱلَّتِى تَجْرِى فِى ٱلْبَحْرِ بِمَا يَنفَعُ ٱلنَّاسَ وَمَآ أَنزَلَ ٱللَّهُ مِنَ ٱلسَّمَآءِ مِن مَّآءٍ فَأَحْيَا بِهِ ٱلْأَرْضَ بَعْدَ مَوْتِهَا وَبَثَّ فِيهَا مِن كُلِّ دَآبَّةٍ وَتَصْرِيفِ ٱلرِّيَـٰحِ وَٱلسَّحَابِ ٱلْمُسَخَّرِ بَيْنَ ٱلسَّمَآءِ وَٱلْأَرْضِ لَـَٔايَـٰتٍ لِّقَوْمٍ يَعْقِلُونَ﴾

"Lo! In the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the difference of night and day, and the ships which run upon the sea with that which is of use to men, and the water which Allah sends down from the sky, thereby reviving the earth after its death, and dispersing all kinds of beasts therein, and in the ordinance of the winds, and the clouds obedient between heaven and earth: are signs (of Allah's Sovereignty) for people who have sense" [TMQ Surah Al-Baqarah 2:164]**.** These are definitive evidences of the existence of the Creator. Let man consider how the camels are created, how the heaven is raised, and how the mountains are set up, and he will apprehend the existence of Allah ﷻ. Therefore, when Gherman Titov, the Russian cosmonaut, undertook his space flight around the Earth, he stated that he saw the Earth suspended in space, held by absolutely nothing—neither from above, nor from below, nor from its sides. It was simply suspended by itself in space with nothing holding it, and he recalled what religions say. That is, he deduced from this observation that it is impossible for the Earth to be suspended in

space in such a manner, held by nothing, while he orbited it and found nothing holding it, yet it remained suspended and did not fall; he deduced from this that there must be something holding it and preventing it from falling. This is a tangible evidence observed by Titov regarding the Earth, and it is the most truthful of evidences, despite its profound simplicity. Similarly, this includes the questioning of man regarding his creation from a gushing fluid; and the questioning of people regarding that which they emit, that which they cultivate, and the fire which they kindle: Did they create the children from that which they emit? Or the crops from that which they cultivate? Or the trees which they kindle? Their definitive answer—as they are absolutely certain that they are not the originators—is that there is a Creator other than themselves who created them. Furthermore, from this tangible evidence, the intellects' attention is drawn to the creation of the heavens and the earth, the alternation of night and day, the ships that sail the sea, the rain, the beasts scattered across the earth, the circulation of the winds, and the clouds, so that these intellects may apprehend from these perceptible entities that there is a Creator. All of these are definitive evidences of the existence of the Creator; they are irrefutable evidences, profoundly simple, apprehended by all people, conceded by all people, and to which no one can find a rebuttal. Thus, through these evidences, the existence of the Creator is palpable and tangible, capable of being directly pinpointed, and they are evidences of profound simplicity.

As for the evidence of the Creator's existence being profoundly complex, this is because there are some individuals among humanity who reject simplicity and complicate matters for themselves. They investigate this simple matter in a convoluted manner, thereby arriving at novel concepts that further entangle them, and consequently, they require evidences for these novel concepts they have reached. For instance, some people in antiquity observed through sensation and observation

that the world is mutable—a fact no one can deny. This signifies that the world is originated, because everything mutable is originated; and since it is originated, it is created, meaning it came into existence after not having existed. However, they perceived that its mutation solely occurred within the parts composing it, whereas as a whole, they perceived it to remain unchanged. The planets remain planets, unchanged; life in living beings remains life, unchanged; and man remains man, unchanged. From this, they concluded that the world is not originated, but rather ancient and eternal, having no beginning; therefore, it is not created by a Creator. Similarly, some people in the modern era observed that the phenomena of the world are manifold—as tangibly witnessed—transitioning from one state to another. This transition from state to state and their constant motion is not an intrinsic product of their own making, for independently and individually, they are incapable of this and possess no power to repel it. The natural course would have been for them to deduce from this the existence of a power that transitions them from state to state and sets them in motion; that is, to deduce the existence of a Creator for the world. Instead, they arrived at the exact opposite conclusion. They asserted that the world is inherently material, that the manifold phenomena of the world are merely diverse manifestations of matter in motion, and that the reciprocal relations among phenomena and their mutual conditioning are necessary laws for the evolution of matter in motion. They asserted that the world evolves in accordance with the laws of the movement of matter, and from this, they concluded that the world has no need for a Universal Mind; thus, it has no need for a Creator to create it, as it is self-sufficient. This demonstrates that in both ancient and modern times, the denial of the Creator's existence did not arise naturally. Rather, it arose in contradiction to the natural order, by providing a fallacious interpretation of that which inherently necessitates the acknowledgment of the Creator’s existence—an interpretation that ultimately leads to its denial. Regarding the

ancients, we find that the mutability of the world is an undeniable fact, and this change is not merely in its parts, but also in it as a whole. However, change does not mean its fundamental reality has altered; rather, its condition is in a state of perpetual change. An orange, a cultivated plant, a stone, iron, man, an animal, and so forth, transition from one state to another by direct observation. Yet, their change does not mean the orange becomes a stone, the stone becomes iron, or the iron becomes a cultivated plant, and so on. Instead, the change occurs in attributes and conditions. As for its alteration into a completely different entity, that is transmutation, and transmutation is not the evidence; the evidence is the existence of change itself. Based on this, it is incorrect to claim that the world as a whole has not changed; it is incorrect to claim that the planets remain exactly as they were, unchanged; it is incorrect to claim that man remains exactly as he was, unchanged; and it is incorrect to claim that life remains exactly as it was, unchanged. The world in its entirety, with all that it contains of the universe, man, and life, is changing. The planets are mutable by observation, and their mere motion is a change; man is mutable by observation, and his transition from an infant to a youth, then to an old man, is a change; life is mutable by observation, and its manifestation in man, animal, plant, and tree is evidence of the existence of change within it, so it is definitively mutable. This entirely refutes their assertion that the world is not originated. Because it is mutable both as a whole and in its parts, it is perpetually changing. Every mutable entity is originated; therefore, the world is originated, and thus it is not eternal. Since it is not eternal, it is created by a Creator, because that which is not eternal is created.

Moreover, the fact that the world is not eternal is sufficiently evidenced by what is observed within it: spring, summer, winter, and autumn; the gathering of clouds and the clearing of skies; lightning, thunder, violent gales, and gentle

breezes; life and death; the transition of a seed into a crop and then into dry chaff, a seedling into a tree and then into wood and firewood, and water into steam or ice; the transition of a sperm-drop into a fetus, then an infant, a youth, and finally a decrepit old man; and an egg into a chick, then a chicken, and then into food consumed by people, among other phenomena occurring in the world as a whole and in every single one of its parts. This alone is sufficient to rationally prove that the world is originated (contingent) in its totality, and originated in every single one of its parts. Its being originated means it is not eternal—i.e., it has a beginning from which it commenced—which means it is created by a Creator. Its having a beginning means it was non-existent and then came into being, and its coming into being *ex nihilo*– out of nothing- strictly necessitates that it has an Originator who brought it into existence. This is sufficient to prove the existence of the Creator, because the existence of a creation definitively implies the existence of the Creator. Thereby, the doctrine held by some in antiquity—that the world is ancient and eternal—is refuted, and it is evidenced that the world is created by a Creator, thus proving the existence of the Creator, Allah ﷻ.

As for what was asserted by some in the modern era—namely, the communists—we find that the crux of their denial lies in their assertion that the reciprocal relations among phenomena, and their mutual conditioning, are necessary laws for the evolution of matter in motion, and that the world evolves in accordance with the laws of the movement of matter. This is the precise locus of their denial of the Creator's existence. The complexity arose for them from interpreting the change and transition of states within the world, the coming into existence of certain things after they were non-existent, and the annihilation of certain things after they existed—or, in their terminology, the shaping of matter into diverse forms—by attributing this strictly to the laws of matter and nothing else.

They claim that the laws of the movement of matter are what influence the world, and that it evolves according to the laws of the movement of matter. This is the crux of their denial. Therefore, the task is to untangle this knot (complex); meaning, the locus of inquiry must be the laws of matter, not the mutability of the world. If it is evidenced that these laws neither originated from matter nor constitute its inherent properties, but are unequivocally imposed upon matter by an external agent, then it follows that an entity other than matter is what influences it. Consequently, their theory is invalidated and their knot untangled, because the world is not evolving in accordance with the laws of the movement of matter, but is being directed by the One who established these laws for it, unequivocally imposed them upon it, and compelled it to proceed according to them. Thus, the theory is refuted, and the knot is untangled.

Regarding the fact that these laws did not originate from matter, this is because the laws consist of subjecting matter to a specific proportion or a specific condition. For water to transform into steam or ice, it transforms solely according to specific laws—that is, according to a specific proportion of heat. The heat of the water initially has no effect on its state *qua* liquid; however, if the heat of the water is increased or decreased, a moment arrives wherein its cohesive state is altered, and the water transforms into steam in one instance and into ice in the other. This specific proportion of heat is the law according to which the transformation of water into steam or ice occurs. This proportion—namely, the fact that heat must be of a specific magnitude relative to a specific magnitude of water—did not originate from the water, for had it originated from it, the water would be capable of altering it and deviating from it. Yet, the reality is that it can neither alter it nor deviate from it; rather, it is unequivocally imposed upon it, which definitively evidences that it does not originate from it. Likewise, it did not originate from the heat, evidenced by the fact that the heat

cannot alter this proportion or deviate from it, and that it is unequivocally imposed upon it; thus, it definitively does not originate from the heat. Therefore, these laws do not originate from matter.

Regarding the fact that these laws are not an inherent property among the properties of matter, this is because the laws are not effects generated by matter such that they could be considered its properties; rather, they are something imposed upon it from the outside. In the transformation of water, the laws governing it are neither properties of water nor properties of heat, because the law is not merely the transformation of water into steam or ice, but rather its transformation at a specific proportion of heat relative to a specific proportion of water. The focal point is not the transformation itself, but the transformation at a specific proportion of heat to a specific proportion of water. Thus, it is not akin to vision in the eye, which is one of its properties; rather, it is the fact that vision only occurs under a specific condition. This is the law: while the eye's ability to see is one of its inherent properties, the fact that it can only see under a specific condition is not an inherent property, but an external mandate. Similarly, burning is an inherent property of fire, but the fact that it only burns under specific conditions is not one of its properties, but an external mandate. The inherent property of a thing is distinct from the laws that direct it, since the inherent property is that which the thing itself provides and which results from it, such as vision in the eye, burning in fire, and so forth. However, the laws that direct things dictate that vision does not occur from the eye except under specific conditions, that burning does not occur from fire except under specific conditions, and that water does not transform into steam or ice except under specific conditions, and so on. Thereby, it is evidenced that the laws of matter are not an inherent property of matter, but an external mandate.

Since it has been evidenced that these laws neither originate from matter nor constitute an inherent property of it, they must originate from another, being unequivocally imposed upon it from an external agent. Thus, it is evidenced that an entity other than matter is what influences it. Consequently, the communist theory is invalidated, as it has been evidenced that the world is not evolving in accordance with the laws of the movement of matter, but rather it is directed by the One who established these laws and unequivocally imposed them upon it. Therefore, the world is in need of the One who instituted these laws for it and imposed them upon it. As long as it is in need of the One who imposed these laws upon it, it—meaning the world—is not eternal. Since it is not eternal, it is created. For its not being eternal means that it came into existence after having not existed; thus, it is created by a Creator, and the mere validation of the existence of creations belonging to a Creator evidences the existence of the Creator.

These are the rational evidences for the existence of the Creator, serving to establish His existence for those who have complicated matters for themselves, thereby complicating their worldview. They are irrefutable evidences, sufficient to dismantle their theory. Establishing that matter possesses no power to proceed except in accordance with these laws, and possesses no power to alter them or deviate from them, is compelling evidence that an entity other than matter has unequivocally imposed these laws upon it. Thus, matter is contingent upon another; it is created and not eternal. Thereby, the foundation of Dialectical Materialism—which is the fundamental creed—is invalidated, and what remains is the discourse regarding the dialectical method in terms of the aspects it adopts.

3

The Marxist dialectical method adopts two aspects of inquiry: the first is the inquiry into thought, and the second is the inquiry into nature. Regarding thought, it posits that thought is the reflection of reality upon the brain; meaning, the core issue is one of reality, not of thought. Reality exists first, and its existence is what brings thought into being; reality reflects upon the brain, and this reflection constitutes thought. Marx states: "My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but its direct opposite. To Hegel…the process of thinking which, under the name of 'the idea' he even transforms into an independent subject is the demiurges (creator) of the world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the idea', with me, on the contrary, 'the ideal' is nothing else that the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." Based on this, Hegel believes that the Idea precedes reality. However, Marx believes that reality precedes the Idea, and that the Idea is the reflection of reality upon the brain. Communist literature states: Marxist philosophical materialism rests upon another principle, which is that matter, nature, and being are an objective reality existing outside consciousness and independently of it, and that matter is the primary element because it is the source of sensations, conceptions, and consciousness. Consciousness, conversely, is a secondary, derivative element, because it is the reflection of matter, the reflection of being. Thought is the product of matter when it reaches a high degree of perfection in its evolution; or, more precisely, thought is the product of the brain, and the brain is the organ of thinking. Consequently, one cannot separate thought from matter without falling into grave error. For the communists, matter is the origin of sensation, the origin of conceptions, and the origin of thought; it is the source of these three phenomena, and thought is the reflection of matter upon the brain. They explicitly declare that thought is the product of

matter, yet they explain how this production occurs, namely, as the reflection of matter.

Engels states: “The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being... The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other... comprised the camp of **idealism**. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of **materialism**...” He later states: “The material, sensuously perceptible world to which we ourselves belong is the only reality. Our consciousness and thinking, however supra-sensuous they may seem, are merely the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter.”

This statement likewise indicates that matter is the origin and thought is its product. Lenin states: “Materialism in general recognizes objectively real being (matter) as independent of consciousness, sensation, experience. Consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best an approximately true reflection”—meaning a complete reflection reaching the highest degrees of precision. He subsequently states: “Matter is that which produces sensation by acting upon our sense organs. Matter is the objective reality given to us in sensation. Matter, nature, being, the physical is primary, while spirit, consciousness, sensation, the psychical is secondary.” He then adds: “The brain is the organ of thought.” All of these statements establish that reality—comprising matter, nature, being, and the physical entity—is the origin, and that from this reality arose intellect and consciousness, sensations, and the psychological entity. Although he did not explicitly detail how it arose from it, the context dictates that it is the reflection of reality upon the brain that produced them, and that the brain is merely the organ upon

which the reflection occurs, resulting in intellect, thought, sensation, and the psychological entity. It is understood from these statements that sensations are the result of the reflection of matter, rather than an inherent component of human composition. Reality, therefore, is the origin, and consciousness and sensations are products thereof.

4

This constitutes the first aspect of the dialectical method, which is the inquiry into thought. It asserts: “The movement of thought is nothing but the reflection of real movement, translated to the human brain and established therein.” Furthermore, “Consciousness is only the reflection of being.” Therefore, thought, in the view of dialectical materialism, is the reflection of reality upon the brain; thus, matter precedes thought. Consequently, when matter reflects upon the brain, thought is brought into existence by this reflection, and it subsequently thinks about the matter that reflected upon it; however, prior to the reflection of matter upon the brain, thought does not exist. Accordingly, “everything is founded upon matter. Matter, nature, being, and the physical entity are the primary element, while intellect, consciousness, sensations, and the psychological entity are the secondary element.” This definition of the intellect—as being the reflection of matter upon the brain—is erroneous from two standpoints:

First: No such reflection exists between matter and the brain; the brain does not project a reflection upon matter, nor does matter reflect upon the brain. Reflection, by definition, is the rebounding of a reflected substance from the surface it has struck. In the case of light, for instance, reflection is the backward rebounding of luminous rays. When sunlight strikes a wall, it collides and rebounds; this very rebounding constitutes

reflection. Similarly, when light reaches a mirror and rebounds, this is reflection. Thus, reflection is the rebounding of matter or energy from a physical body. Such a phenomenon is entirely absent in both the brain and material reality. The brain does not collide with reality and rebound from it, nor does reality collide with the brain and rebound. Consequently, there is absolutely no reflection between matter and the brain. It follows that thought is not the reflection of matter upon the brain, for reflection between the two is non-existent, impossible, and inconceivable. No reflection from material reality upon the brain can occur under any circumstances. When matter is perceived, it is not reflected upon the brain; rather, it is transmitted to it via the senses. The sensation of matter is conveyed to the brain through the sensory apparatus, thereby producing a perception. The transmission of this sensation is neither a reflection of matter upon the brain nor a reflection of the brain upon matter; it is, strictly speaking, a sensory perception of matter. In this regard, there is no distinction between the eye and the other senses. Sensation arises from touch, smell, taste, and hearing just as it does from sight. Therefore, what actually transpires is a sensory perception of objects, not a reflection of objects upon the brain. Man perceives objects through his five senses; objects do not reflect upon his brain.

Furthermore, the visual process within the eye is likewise not a matter of reflection but rather one of refraction. Light refracts within the eye, and the image of matter settles upon the retina without rebounding outward. Thus, what occurs is refraction, not reflection, and a fundamental distinction exists between the two. Reflection is the outward rebounding of an image, whereas refraction is the internal stabilization of an image. The image appearing in a mirror is the result of a reflective process; it appears only when light is reflected upon it, allowing the image to stabilize, and in the absence of light, it vanishes. Reflection in this process pertains to light striking a

body through which light cannot penetrate; hence, the image does not appear unless light is reflected. The condition in this instance is a reflection of light, not of the image itself, for the image remains stabilized. Consequently, when the image of a person or an object appears in another's eye, it appears due to the reflection of light, which is why it is absent in darkness. This, too, is not a reflection of the person or the object, but a reflection of light. Moreover, this reflection does not, in itself, constitute vision. From this, it becomes evident that the image appearing in a mirror or in another person's eye is a reflective process, not a refractive one. Reflection in this operation is the action of light upon an opaque body, not the reflection of the image. Vision, however, is not of this nature; it is not reflection. Rather, the light emanating from matter refracts within the eye, producing its image upon the retina, and from this refraction, vision occurs. Accordingly, the transmission of reality to the brain via the sense of sight is not reflection but refraction. For all these reasons, the concept of reflection, as such, is non-existent in the cognitive process and is impossible to realize. Thus, the dialectical definition of thought is erroneous and contrary to reality.

Second: Sensation alone does not give rise to thought; rather, what occurs is merely sensation—that is, the sensory perception of reality and nothing more. Sensation upon sensation, even a millionfold, regardless of the diversity of sensory types, yields only sensation and never results in thought. For thought to occur, there must be a presence of previous information within the human mind, by which the perceived reality is interpreted. Let us consider contemporary man—any individual—and provide him with a book written in Syriac. If he possesses no prior information regarding the Syriac language, and we direct his senses toward the text through sight and touch, repeating this sensory encounter a million times, he will remain unable to recognize a single word until he is provided with

information concerning Syriac and its related concepts. Only then can he begin to think about it and comprehend it. Similarly, let us take a child who possesses the capacity for sensation but lacks any prior information. If we place before him a piece of gold, a piece of copper, and a stone, and engage all his senses in perceiving these objects, he will be unable to comprehend them regardless of how often these sensations are repeated or varied. However, if he is provided with information about them and then perceives them, he utilizes that information to achieve comprehension. Should this child grow to the age of twenty without acquiring any information, he would remain as he was on his first day—merely sensing objects without comprehending them, regardless of the growth of his brain. This is because the faculty of comprehension is not the brain alone, but rather the synthesis of previous information with the brain and the perceived reality. Likewise, students in a laboratory cannot generate thought regarding the materials before them—even if they perceive them through every sensory mode millions of times—unless they are provided with information concerning them. Thus, it is absolutely impossible for thought to exist merely through the sensation of reality; there must be information about that reality through which it is interpreted, thereby producing thought. Previous information is an indispensable requirement for the generation of thought or comprehension alongside the sensation of reality, and without it, thought does not exist whatsoever.

This pertains to intellectual perception; as for sensory perception, it emanates from instincts and organic needs. That which occurs in animals by way of sensory perception or instinctual discernment occurs in man as well. Thus, through the repeated presentation of an apple and a stone, he recognizes that the apple is edible and the stone is not, just as a donkey recognizes that barley is edible and soil is not. However, this discernment constitutes neither thought nor intellectual

perception; rather, it is a reflexive response of the instincts and organic needs, present in animals just as it is in man. Consequently, thought cannot possibly occur unless previous information exists alongside the transmission of reality to the brain via the senses. Accordingly, the mind—or thought, or perception—is the transmission of reality to the brain via the senses, coupled with the presence of previous information through which that reality is interpreted.

It is contended that primitive man encountered material objects which then reflected upon him; thus, through sensory perception, he came to recognize which fruits were edible and which were not. He supposedly learned to identify and avoid perilous beasts while taming and riding others. Through sensation and experience, he discovered that wood floats on water and subsequently utilized it to cross rivers. He realized that sleeping in caves provided protection from rain and cold, and thus sought such shelter. In this manner, it is argued, primitive man arrived at issuing judgments upon things and acting according to these judgments—that is, according to this "thought." This is cited as evidence that thought is merely the transmission of reality to the brain via the senses, without the necessity of prior information. The rebuttal to this assertion is that the actual state of primitive man remains unknown and absent from direct observation. What we seek to understand is the nature of thought and the cognitive process as it occurs in contemporary man. Therefore, the known should not be measured against the unknown, nor the present against the absent. Instead, the inverse is true: the unknown must be measured against the known, and the absent against the present. It is logically fallacious to measure the contemporary man before us—who is known—against the primitive man who is absent and unknown, in an attempt to derive the meaning of thought. Instead, we must measure primitive man against contemporary man; by understanding the nature of thought and

perception in the latter, we may deduce their nature in the former. Consequently, citing this argument is false.

Furthermore, the historical narratives concerning primitive man—or what is termed “Stone Age Man”—describe him as a being who searched for sustenance, utilizing stone tools to gather forest fruits, hunt fish, construct dwellings, and repel predatory animals. Even if these accounts are accurate, they pertain to the satisfaction of instincts rather than the exercise of thought; that is, they relate to sensory perception rather than intellectual perception. Regarding that which pertains to the instincts, sensory perception arises from mere sensation and the repetition and variation of that sensation. Through repeated and varied sensory encounters, a being learns which fruits are edible and how to obtain them, identifies harmful animals and the means to repel them, and recognizes the discomfort of rain and cold and the methods of seeking refuge in caves or constructed shelters. All of this is achieved through sensation and its repetition, a process that occurs in animals just as it does in humans. The anecdote of the monkey and the bunch of bananas is well known: a bunch of bananas was suspended from the ceiling of a room, and a chair and a stick were placed inside before the monkey was introduced. The monkey observed the bananas and attempted to reach them but failed. It began to pace the room, encountered the chair, brought it over, and climbed upon it, yet still could not reach the bananas. It continued to pace until it found the stick and attempted to use it, again failing. Finally, it climbed the chair with the stick in hand, struck the bananas so that pieces fell to the ground, descended, and ate them. Thus, it utilized the chair and the stick to obtain the bananas. This action by the monkey does not constitute thought; rather, it is sensory perception related to the instincts and their satisfaction. For such an act, the sensation of reality and the repetition and variation of that sensation are sufficient. A similar instance is the famous observation of rats stealing eggs. When

rats attempt to steal eggs that are within reach, one rat lies on its back while another rolls an egg onto its belly. The first rat grips the egg with its limbs, and the second rat pulls the first by its tail to their burrow, where they deposit the egg before returning together for more. This, too, though a complex rather than a simple process, actually occurs and is not thought; it is sensory perception related to the instincts. The descriptions of primitive man are of this nature; what is reported of him falls under the category of sensory perception, not thought. Moreover, the definition of thought must be based on certainty (*yaqin*), not conjecture (*zann*), because it serves as the foundation for everything and upon it all conduct toward events and objects is built. Therefore, its evidence must be certain, not speculative or based on guesswork. What has been reported concerning primitive man is found in history, which is conjectural and lacks certainty; thus, it cannot serve as evidence for the definition of a matter requiring certainty. It is unacceptable to derive the most significant human faculty—the meaning of the intellect, thought, and perception—from historical narratives. Everyone is aware of the degree of reliability afforded to history or to the inferences drawn from archaeological remains regarding the "thought" of primitive man, upon which a definition of contemporary thought is then constructed. No rational person can accept that the foundation of the most vital of all human matters should be historical reports or archaeological traces. Rather, contemporary man—the man we can sense and observe—must be the subject of inquiry. From the study of contemporary man, we derive the meaning of thought. We observe the signs and effects that appear in him as a result of being placed in various circumstances and conditions, and we extract the permanent results that never fail. Once these results reach the level of certainty, we may then formulate the definition of the mind, thought, or perception. In this manner, we arrive at the definitive truth.

It might be posited that an individual may observe a person without engaging in conversation or possessing any prior information about them, and then, after an absence of several years, recognize them instantly upon a subsequent encounter. In such an instance, it is argued, the individual has retrieved the sensation, and through this retrieval, issued a judgment that this person is the same one seen years prior. The rebuttal to this is that the sensation of an object occurs within the brain, leaving an impression therein; thus, when the object is presented again through the same sensory mode, the individual retrieves the initial sensation, recognizes the object as identical, and acts accordingly based on this retrieval. Consider, for example, a child presented with a lamp whose glass is intensely hot; should the child touch it and burn his hand, and then, after a period, the lamp is brought near him again with a request to touch it, he will refuse. He does so because he retrieves his sensory experience of the glass, finds it to be burning, and consequently declines to touch it. Similarly, when you encounter a person you have seen before, you retrieve your initial sensation and thus recognize them. This recognition does not constitute thought. Instead, it is merely the retrieval of sensation. For this reason, if you were to recognize someone by sight but had never heard their voice, you would not recognize them if they spoke; nor would you recognize them through touch if you could not see them. You only recognize them through the specific sense by which the original sensation was captured, as retrieval is not of the “man” in an abstract sense, but of the specific sensation that occurred in relation to him. As for your conduct toward him—if it pertains to instincts such as fear, sustenance, or defense—it occurs based on the retrieval of this sensation, just as it occurred with the child and the hot lamp. However, in matters unrelated to the instincts, nothing occurs, because regarding instinctual matters, no thought has taken place; there has only been a retrieval of sensation. Thus, sensation, its repetition, and its retrieval do not constitute thought; they constitute sensation and nothing more.

The knowledge that arises is merely identification through sensation, and the resulting conduct is instinctual. All of this falls outside the realm of thought and is categorized as mere sensation or sensory perception.

Furthermore, it might be contended that an individual could be presented with a complex apparatus about which he possesses no prior specific information, and be tasked with its disassembly and reassembly. Should the individual, through various trials and experiments, succeed in disassembling and then reassembling it, it would seem he has arrived at a thought without the need for prior information. The response to this is that such an individual already possesses a vast array of diverse information. Through his multiple experiments, he begins to link the information he already holds with the reality before him, and correlates different pieces of information with one another until he succeeds in generating the information necessary to interpret the disassembly and reassembly of the machine. It is through this synthesized information that he arrives at thought. Therefore, this does not serve as a valid counter-example, for the individual in question already possesses information. The true example would be a child who possesses no information whatsoever, or a man who lacks any information that could assist him in generating the knowledge required to interpret reality—such as bringing a desert nomad into a laboratory and leaving him to experiment, or placing a linguist in an atomic laboratory and demanding he uncover the secret of the hydrogen bomb. Such individuals lack the requisite information and, consequently, will never arrive at thought. These are the valid examples, not the individual who possesses information he uses.

Accordingly, it is a matter of conclusive certainty that thought cannot occur except through the presence of previous information by which reality can be interpreted. Reality alone, through mere sensation, cannot produce any thought, although it may produce sensory perception related to the instincts, the

retrieval of sensation, or the identification of that which was sensed. As for passing a judgment upon it—that is, the occurrence of thought—this is absolutely impossible. Thus, the correct definition of thought is: the transmission of reality via sensation to the brain, coupled with previous information that interprets this reality.

The issue of whether reality precedes thought or thought precedes reality is not pertinent here, for the inquiry is strictly confined to the definition of what thought is; thus, priority and posteriority have no bearing on the matter. If it is claimed that thought exists prior to reality, and that thought is the creator and fabricator of reality—as Hegel asserts—then such a claim is erroneous. This is because thought is the judgment passed upon reality, and it is impossible to issue a judgment except upon an entity that exists at the moment of issuance. Therefore, reality must necessarily exist at the time it is being thought upon. Reality, then, is neither the creation of thought nor its product; rather, it was already in existence when thought—that is, the process of thinking about it—emerged. Thought cannot come into being unless its corresponding reality exists at the time of its emergence. No thought exists without a corresponding existing reality. That which has no existing reality is not thought at all, but rather mere imagination and delusion. However, if Hegel intended that the Creator of reality, who brought it into existence from nothingness, exists prior to reality, then that is correct; for reality is contingent (created) and the Creator is Eternal, and thus the Creator is necessarily prior to reality. Yet, it is evident that Hegel did not intend this; he intended “thought” to mean the cognitive process, and therein lies the error.

If it is asserted that reality precedes thought, and that the mind is naught but a product of “highly organized matter”—as Engels postulates—then such a claim is erroneous. This is because thought is, by definition, the passing of judgment upon reality, and no judgment can be rendered absent the existence of

prior information regarding that reality. This information constitutes an essential component of thought; without it, thought cannot manifest. Consequently, its existence is contingent upon the presence of such information. Therefore, any inquiry into whether thought precedes reality or vice versa must necessarily investigate the prior information through which thought becomes possible: did this information exist before reality or after it? This is because this information is, in itself, thought. Thus, the investigation must first be directed toward this information, given the established premise that no thought can exist without prior information.

This information is not necessarily posterior to the existence of reality; it may exist prior to it or subsequent to it. If it were evidenced that matter is eternal, then information would necessarily have to arise after it, and consequently, thought or the mind would be posterior to matter. However, if it is evidenced that matter is not eternal but is a creation of a Creator, then the primary information for the first instance of thought must have existed prior to matter. It must, therefore, have originated from the One who created matter. Thus, God the Creator is the One who revealed the first information, which preceded the first instance of thought in existence. Furthermore, thought is the synthesis of reality and judgment; for thought to occur, it requires information. The very first thought to ever occur must have been preceded by information, as no thought could have existed before it to provide information about reality. It is therefore inevitable that the first information for the first thought existed prior to reality. Had it existed after reality, thought would have occurred without it, meaning the first thought would have been produced by reality alone without prior information. This would imply that thought does not require information to manifest, which is a false conclusion, for it has been established that no thought can exist without prior information. Consequently, it is imperative that the first

information for the first thought existed prior to matter. To claim that the first information for the first thought arose after matter is to negate the necessity of prior information for the very first idea that ever occurred. Accordingly, the evidence that matter is a creation of a Creator necessitates that the first information for the first thought occurred prior to matter, just as the evidence that thought cannot exist without prior information necessitates the same conclusion.

As for the ideas that arose subsequently—that is, those for which prior information exists and which were formed through that information—it is possible that the information through which these thoughts were produced existed before matter, just as it is possible it existed after it. In such cases, one cannot categorically assert that information arose after matter. This is evidenced by the fact that hypotheses, which precede both theory and practice, contain information about a thing before its invention; once the thing is invented, it is judged by means of that prior information. Therefore, it cannot be decisively stated that thought occurred after matter. In any event, the core of this inquiry is not the definition of thought itself, but rather the nature of matter: is it eternal or created? In other words, are the universe, man, and life eternal or created by a Creator? Since the inquiry here is not the definition of thought, this point is neither relevant nor a subject of this specific discussion.

5

This constitutes the dimension of inquiry regarding thought, or the foundation upon which thought rests, and this is its refutation. The Marxists apply their inquiry into thought to the study of life in society and the study of societal history. They argue that if it is true that nature, being, or the material world is the primary element, while perception or thought is

the secondary, derivative element—and if it is true that the material world is an objective reality existing independently of human perception, while perception is a reflection of this objective reality—then it follows that the material life of society, or the social being, is also the primary element. Intellectual life, conversely, is a secondary, derivative element. They contend that the material life of society is an objective reality that exists independently of the human will, whereas the intellectual life of society is a reflection of this objective reality, or a reflection of that which exists. Consequently, one must seek the origin of societal life, the source of ideas regarding social organization, the origin of societal theories, political views, and political institutions, not within the ideas and theories themselves, nor within the political views and institutions, but rather within the material conditions of the life of society—within the existing social conditions of which these ideas, theories, and views are a mere reflection.

Therefore, if we observe different ideas and theories regarding social organization and divergent political views and institutions throughout the various epochs of societal history—if we find these specific ideas and theories under the system of slavery, and find others under feudalism, and yet others under capitalism—then the explanation for this does not lie in the nature or characteristics of the ideas, theories, and political institutions themselves. Rather, it lies in the material conditions of the life of society during the various stages of its development. “Social being,” as they term it, and the material conditions of societal life are what determine the ideas, theories, political views, and political institutions of a society. Marx wrote on this subject, stating, “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.” This implies that man’s concepts regarding life are not what direct him in life; rather, the reality of the society is what directs him, because his concepts

are merely a reflection of that reality. This further implies that thinkers are not the ones who revive a nation; rather, the reality of the society is what revives it, because the ideas of thinkers are a reflection of that reality. It also implies that legislation is not formulated by jurists and legislators to address occurring events; rather, the reality of the society is what produces legislation, as it reflects upon the brains of legislators, who then formulate the law. Thus, sciences and knowledge are merely reflections of societal reality. This is the essence of the dialectical theory from an intellectual perspective and from the perspective of applying its theories to the study of life in society and societal history.

Nevertheless, upon perceiving that the influence of ideas and intellectuals within society is undeniable, the communists conceded this fact; yet, they reinterpreted it to harmonize with their theoretical framework regarding the application of thought to the social sphere. Consequently, they asserted that it does not follow from Marx's dictum—that "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness"—that social ideas, theories, and political views are devoid of significance in social life, or that they fail to exert a reciprocal influence upon social existence and the development of the material conditions of social life. They argue that thus far, the discussion has pertained solely to the *origin* of social ideas, theories, and political institutions, and to their emergence and manifestation, wherein it was stated that the spiritual life of society is a reflection of its material conditions. However, regarding the importance of these social ideas and theories, and their role in history, Historical Materialism does not deny this; on the contrary, it specifically emphasizes their role and immense importance in social life and societal history. This implies that they concede the importance of thought, yet after doing so, they revert to viewing it as a mere consequence of material life rather than the primary agent affecting it. Thus, they state: "Social ideas, theories, and

political institutions are engendered by the urgent tasks set forth by the development of the material life of society; subsequently, they themselves react upon social existence and the material life of society by creating the necessary conditions to resolve the pressing, urgent problems of material life, thereby rendering the forward progress of society possible." In other words, material life provides the ideas, and only then do these ideas acquire their importance. The significance of thought, therefore, "does not stem from the fact that thought *qua* thought influences society, but rather from the fact that society produced the thought," which then acquired importance within that society. They contend: "New social ideas and theories do not emerge except when the development of the material life of society places new tasks before it; however, once they emerge, they become a force of the highest order, facilitating the accomplishment of the new tasks set by the development of material life, aiding societal progress, and revealing the gravity of the role played by new ideas, theories, and political institutions as a force for organization, mobilization, and transformation. In reality, new social ideas and theories appear because they are necessary for society; for without their organizing, mobilizing, and transforming action, it would be impossible to resolve the urgent, pressing issues necessitated by the development of society's material life." Thus, it becomes evident that their acknowledgment of the importance of thought does not constitute a recognition of its role in the origination, formation, or distinct characterization of society; rather, it is an admission that society is the progenitor of ideas, which then gain importance only insofar as people adopt them as instruments for organization and mobilization. Their importance, in the communist view, is not relative to society itself, but relative to their dissemination among the masses. As for society, thought remains a product thereof, rather than an independent entity existing for society or a primary influence upon it.

6

This constitutes the summation of the communist perspective regarding the application of their theory of thought to the study of social life. They maintain that since thought is the reflection of reality upon the brain, the origin of society's intellectual life must be sought within the material conditions of society—namely, in nature, population growth, and the mode of production, which they define as the instruments of production, the people, productive knowledge, and the relations of production. This is erroneous from two perspectives:

The first perspective: It has been established that thought is not a reflection of reality upon the brain; consequently, the derivative proposition—that intellectual life is a reflection of material reality—is inherently fallacious, as the foundational premise has been evidenced erroneous.

The second perspective is that human conduct in life is inextricably linked to his concepts regarding it; man conditions his behavior in life in accordance with his conceptualizations thereof. For instance, a man's concepts regarding a beloved individual condition his conduct toward them in a manner diametrically opposed to his conduct toward someone he detests—provided he possesses concepts of animosity toward the latter—and differently still from his conduct toward a stranger about whom he holds no concept whatsoever. Thus, human behavior is contingent upon human concepts. Consequently, should we desire to transform base human conduct into refined, elevated behavior, it is imperative that we first alter the underlying concepts. This is because man possesses a "vital energy" that impels him toward the pursuit of its satisfaction. This energy manifests in two dimensions: the first consists of those needs he is driven to satisfy, the neglect of which results in death; these are termed "organic needs," such as hunger, thirst, and the relief of nature. The second dimension

comprises those needs he is driven to satisfy, the non-fulfillment of which causes discomfort but not death; these are termed "instincts." These include the drive for self-preservation, the drive for the procreation of the species, and the sense of inherent inadequacy coupled with the need for a Supreme Power—namely, the survival instinct, the procreation instinct, and the instinct for sanctification (the religious instinct). Both man and animal are impelled toward satisfaction by this vital energy, which constitutes the primary source of movement and impetus in the life of both human and animal. However, in the animal, reality is conveyed to the brain via the senses, where it is perceived and imprinted. Upon the repetition or variation of this sensation, the animal retrieves the initial sensory impression, thereby acquiring a rudimentary knowledge of reality insofar as it pertains to the satisfaction of its vital energy. Consequently, it adopts a behavior aimed at satisfying that energy—whether by consuming the object, repelling it, fawning over it, or other similar actions. Its conduct never transcends this scope; that is, its actions are strictly confined to matters concerning the satisfaction of energy, whether it be the fulfillment of an organic need or an instinct. It remains perpetually dependent upon the sensory perception of this reality to achieve the knowledge necessary for satisfaction. In contrast, while reality is also conveyed to the human brain via the senses, perceived, and imprinted therein, man does not require the repetition or variation of sensation to achieve recognition; rather, he correlates the sensory input with his "prior information," thereby attaining comprehension. Furthermore, his knowledge of the object is not restricted merely to its utility for satisfaction; he understands its relation to satisfaction while simultaneously issuing a judgment upon its essential nature. Consequently, he adopts a dual behavior toward it: one aimed at satisfying his vital energy, and another aimed at interacting with that reality in accordance with his intellectual comprehension. Thus, a profound distinction emerges between human conduct, which

arises from the sensation of reality, and animal behavior. Human conduct is predicated upon the correlation of prior information with reality—that is, it is based upon an intellectual perception of reality. Conversely, animal behavior is founded solely upon sensation, the repetition of such sensation, its retrieval, and its variation. Consequently, animal behavior is bound to sensory perception—namely, the instinctual impulse and nothing more—whereas human conduct is bound to intellectual perception, which is to say, to his concepts, rather than the instinctual impulse alone. If the impression of reality upon the brain were the sole progenitor of ideas, systems, and political views, then it would follow that these should exist within animals as well; for reality is imprinted upon the animal brain just as it is upon the human brain, with no distinction regarding the process of imprinting via the senses. Yet, empirical observation confirms that it is impossible for animals to possess ideas, theories, political views, or political institutions; these exist exclusively within the human domain. This definitively evidences that man possesses an additional faculty beyond the mere imprinting of reality upon the brain: namely, the concepts he holds. Furthermore, it is a tangible observation that peoples and nations do not experience a renaissance unless they possess thinkers who chart their course. Marxist socialism itself consists of ideas originated by a German thinker; thus, it did not emerge from the indigenous reality of Russia. Had Lenin not championed these ideas and organized an ideological political party around them, the socialist system would never have been established in Russia. This fact alone suffices to refute the claim that the origin of ideas, theories, and political views is material reality rather than thinkers; it establishes that thought is the foundation of renaissance, the basis of systems, and the cornerstone of political views and institutions.

They contend that they do not deny the importance of ideas, theories, political views, and institutions in social life;

rather, they believe these hold great significance in social existence and societal history. They assert that obsolete ideas and theories hinder society, while new ideas facilitate societal progress and development. Thus, they claim not to deny the impact of ideas, yet they maintain that the origin of social ideas, political views, and institutions—and their very emergence—is a reflection of the material conditions of societal life. The rebuttal to this is that such a statement does not constitute a genuine recognition of the importance of thought in the origination and advancement of society; rather, it is merely an acknowledgment of its utility in being disseminated to the masses and mobilizing them toward a predetermined path. They do not contend that social relations arise from the ideas and sentiments held by individuals; rather, they assert that material life engenders ideas, which subsequently impel the people. For them, the primary element is the material life of society. When this material life evolves, its development places new exigencies before society, giving rise to new ideas and theories. Thus, within society, priority is not accorded to ideas, but to what they term "societal development." Once these ideas emerge, they become a force of significance, not for the purpose of originating society, improving it, or determining its progress or decline, but rather to be adopted by the masses and to mobilize and organize them against the decaying forces within society. This facilitates the accomplishment of the new tasks that the evolution of material life has placed before society. Consequently, their acknowledgment of the importance of thought, in the manner they present it, is not a recognition of its vital role in life, but rather an admission of its utility as a means of utilizing the people in the struggle to transform society. Thus, it is not an acknowledgment of the primary source. Marx’s statement is explicit, “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence,” meaning it is not thought that determines the relations between them, “but, on the contrary, their social

existence that determines their consciousness," meaning that the existing relations between them are what determine their ideas. Therefore, priority is not given to thought, but to material life. This, naturally, constitutes a denial that thought is the originator and transformer of society, in addition to denying its fundamental importance within society. It is not merely a denial of its importance, but a denial of its having any causal effect whatsoever, and consequently, a denial of the role of thinkers and legislators in the origination and transformation of society. By establishing material life as the foundation for the creation of society and its transition from one state to another, they accord exclusive importance to it rather than to thought—a profound error. For thought is the foundation of renaissance, not the reality upon which society subsists. It is thought that transforms the reality of society; base thought hinders progress, while elevated thought facilitates the path toward advancement. This suffices to prove that systems, theories, and political views are, in essence, ideas. They are, in reality, the product of ideas rather than the material conditions of societal life. For if we encounter a society such as China, which existed under feudalism, had the United States seized control of it, it would have found capitalist ideas there, and China would now be implementing capitalist systems and theories. However, it encountered socialist ideas, and thus implemented socialist systems—or more precisely, what they term "People's Democracy," which occupies a position between capitalism and socialism. Thus, the divergence of systems arose from the divergence of ideas. Systems originate from ideas, and their emergence in Russia, China, and the states of Eastern Europe serves as the best evidence that theories, systems, and political views are a collection of ideas. These may emanate from a comprehensive intellectual premise, or they may not. These ideas may concern an existing reality, or they may concern something intended to be brought into reality. If they emanate from a comprehensive intellectual

premise, they are derived from ideas and thus originate from thought. If they do not emanate from such a premise, they cannot exist without prior information—that is, without prior ideas. Thus, it is thought that has produced them from reality. If they concern an existing reality, they were not taken from that reality alone; rather, prior information produced them in conjunction with it, and thus they did not arise solely from reality. If they concern something intended to be originated, they did not arise from an existing reality at all, but from pure thought. Consequently, no thought ever arises from reality alone; instead, thought arises either from previous thought or from reality in conjunction with thought. Therefore, the inquiry into the origin of intellectual life, and the source of social ideas, social theories, political views, and political institutions, must be directed toward ideas and theories, not toward society—that is, not toward what they term the "material conditions of societal life." The simplest evidence for this is that the inquiry into the origin of intellectual life in contemporary Russia, and the source of its ideas, theories, and political views, is found within Marxist ideas and their interpretations, not in the current life of Russia, nor in the life of its society at the time of the Communist Revolution. Thought is the foundation of systems, theories, and political views; it is that which transforms society, and that which either revives it or causes its decline. It is thought that conditions relations into a specific state, and it is that which determines the conduct of man in life.

The upshot is that the communist theory, which posits that the social existence of people determines their consciousness, is fallacious. Reality demonstrates that the ideas embraced by people are what determine their social existence. The mission of the Messenger ﷺ (بعثة الرسول ﷺ) serves as the most compelling evidence for this; the social existence of the Arabs upon the advent of Islam was in total contradiction to the ideas he

brought. It was the ideas of Islam that subsequently determined their social existence for them. Furthermore, the lands conquered by the Muslims possessed social existences that contradicted the ideas of Islam, yet these ideas were applied to those conquered societies, transforming them entirely and unifying them into a single society. The social existence of the Persians differed from that of the Romans, and the social existence of the Romans differed from that of the Berbers in North Africa; however, the ideas of Islam arrived and transformed the material life in all these diverse societies, rendering them a single, unified material life. This tangible reality evidences that ideas are what transform material life—that is, they are what determine the social existence of people, whether at the inception of these ideas during the mission of the Messenger ﷺ in the Arabian Peninsula, or when these ideas were carried and applied to people during the Islamic conquests.

Furthermore, the assertion that the significance of ideas is confined to their adoption by the masses and their mobilization to facilitate the accomplishment of new tasks, rather than in the origination of society, is erroneous. Their significance lies in their capacity to transform society and impel people toward change, not merely in the act of impelling change itself. The ideas of the Messenger ﷺ originated through Revelation (الوحي), and he did not derive them from his social existence nor from the society in which his contemporaries lived. They certainly did not emerge from material life. For the people who accepted these ideas in Al-Madinah and upon whom they were applied, the significance of these ideas did not lie in their being adopted by the popular masses or being used to mobilize and organize them against decaying forces; rather, their significance lay in the fact that they transformed their material life, altered their mode of existence, and brought about a radical upheaval in their mentalities, dispositions, and way of life, thereby creating a new society. Thus, their importance was primarily in the origination

of society, not in driving people to struggle against decaying forces. It was these ideas that established the Islamic society in Al-Madinah. Subsequently, they held significance in carrying these ideas to other peoples and applying them. In both instances—the initial establishment of society and the establishment of society in every conquered land—their importance lay not merely in people adopting them, but primarily in the origination of society. They defined the society, and people carried and applied them to themselves, whereby society came into existence. Then, they carried them as a message to others, applied them, and established them therein. Thus, their significance lies in the origination and transformation of society, not merely in the organization of people. This refutes the communist claim that ideas and theories are engendered by urgent tasks set by the development of the material life of society, and that they then function to facilitate new tasks. The falsity of this claim is evident from reality, which demonstrates that ideas are what influenced society, originating and transforming it. Their influence was not merely in facilitating social transformation but in originating it from its very foundation. Reality also demonstrates that these ideas were not derived from the material life of society, nor were they engendered by the urgent tasks of material development; rather, they were brought by Revelation from Allah ﷻ. That is, they are ideas from outside the society in which the Messenger ﷺ lived and from outside its material life. This is sufficient evidence to refute this theory from two perspectives: the origin of thought, theories, and systems, and the nature of their influence and significance in life.

7

This pertains to the application of the materialist theory of thought to society. As for the dimension of inquiry into nature

within the dialectical theory, their views are summarized in four points: First, that nature is a cohesive, integral whole in which objects and events are fully interconnected. Second, that nature is not in a state of rest, but is in constant evolution and change. Third, that the movement of evolution is a development that transitions from quantitative changes to qualitative changes in a rapid and sudden manner. Fourth, that all things and their events contain internal contradictions. The sum of these four points provides a clear picture of their views on nature according to Dialectical Materialism.

Regarding the first point, they assert that dialectics does not view nature as a fortuitous accumulation of objects, or as events severed from one another, or as entities isolated and independent of each other. Rather, it considers nature to be a cohesive, integral whole wherein objects and events are organically interconnected and mutually dependent, such that they constitute reciprocal conditions for one another. Consequently, they maintain that no natural phenomenon can be understood if viewed in isolation, sequestered from the events surrounding it. Indeed, any event in any field of nature may transform into a meaningless absurdity, devoid of significance, if perceived apart from its encompassing conditions or if detached from those circumstances. Conversely, any event can be understood and justified if viewed through its indissoluble link to the surrounding phenomena—that is, if viewed as it is defined and conditioned by the events encompassing it. This implies that the sun is inseparably linked to its own motion and the motion of the surrounding planets; it implies that man is indissolubly linked to the land in which he dwells; and it implies that the life present within a living organism is inseparably linked to its manifestation within that organism, whether it be a human, an animal, or a tree. It further implies that a thing can only be understood through the event that encompasses it, just as an event can only be understood through the object and the things that surround it. Thus, the object or the

event is defined by the phenomena or things encompassing it, rather than by its own essence.

Regarding the second point, they do not consider nature to be in a state of stasis or stagnation, nor a state of rest and stability; rather, they view it as a state of perpetual motion and change, a condition of unceasing renewal and evolution. Within it, something is always being born and evolving, while something else is dissolving and decaying. For this reason, it is insufficient to merely observe events in terms of their mutual relations or their reciprocal conditioning; they must also be viewed in terms of their motion, their change and development, and their emergence and disappearance. Engels states, “Nature as a whole, from the smallest particles to the largest bodies, from a grain of sand to the sun, from the protist (the living cell) to man, is in a constant state of genesis and dissolution, in an uninterrupted flux, in a state of perpetual and eternal motion and change.” Engels further remarks: “One looks primarily at things and their mental reflections in terms of their mutual relations, their sequence, their motion, and their emergence and dissolution.” This signifies that all things in the universe—from a grain of sand to the sun, and from the first living human cell to man himself—must be viewed not only as indissolubly interconnected but also as existing within a process of life and annihilation. This means that some of its atoms perish while other atoms are revitalized within it. Accordingly, the sun must be viewed in connection with its motion, and as matter that changes and evolves, wherein atoms decay and others come to life. The same applies to man and to life itself; in each, there is a link to its motion and to the internal cycle of life and perishing.

Regarding the third point, they do not consider the movement of evolution to be a simple process of growth wherein quantitative changes do not lead to qualitative ones. Rather, they view it as a development that transitions from minute, latent quantitative changes to manifest and fundamental

changes—that is, to qualitative changes. These qualitative changes are not gradual; they are rapid and sudden, occurring through leaps from one state to another. Such changes are not merely possible; they are necessary, resulting from the accumulation of imperceptible and gradual quantitative changes. For instance, the quantitative changes that occur in water due to heat are quantitative and imperceptible, and they are also gradual; however, when they reach the critical point—that is, a specific state—the qualitative change occurs through a leap, and the water transforms into steam, transitioning from one state to another. This transition is not accidental but necessary. Therefore, communists believe it is imperative to understand the movement of evolution not as a circular motion or a simple repetition of itself, but as a progressive, ascending movement—a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, and a development that moves from the simple to the complex, and from the lower to the higher. That is to say, the movement of evolution should not be viewed merely as a process of life and perishing, or genesis and dissolution. Instead, it must be seen as perishing and life, or dissolution and genesis, occurring along an ascending path that moves matter from one state to another state distinct from and superior to the first. Thus, its movements are ascending and its evolution is progressive, rather than circular—moving along the same path and returning to its origin. Instead, it transitions from one state to a better state, and so forth. Engels states, “Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasing daily, and thus has shown that, in the last resort, Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes through a real historical evolution. In this connection, Darwin comes before all others. He dealt the metaphysical conception of Nature the heaviest blow by his proof that all organic beings, plants, animals, and man himself, are the products of a process of evolution going on through millions of years.”

Engels further elaborated that quantitative changes turn into qualitative changes in dialectical evolution, stating: “In physics... every change is a transformation of quantity into quality—a consequence of quantitative change of the amount of motion of some form or other that is inherent in a body or communicated to it. Thus, the temperature of water has at first no effect on its liquid state; but as the temperature of liquid water rises or falls, a moment arrives when this state of cohesion alters and the water becomes transformed into steam or ice... So also a definite minimum current is required to make a platinum wire glow; so every metal has its melting point; so every liquid has its definite freezing and boiling point at a given pressure—in so far as our means allow us to produce the requisite temperature; so, finally, every gas has its critical point at which it can be liquefied by pressure and cooling... The so-called constants of physics are for the most part nothing but designations of nodal points where quantitative addition or subtraction of motion invokes a qualitative change in the state of the body concerned, where, consequently, quantity is transformed into quality.”

This means that the increase or decrease of motion is a quantitative change; heat is quantity and not quality, and the amount of water is quantity and not quality. However, the state of the water—whether liquid, steam, or ice—is the quality. Thus, the quantitative change produced a qualitative change, and the points of qualitative transition from one state to another are the nodal points or fixed points. These nodes, or fixed points, are where the transformation from quantity to quality occurred—that is, from water to steam or to ice.

Engels, in his discourse on chemistry, states: “Chemistry can be termed the science of the qualitative changes of bodies as a result of changed quantitative composition.” Even Hegel recognized this in his time. Take oxygen: if we combine three atoms in a molecule instead of the usual two, we obtain a new

substance, ozone, which differs markedly in its odor and effects from ordinary oxygen. And what shall we say of the various combinations of oxygen with nitrogen or sulfur?! Each such combination yields a substance qualitatively distinct from all others. Thus, Engels attempts to demonstrate through physics and chemistry an intrinsic change occurring in nature—a transition of things from one state to another superior to the first. This transition from quantity to quality, and from one quality to another via quantity (e.g. increasing atoms from two to three), mirrors the physical process where increasing heat transforms water into steam. This implies that the movement of development in nature is not a simple circular motion but an ascending one, transitioning through the increase or decrease of quantity into a new state.

As for the fourth point, it posits that all natural objects and phenomena contain internal contradictions, for they all possess a negative and a positive side, a past and a present. They all contain elements that decay and elements that develop. The struggle between these opposites—the conflict between the old and the new, between that which dies and that which is born, between that which perishes and that which evolves—constitutes the internal content of the developmental process; it is the internal driver for the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative ones. For instance, the transformation of water into steam through increased heat, or into ice through its decrease, is not achieved through the harmony of atoms within matter, but through the antagonism of these atoms with one another. This is the meaning of it occurring through contradictions. The collision occurring between atoms within matter is what generates this transformation. This is the significance of the claim that all natural objects and phenomena contain contradictions—that is, they contain negative and positive atoms whose collision results in transformation. Consequently, the dialectical method considers that the

movement of development from the lower to the higher does not proceed through a gradual, harmonious evolution of events, but through the emergence of contradictions inherent in things and phenomena, and through the struggle of opposing tendencies operating on the basis of these contradictions. Lenin states: "Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects." He further asserts: "Development is the 'struggle' of opposites."

8

This is the summation of communist views on nature: that nature is an indivisible whole in a state of constant development and change; that this change transitions from quantitative shifts to qualitative ones along an ascending path from a lower to a higher state; and that this is achieved through the contradictions inevitably present in objects and phenomena—namely, through the struggle of opposites. All of this is erroneous across all four points, as they are merely hypotheses and holistic analogies.

The first point is nothing more than mere hypotheses. Nature is the sum total of celestial bodies and the system governing them. Regarding the planet Earth upon which we dwell, nature consists of the laws governing the Earth and its life-sustaining capacities, along with the Earth itself and the objects upon it. This nature—meaning objects and their laws—is an integral whole in terms of the universe in its entirety, the Earth as a whole, and each planet as a totality. However, regarding each planet and the Earth specifically, they are, in their particularities and specific laws, not interconnected with others. Rather, from this perspective, they are isolated from others, existing in an environment pertaining to them alone in terms of objects and laws, even if this occurs within the general collective framework of the universe. Similarly, the objects on

Earth and their laws are, in relation to each specific thing, independent of others; every object possesses laws specific to it and is not interconnected with others, even if this takes place within the laws of the Earth and subsequently the laws of the universe. This has become tangibly evident regarding planets and the Earth specifically following space voyages, where the cessation of weight was evidenced upon reaching a point of gravitational equilibrium. At such points, the Earth's gravity no longer exerts influence; where the gravity of two or more planets cancels out, gravity vanishes, and the individual effectively exits the Earth's gravitational field, rendering its laws non-influential. This signifies that the Earth possesses specific laws not interconnected with other planets, operating independently, even if it possesses other laws linked to other celestial bodies. Thus, every planet is linked to others by certain laws and separated from them by specific laws independent of others. This is tangibly clear regarding objects and events on Earth: earthquakes in Iran do not affect Iraq, and volcanoes in one region do not affect another to which their influence does not reach. Furthermore, that which applies to animals does not apply to man; the animal walks on four legs, lacks intellectual perception, and lives according to vital energy derived from instincts and organic needs. Man, however, walks on two legs, utilizes his hands differently from his feet, and possesses intellectual perception; his conduct in life is governed by his concepts rather than merely his instincts and organic needs. The state of inanimate objects differs from that of living beings; inanimate objects do not require nourishment, whereas living beings do. Inanimate objects do not sense, while some living beings do. Inanimate objects lack vital energy from instincts and organic needs, whereas some living beings possess it. Moreover, man himself proceeds in life, in terms of his creation, according to uniform laws, yet he proceeds in his livelihood and relations according to diverse systems, enjoying complete choice regarding the system, thought, and lifestyle he desires. He is not

bound to nature by a deterministic link, nor does nature direct his livelihood; rather, he directs himself by choice. Hence, this point is a mere hypothesis. When they observed that the universe is an integral whole in terms of its movement within specific laws, and that the Earth is an integral whole in terms of its movement within specific laws, they claimed that nature is an indivisible whole. They neglected the fact that this totality exists only in the general sense—that is, in terms of the universe as a whole or the totality of a thing. However, regarding the specificities of objects, they are distinct and independent. The Earth is distinct from Venus, independent and not deterministically linked by its specific laws. Iron is distinct from mercury, independent of it and not deterministically linked in its specific laws, despite both being metals. Man is distinct from animals and not deterministically linked in his specific laws, despite both being animals. Thus, the deterministic interconnection in everything between the parts of the universe and its contents is non-existent; rather, only a general interconnection exists.

The universe—comprising the sum total of celestial bodies—man, as a rational animal, and life, as the vital principle within living organisms, constitute the entirety of the world; they are interconnected as a collective whole insofar as they form the world. Thus, man exists within the universe and is consequently linked to both the universe and life; however, life is not linked to man, nor is the universe linked to life by any deterministic necessity. Life manifests in man, animals, birds, insects, trees, and plants, and while these entities exist within the universe and are thus linked to it, the universe is not linked to them, nor is man linked to them by a deterministic bond. Furthermore, the aggregate of celestial bodies that constitute the universe are interconnected in a manner that forms the cosmic whole; yet, the Earth is not linked to Venus, nor is the sun linked to Mercury by any inevitable necessity regarding the totality of

their properties and specificities. Consequently, perceptible, tangible existence is interconnected in its totality—that is, in its capacity as the world—just as the Earth, as a planetary whole, is linked to the sun; man, as a human whole, is linked to the Earth, the sun, and life; and life, as a vital whole, is linked to the universe and man. Thus, while perceptible, tangible existence as a totality consists of the universe, man, and life interconnected with one another, each part simultaneously constitutes a distinct whole, linked to the others in its general totality but separate from them in its specific properties. Interconnection, therefore, pertains only to the general totality, whereas the universe, man, and life each remain distinct, governed by specific properties and laws that are not interconnected with anything else.

Furthermore, not every element within perceptible, tangible existence is linked to every other; that is, a thing is not necessarily encompassed by everything else in existence. A thing may be surrounded by certain entities while being entirely removed from others, and the existence of those surrounding entities is not always an indispensable condition for its survival; they may constitute a condition in some instances and not in others. For example, man is encompassed by light and air, and his life is contingent upon water and nourishment, yet he possesses no vital link to Venus or Mars; nor is the mineral copper a condition for his survival, nor is mercury something without which he cannot live. This demonstrates that man is linked to certain elements in the universe and unlinked to others, and that among the things to which he is linked, some are essential to his life while others are not. The same principle applies to animals, planets, inanimate objects, and all else. This signifies that not everything in existence is interconnected; and insofar as an element is not linked to another, it is not a part of it, and consequently, they do not form a single whole. Therefore, to characterize nature as an indivisible whole and to consider every part thereof as dependent upon the other is contrary to the

reality of objects in the world and inconsistent with the nature of perceptible, tangible existence.

Moreover, while water is a condition for human life, man is not a condition for the continued existence of water as such. Air encompasses man, yet man does not encompass air, and the existence or non-existence of man is not a condition for the survival of air. The same holds true for animals, the sun, mountains, and other entities; in the things to which they are linked, it is not inevitable that those things be reciprocally linked to them. Thus, the survival of these interconnected entities is not mutually dependent. Consequently, the comprehension of a thing is not contingent upon its surroundings; rather, it can be understood in isolation from that to which it is linked. Man can be understood independently of water, even if it encompasses him; water can be understood independently of man; the sun can be understood independently of man; and plants can be understood independently of air, and so forth. Accordingly, it is erroneous to assert that a thing cannot be understood if viewed in isolation, sequestered from the objects surrounding it.

Man is surrounded by various entities, from celestial bodies like the Earth and the sun to inanimate objects like mountains and rivers, and living things like plants and birds; nevertheless, that which defines his essence is his human reality, not the Earth, the sun, mountains, rivers, plants, or birds that encompass him. He is not deterministically linked to the land in which he dwells; he may actively transform that land into a state of his own choosing—as is the case with revolutionary reformers—or he may depart for another land entirely. He is, therefore, not linked to his surroundings by an inevitable, indissoluble bond; rather, he is entirely distinct from his environment, adapting himself as he sees fit. Based on this, it is fallacious to claim that a thing or an event is defined solely by the phenomena and objects surrounding it, for reality evidences that objects and events are defined by their own essence

(quiddity), not by their surrounding environment. Through all of this, the error of the first point becomes manifest.

Regarding the second point, while it is true that the world is in a state of constant change, it is incorrect to assert that everything within it simultaneously encompasses both birth and perishing; that is, it is not true that everything within it is in a state of renewal. There are things whose change constitutes a state of renewal, where something is born and something dies, such as a seedling or a youth; however, there are also things in which no such birth or death occurs, such as water, rocks, and all inanimate matter. Furthermore, there are things whose development is strictly a state of perishing, such as a decaying tree or a frail old man. The claim that everything in the world is being born and evolving while simultaneously growing and dissolving is a false assertion contradicted by the reality of objects existing in the world. Indeed, the communists themselves state that a thing which appears stable and settled at a given moment, while in reality it is perishing, is unimportant and unworthy of consideration; rather, the important and noteworthy thing is that which is born and evolves. They conclude from this that they should not base their actions on classes that have ceased to evolve, but rather on those that are evolving. This constitutes an explicit admission on their part that there are things in which birth and perishing occur—namely, the renewable—and things in which only perishing occurs—namely, those in a state of dissolution. This is the actual reality of things in the world. From this, it is evident that the claim that everything in the world is in a constant movement of genesis and dissolution is a fallacious statement contrary to reality, thereby exposing the corruption of the second point.

As for the third point, it is fallacious to assert that the change occurring within objects constitutes a transition from a lower to a higher state, or from the deleterious to the beneficial. This is a mere hypothesis; it is neither a transition from one state

to a superior one, nor necessarily from a good state to a bad one, but is rather change *qua* change. It may result in a superior state, or it may lead to a degraded one. In inanimate objects, for instance, the nature of change varies: the molding of bread is a transition from a sound state to a corrupted one, and the crumbling of stones is a transition from a cohesive state to a disintegrated one. Similarly, in living organisms—whether man, animal, or plant—changes likewise diverge. A child transitions through growth from one state to a superior one, as does a germinating plant or a young animal. However, the transition of man from youth to elderly is a transition from a vigorous state to a frail one. Thus, change exists in both inanimate and animate beings, yet it is merely a transition from one state to another, irrespective of whether that transition is toward the better or the worse. Consequently, their claim that an object "evolves"—in the sense that it necessarily transitions to a superior state—is a proposition invalidated by empirical observation. What actually transpires is mere change, which may be toward improvement or toward deterioration. Furthermore, while transition renders the preceding state “old” and the succeeding state “new,” if the process were truly “evolution”—meaning a transition to a superior state—then the new would invariably be better than the old. Yet, observation has evidenced this to be false; change is neutral, potentially leading to the better or the worse. Thus, the assertion that movement is inherently progressive and ascending, and that change is invariably upward toward the better, is a patently void claim. The very example of water, which they adduced to substantiate their theory, serves to invalidate it; for when water transforms into steam, it can be condensed and cooled, thereby reverting to its primary quality—namely, water. This does not constitute an ascending change toward the better, but a reversion to the original form. Accordingly, the “new” is not invariably beneficial, nor is it invariably deleterious. Likewise, the “old” is not invariably bad, nor is it invariably good. The fact that a thing is “new” does not

define its quality as good or bad; it simply denotes its novelty. Similarly, the fact that a thing is “old” does not define it as bad or good; it simply denotes its antiquity. Decrepitude is “new” while youth is “old” [relative to the person’s history]; mold in bread is “new” while the fresh bread was “old” [the preceding state]; dough is “old” while the baked bread is “new”; the zygote is “old” while the infant is “new.” Thus, millions of changing things do not collectively represent an ascending or descending movement. Some may be ascending, such as water turning into steam, a child becoming a youth, a seedling becoming a tree, dough becoming bread, or a platinum wire becoming incandescent. Conversely, the change in objects may be a descending movement, such as steam reverting to water, a youth reaching frailty, an ancient tree falling and decaying, bread molding, or a platinum wire darkening when the electric current is severed. Movement, therefore, is merely movement, and change is merely change; they are described neither by ascension nor descension, for ascension is not an inherent property of movement or change, nor is descension. Neither is an inseparable concomitant of change. Therefore, the claim that change is inherently ascending is an erroneous proposition that contradicts the reality of both movement and change. Furthermore, among the millions of changing entities, change is not always toward the better; it may be toward the better or the worse. No one doubts that youth is superior to frailty, that fresh bread is better than moldy bread, that the living is better than the dead, that green grass is superior to dry stubble, or that an oil well brimming with petroleum is better than one that has been depleted. In these instances, the change was toward the worse, not the better; they thus falsify the claim that change is inherently toward improvement. However, this also does not imply that change is inherently toward the worse, as it may indeed be toward the better. No one doubts that a youth is better than an infant, that a tree is superior to a seedling, that bread is better than dough, that an infant is superior to a zygote, or that a

chick is better than an egg. In these cases, the change was toward the better. Nevertheless, these examples do not prove that change is *always* toward the better; rather, the sum of all examples and the reality of all things demonstrate that change may be toward the better or the worse. Whether a thing is good or bad does not arise from the act of change itself, nor is it contingent upon its being new or old; rather, it is contingent upon its own essence (*mahiyyah*), whether it be old or new.

Furthermore, the transition from a beneficial state to a deleterious one is not exclusively confined to the phenomenon of "regression" (*intikas*), such that it might be argued that regression is merely a possibility—a concept found in Marxist discourse regarding so-called "reactionary reversal." Instead, change may manifest as regression, as occurs when steam reverts to water, or it may not be a reversion to the primary state at all, but a transition to a *different* state that is nonetheless worse than the first, such as the transition from youth to decrepitude. Therefore, "evolution" — in the sense of renewal and transition to a superior state — is not the inherent attribute of things in the world. Instead, the inherent attribute of the world and of everything within it is simply "change," whether that change be progressive, regressive, or toward a different, previously non-existent state that is deleterious.

Furthermore, change within objects does not inevitably transition them into entities other than their original state; rather, change may result in a different state, or the objects may remain—despite the change—identical to their primary state, unchanged in essence. Indeed, it is impossible for them to change their fundamental nature regardless of the external factors of change acting upon them. For instance, a chemical process may alter a substance entirely, transforming it into something other than the original, as in the example provided by Engels regarding oxygen: if three atoms are combined in a molecule instead of the usual two, a new substance is

obtained—ozone—which differs markedly in its odor and effects from ordinary oxygen. However, there are numerous counter-examples where it is impossible for a thing to become anything other than what its quiddity dictates. For example, no process can transmute iron into gold, nor can any process transform a horse into a camel. Similarly, human semen cannot be transformed into a child if placed within a monkey, a mare, a she-camel, or any living being other than a woman. A stone cannot be transformed by any process into a living being, and so it is with millions of things that cannot possibly transition into something other than their own quiddity. Consequently, the assertion that plants, animals, and subsequently man, are all the products of an evolutionary process spanning millions of years is a corrupt claim invalidated by reality. If the accumulation of dust, air, and water upon a piece of wood over many years causes it to petrify and become stone, the quiddity of a grain of wheat has not changed since man first knew it, nor has its manner of growth. The sheep, since man first encountered this animal, has not changed in its "sheep-ness" or its inherent nature. Man, as male and female, has not undergone the slightest change in his humanity, his animality, his vital energy, or the specific property of his brain—which is the capacity to link information to reach a judgment. As for the variations in the size of a wheat grain, the dimensions of a sheep, or the volume of the human skull and bones, these are merely morphological changes in form, not in quiddity. Change occurs inevitably and may affect size and shape, but change in quiddity is not an inevitable occurrence. It may happen such that a thing becomes something else, or it may be impossible to occur regardless of the factors of change. Therefore, it is erroneous to claim that the objects currently in the world are different from those that existed previously. This exposes the fallacy of Darwin's position that the entire organic world as it exists today is the product of an evolutionary process spanning millions of years—implying it is distinct from the primary world of millions of years ago. Iron,

water, soil, air, and their like remain the same regardless of the passage of ages; the camel, the horse, the sheep, the lion, and other animals remain the same despite their antiquity; and man has remained the same since his existence was first known on Earth, without the slightest change in his quiddity. The world changes, undoubtedly, but its change does not imply a departure from its quiddity, nor does the change of objects within it imply that they have indeed diverged from the quiddity upon which they were originated.

From all of this, it becomes evident that “evolution”—as they define it: a progressive ascending movement and a transition from the lower to the higher, from the good to the better, or from the deleterious to the beneficial, and in terms of its capacity to transmute one thing into another—is not an inherent property of change, nor is its occurrence necessary. The world changes, but this change does not equate to the “evolution” they describe. This evolution is not inevitably realized within objects. Thus, the claim that it is an inseparable concomitant of change, and the assertion of its inevitability within objects, is a void claim invalidated by reality. Through this, the corruption of the third point is manifest.

Regarding the fourth point, it is incorrect to assert that all natural objects and events contain internal contradictions. This is merely a theoretical postulation. It has been evidenced that not everything contains the simultaneous presence of life and annihilation. This alone evidences that not everything contains contradictions. Furthermore, the fact that things are born, die, perish, and come into existence does not mean that this constitutes a necessary contradiction inherent to them. A living body contains cells that are born and cells that die, yet this does not imply the existence of a contradiction within the living organism. Moreover, inanimate bodies undergo annihilation, but they do not experience "birth"—that is, they do not bring themselves into existence. Therefore, what is termed

“contradictions” is not an inseparable concomitant of objects and events. Regarding objects, this is evident in inanimate matter; if water is left as it is, it may decrease, but it does not increase, and it experiences neither a negative nor a positive pole, nor do contradictions occur within it. Sand, if left as it is, exhibits no observable contradictions. As for events, commercial transactions are executed without any contradiction occurring within the procedure of the contract, and the act of prayer occurs without any internal contradiction. Thus, the claim that contradictions are inseparable from objects and events is a void assertion. If tendencies are antagonistic and no reconciliation occurs between them, a collision ensues; only then does what is termed “contradiction” occur within a living body or within society. However, if reconciliation occurs between antagonistic tendencies, the antagonism is removed—such as ceasing the application of heat to water before the transition to steam begins, in which case no contradiction occurs and no transformation takes place; or as in providing workers with more than their sufficiency, in which case no collision occurs with the employers. Therefore, the claim regarding the inevitability of contradictions is an erroneous proposition because they are not inevitable in all things, nor are they inevitable within society. Thus, the error of the fourth point is laid bare.

Through the refutation of these four points, the fallacy of the communist perspective on nature is laid bare, and consequently, the error of their assertion regarding the inevitability of world evolution—as they define it—is exposed. They perceive nature as an indivisible whole, wherein every element is interconnected, such that any occurrence affecting one entity necessarily influences the others. They maintain that everything in the universe is in a state of perpetual motion and constant change, characterized by the emergence of the new and the dissolution of the old—a process of birth and death. They further contend that this movement is an ascending one and that

this change is a transition toward the better, asserting that every natural entity harbors internal contradictions. This is because, in their view, everything involves a struggle between life and perishing, between that which is born and that which fades; this "struggle of opposites" is what they term evolution. Thus, Lenin stated: "Development is the 'struggle of opposites,'" implying that evolution occurs throughout the entire world. Their position, therefore, is that as long as everything in the world undergoes a struggle of opposites between death and birth, and as long as everything moves in an ascending trajectory toward the better, and given that the world is an indivisible whole where all parts are interconnected, it follows that the struggle of opposites occurring in every part must inevitably occur in the world as a whole. Consequently, the world—by virtue of these contradictions—transitions inevitably from one state to a superior state, and into a condition distinct from the first; this is their "evolution," an inevitable process from which there is no escape. However, the corruption of this logic is manifest in both its universal and particular applications. Contradiction is not inevitable in all things; there are entities in which no contradiction occurs, such as minerals, and there are events devoid of contradiction, such as a sale by mutual consent. Thus, even if one were to grant the validity of their other points, this alone evidences that world evolution is not an inevitable matter. Furthermore, the transition of things toward the better or toward states distinct from the primary one is not a universal necessity; there are things that transition toward the worse, such as youth passing into decrepitude, and there are things that remain as they are, where change does not transition them into a state other than the primary one, thereby precluding "evolution." This further evidences that world evolution is not inevitable. Moreover, the change of objects does not necessitate the presence of birth and death, as these are not inherent properties of change itself. In the absence of genesis and dissolution, or life and death, contradictions do not exist, and where there are no

contradictions, there is no “struggle of opposites”—and thus no evolution. Finally, the world is not so interconnected that everything is affected by every other; observation confirms that the inhabitants of Earth are not influenced by Mars, nor are the people of Siberia affected by those of Brazil. Even if a struggle of opposites were to occur in certain objects or parts of the world, it is not inevitable that it should occur in other objects or parts. Thus, evolution in the sense they intend—as a transition to a better state and a departure from the primary condition—is not an inevitable occurrence in the world, which highlights the fallacy of their views on nature.

9

However, the communists do not stop at presenting their views on nature and their theory on the inevitability of world evolution; rather, they subject the study of societal life and history to these views—that is, to the tenets of the dialectical method. They argue that if it is true that there are no isolated events in the world, and if all events are interconnected and mutually condition one another, then it is clear that no social system or historical social movement should be judged from the perspective of “eternal justice” or any other preconceived idea, as historians often do. Instead, they maintain that we must base our judgment on the specific conditions that engendered that particular system or social movement to which they are linked.

The demand for the establishment of a bourgeois republic under the conditions of Tsarism and bourgeois society—in Russia in 1905, for instance—was an understandable, correct, and entirely revolutionary act, because a bourgeois republic represented a step forward at that time. However, the demand for the establishment of a bourgeois democratic republic under the current conditions of the Soviet Union would be a violation

and a reactionary, counter-revolutionary act, because a bourgeois republic constitutes a step backward relative to the Soviet republic. Everything, in their view, is contingent upon circumstances, time, and place; it is in this manner that they apply their first point.

This constitutes the summation of their thesis regarding the application of the first point—namely, that nature is an indivisible whole—to the study of societal life; that is, their subordination of the study of society and its history to the first tenet of their view on nature. This view is patently erroneous. Observation confirms that every entity in the world possesses specific attributes that distinguish it from others, and specific laws that diverge from the laws of others. The Earth is distinct from Venus, possessing an independent existence and lacking any deterministic link in its specific laws; iron is distinct from mercury, and is not deterministically linked to it in its specific laws, despite both being metals; and man is distinct from animals, lacking any deterministic link in his specific laws, despite both being animals. Thus, a deterministic interconnection in every respect between the parts of the universe and its contents is non-existent; rather, only a general interconnection exists. Furthermore, man, specifically in his pure choice of his way of life and his mode of existence, and in his conduct according to the law he chooses, is independent of everything else in the universe; in this regard, he is entirely unlinked to anything else. Indeed, it is within his power for individuals to diverge from one another in their way of life and mode of existence. Thus, an interconnection in the way of life between man and nature is non-existent. Consequently, every social system and every social movement was not engendered by deterministic circumstances, but was rather produced by ideas concerning life; thus, a system was established and a movement arose, and if these ideas are changed, the system changes accordingly. Lands such as the Islamic territories were governed by Islam and followed the system of the Caliphate

(*Khilafah*) in governance; then, capitalist Christians seized them, imposed capitalist ideas, and implemented the capitalist system. If the ideas of the people are changed and Islamic ideas are instilled within them, they return to the system of Islam and follow the system of the Caliphate. This is neither a violation nor an anti-natural innovation; rather, it is consistent with the reality that every nation proceeds in life according to the ideas it possesses. Eastern Europe, as the nightmare of Marxist socialist rule recedes, is returning to capitalist ideas and following the system of liberties. This is not a violation of nature, but is consistent with the reality that every people proceeds in life according to the ideas it holds. Even Russia today, which follows Marxist socialism, fears the return of capitalist ideas and thus resists thought with "iron and fire," for it is certain that if capitalist ideas were to become dominant in Russia, the Marxist socialist system would undoubtedly be demolished and replaced by the capitalist system. Therefore, the fact that objects and laws in the universe, viewed as a whole and in every part, are considered an integral whole does not imply that a part possesses no laws other than universal laws, or no movement other than universal movement. Observation evidences that it possesses laws specific to it and movements specific to it; by these specific laws and movements, it is distinguished from other things and is not interconnected with them, despite both being linked to the universality of the universe and its laws. Man is distinguished from all parts of the universe by possessing laws and movements specific to him; he dominates objects and events within a wide sphere, choosing the laws he desires and performing the movements he intends. Although he is subject to laws specific to him, such as the heartbeat, and to the general laws of perceptible, tangible existence, he does not condition his behavior upon everything in the universe, nor is the path of others—such as Mars, for instance—conditioned by him. Thus, the claim that all events are interconnected and mutually condition one another is a void assertion. Consequently, the

claim that man proceeds in his livelihood in a deterministic manner is a void assertion, and considering his choice of the system he desires as a violation or an anti-natural innovation is a false statement contrary to reality. Man is independent of the remaining objects and events in the world; within the sphere where he possesses choice, he selects the system he desires.

This is from one perspective; from another, the demand for the establishment of a democratic republic in Russia under the conditions of Tsarism in 1905 is not considered progress or a step forward simply because it was consistent with the conditions of a disintegrating Tsarism. Rather, it constitutes progress if the system of a democratic republic is inherently better than the system of Tsarism, irrespective of circumstances, events, or nature. Thus, whether the demand for a system constitutes progress or regression is attributable to the demanded system itself, not to circumstances, events, or nature. Similarly, the demand for the establishment of a democratic republic under the current conditions of the Soviet Union would not be a violation, a reactionary counter-revolutionary act, or a step backward simply because it is inconsistent with the "progressive" conditions of the Soviet Union or because it opposes them. Rather, it would be reactionary if the system of a democratic republic were to hinder the progress of the nation or prevent it from advancing, regardless of the conditions prevalent in the Soviet Union. The evidence for this is that East Germany, when governed by its current system, regressed, and the misery of the people under its shadow intensified to the point that they began to flee from it in droves and individually. Bulgaria feels that if it were governed by a democratic republic, it would advance, despite the fact that its current system was established by the Soviet Union. This clearly demonstrates that whether a system is progressive or reactionary is not attributable to circumstances, events, or nature, but is rather attributable to the system itself. If it takes the nation by the hand through the stages of intellectual elevation and material progress, it is a

progressive system; if it delays the nation from intellectual revival or material progress, or hinders it from revival and advancement, it is reactionary, regardless of circumstances, events, and nature.

Thus, the error in applying the first point of their perspective on nature to the study of societal life becomes clearly manifest. This fallacy arises from two distinct premises:

First, their assertion that nature is an indivisible whole implies that man is linked to his surroundings—mountains, rivers, and planets—in a manner that conditions him and his behavior. However, reality refutes this; for it is not man's physical environment that conditions his conduct, but rather the concepts he possesses. Consequently, the lack of an interconnection between objects that would mutually condition one another becomes evident. Second, they applied the concept of nature as a totality to societal life, concluding that circumstances are the progenitors of social systems. They judge a system based on the circumstances that engendered it, thereby rendering societal life a product of its environment. Reality refutes this as well; for societal life consists of the management of relations between people, and that which directs these relations is the concepts they hold. Even if we were to grant, for the sake of argument, that man is linked to the sun, mountains, and rivers, the application of this link to the ongoing relations between people is impossible. Material objects in the world have no bearing on the management of relations; rather, relations are directed by the interests that people are impelled to satisfy. Other objects are neither the subject of inquiry nor relevant to the matter; they constitute a non-issue in this context and possess no existence in the management of relations. Therefore, the interconnection found among natural objects does not apply to the relations between people, and such an application is untenable. This further demonstrates that events do not mutually condition one another as a result of their interconnection,

exposing the error of subjecting societal life to the links found between events and objects, even assuming such links exist.

Regarding their claim that everything is contingent upon circumstances, time, and place—and their consideration that the demand for a specific system is progressive in certain conditions and reactionary in others—a single contemporary example from Europe suffices to demonstrate the corruption of the communist view. This is the system of the Free Trade Area and the Common Market currently implemented in Europe. The United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, and Portugal proceed according to a specific system termed the “Free Trade Area,” while Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg proceed according to a specific system termed the “Common Market.” All circumstances in these nations, in terms of time and place, are identical; nevertheless, each group has bound itself to a system distinct from the other. The demand for either system was considered neither reactionary nor progressive. However, following implementation, it became evident that the six nations following the Common Market achieved a degree of material progress so remarkable that it captured global attention. Is this system to be called “progressive” due to circumstances of time and place, or due to the ideas inherent within the system itself? Furthermore, the seven nations following the Free Trade Area are attempting to join the Common Market and abandon their current system. Is their lack of material progress under the Free Market to be considered "reactionary" because it is a step backward relative to their circumstances, or is it because its failure became apparent to them, prompting a desire for change? Is this not tangible evidence that circumstances have no bearing on a system, nor do they render it progressive if it harmonizes with them or reactionary if it is a “violation and an anti-natural innovation”? Rather, that which renders a system sound or corrupt is the ideas of which the system is composed.

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This concerns the application of the first point. As for the application of the second point, they assert that if it is true that the world is in a state of perpetual motion and evolution—and if the disappearance of the old and the emergence of the new are indeed the laws of evolution—then it becomes clear that there are no fixed, immutable social systems, nor are there eternal principles of private property and exploitation. They argue there are no eternal ideas regarding the subjugation of peasants to great landowners or workers to capitalists; consequently, the socialist system can replace the capitalist system, just as the capitalist system once replaced the feudal system.

This view is predicated upon their perspective on nature—specifically, that it changes and that things emerge while others dissolve—leading them to conclude that systems likewise change. That is, they believe a change in systems is inevitable, with some systems coming into existence and others vanishing. This is pure error. While it is true that the world changes, this does not imply that systems must inevitably change as long as the world does. Systems may change or they may remain static; they are not linked to the world's physical changes on one hand, nor do the laws governing nature and its objects apply to them on the other. The change of objects in the world may occur due to specific factors, such as the petrification of soil; however, this is linked neither to the nature of the soil nor to the purchase of the stone. Systems are not linked to the change of objects. Furthermore, the factors that lead to the change of objects do not apply to social systems, just as the factors leading to systemic change in society do not apply to physical objects. Linking the change of systems to the change of the world is groundless due to the clear divergence between the two. Therefore, the assertion that systemic change is inevitable because change in the world is

inevitable is a fallacious claim. Indeed, systems may change whether objects change or remain as they are. The possibility of systemic change is not the error; rather, the error lies in rendering systemic change an inevitability and asserting that they change because the world changes. These two premises are erroneous, for there is absolutely no correlation between the change of the world and the nature of social systems.

Furthermore, the question of whether systems are immutable or mutable is irrelevant; change and stability are not the subjects of inquiry regarding systems. Systems are treatments for events and objects; thus, the perspective toward them is not one of stability or change, but instead of validity and invalidity. The system of permissible property is ancient, while the system of abolishing property is new; yet it cannot be said that the disappearance of the old and the emergence of the new are laws of evolution. It is not argued that because the system of permissible property is old, it must vanish to be replaced by the abolition of property. This is because, in reality, the system of permissible property remains unchanged, while the abolition of property emerged due to the presence of new ideas, not because the old vanished. Similarly, the system of war is ancient, and the system of peace and disarmament is new. It is not said that the system of war must vanish because it is old and be replaced by peace and disarmament; this is not said because, in reality, the system of war exists and possesses a tangible reality, while the system of peace and disarmament remains mere ideas and theories. The system of non-punishment of envoys—that is, what is termed diplomatic immunity—is ancient, and no contrary system has replaced it. It is not said that it is old and must vanish to be replaced by a new system, because it exists and no alternative has yet emerged. Consequently, the perspective toward systems is not one of stability and change, for this is entirely irrelevant; rather, the perspective is one of soundness and unsoundness. Thus, it is incorrect to analyze systems on the basis of stability and change; they must be

analyzed solely on the basis of soundness and unsoundness. A system, in its essence, is not like a loaf of bread that molds, nor like dough that changes into bread, nor like a child becoming a youth or a youth becoming senile. It is a treatment for facts; therefore, the world's inevitability of change and lack of stability do not apply to it. Systems are not bound to the world such that its change leads inevitably to theirs. These three points refute and falsify this claim. The greatest evidence is the reality of systems and ideas. Some systems remain unchanged despite their antiquity, such as diplomatic immunity, armament, and espionage. Some ideas remain unchanged despite their antiquity, such as the idea that the sun is luminous, that one plus one equals two, and that man cannot live without food. If change in systems and ideas were inevitable, no single system or idea would remain static, for nothing in the world is unchanging. If systems were bound to the world, it would be impossible for any system or idea to remain unchanged, for nothing in the world remains unchanged. However, the fact that some systems and ideas remain static evidences that the claim of inevitable change in systems and ideas is erroneous, as is the claim that they are bound to the world in terms of stability and change.

It is true that many systems and ideas have changed. The system of governance as a sacred divine right for the monarch and his heirs has changed, replaced by a system where the nation chooses whom it wishes to be its ruler. The imperial system, which granted privileges to the center of the empire over the other provinces, has changed and been replaced by a system of equality in rights and duties. The system of racial discrimination, favoring one race over another based on color or ethnicity, has changed and been replaced by a system of non-discrimination. However, this change did not occur because the world changes; it occurred because the corruption and unsuitability of these systems and ideas for treating human problems became manifest. They were changed and replaced by what was thought to be a sound treatment for these problems.

Their change was not because change is inevitable in systems, nor because they are bound to the world and the world changes; rather, they changed because people saw them as unsuitable for treating their problems and thus changed them. Therefore, the existence of change in systems and ideas cannot be taken as evidence for the inevitability of change or for their connection to the world's flux.

Systems may also change due to the change of facts. A system is designed for a specific reality; when that reality changes and a new one emerges, the system becomes unsuitable for the new reality, necessitating a different system. Thus, the system changes because the reality changes. This may occur in subsidiary rulings or in general systems. For instance, grape juice is a specific reality treated by a specific ruling, which is the permissibility of its consumption, sale, and transport. If this juice ferments and becomes wine, the reality changes, requiring a system other than the first; it is then treated by a different ruling, which is the prohibition of its consumption, sale, and transport. The Shariah ruling changed because the reality changed. Similarly, when a state of actual war exists between two nations, a specific reality governs their relations, and for this reality, there is a specific system: the permissibility of the blood, property, and land of the combatant enemy. If a treaty of peace, good neighborliness, and general security is concluded between the two nations, the reality of their relations changes, requiring a system other than the first: respect for the treaty and the inviolability of their persons, property, and land. The Shariah ruling changed because the reality changed. However, this change did not occur because change is inevitable in systems, nor because the world changes, but because the reality treated by the system changed. This reality is not "the world," nor is it something that changes by a cosmic law; rather, the system was designed for it, and once it ceased to exist, the system treating it no longer had a place.

Furthermore, the modification of systems upon the alteration of facts, or their replacement upon the manifestation of their corruption, is contingent solely upon the ideas held by the individual effecting such change. If these ideas perceive that the new reality renders the old system no longer viable, the system is changed; conversely, if these ideas do not perceive such a shift and maintain that the old system remains suitable for the new reality, no change occurs. For instance, regarding grape juice, some individuals do not perceive that its transformation into wine necessitates a system different from the first; thus, they maintain the original system, and the permissibility of its consumption, sale, and transport remains. Meanwhile, others perceive that the change in its reality renders the first system unsuitable, necessitating a new system for its treatment. Similarly, regarding the colonization of weak nations, most of the world views it as a corrupt system, and there is a global public opinion against it; yet, capitalist states view it as a viable system and thus cling to it. Despite global pressure, they have not seen fit to change it, nor have they changed it voluntarily; rather, they merely substituted its method. What was once achieved through armies and combat is now conducted through loans and aid. Thus, the colonial system has not changed despite the manifestation of its corruption and despite global pressure; for as long as capitalist ideas are not uprooted from the minds of capitalist states, the colonial system cannot change so long as these states possess the capacity to maintain it. Therefore, systemic change is not only far from being inevitable or occurring because the world changes, but even in the instances where systems are changed—namely, the manifestation of their corruption or the mutation of the reality to which they are applied—such change does not occur unless the ideas necessitating systemic change exist within the human agent of bringing change.

An observer of historical facts since the inception of humanity perceives that when man adopts a system other than his primary one, he does not effect this change in accordance with cosmic flux or the mutation of objects and events. Rather, he effects change through the transformation of the ideas he carries and the sentiments awakened within him, just as paganism was changed and replaced by Islam, and as capitalism was changed in Russia and replaced by socialism. As for the change of objects and ongoing facts, this merely requires a new treatment for the newly occurred objects and facts; it does not require a change of the system itself. This is because a system is a collection of treatments that may be based on a comprehensive intellectual premise regarding the universe, man, and life—as is the case with the three ideologies: Islam, Capitalism, and Marxist Socialism—or it may not be based on a comprehensive premise but remains an interconnected whole that provides a specific viewpoint and method, such as Japan. Thus, the change of objects and events does not change the system; rather, it necessitates treatments for these objects and events, while the people remain committed to the system under which they live. A system usually consists of broad outlines; while events are renewed and objects change, their mutation does not imply a change in the broad outlines. Instead, it implies the formulation of treatments for new events and objects derived from those broad outlines. If the system lacks the capacity to incorporate new treatments—as is the case in the capitalist system and Western jurisprudence—they formulate new treatments for them and attempt to reinterpret (*taʾwīl*) the broad outlines to harmonize with the new treatments, which, after such reinterpretation and explanation, become part of the system. Thus, systemic change only occurs if ideas change, not because events or objects change. It is the ideas held by man and the sentiments awakened within him that perceive the need for systemic change while facts remain static; it is they that perceive

the need to formulate treatments from within that system for renewed facts and objects; and it is they that perceive the need to change the treatments themselves to suit the change of facts and objects. Therefore, all change—whether in systems *qua* systems, in the formulation of treatments from those systems for renewed facts, or in the modification of treatments due to the change of facts—emanates from ideas and sentiments alone. The change of the world has no bearing on any of this, nor does the change of facts and objects dictate their modification or stability. Consequently, there is no inevitability of systemic change to be replaced by another based on the change of the world or the mutation of events and objects. Rather, the issue of systems is an issue of the ideas people carry and the sentiments awakened within them; if these change, the system changes, and if they do not, it does not change and remains eternal so long as people carry its ideas and sentiments. Accordingly, there is no necessity for the socialist system to replace the capitalist one, nor the capitalist to replace the socialist; rather, one system replaces another in only two instances: first, if ideas and sentiments change; and second, if a force emerges that is materially and intellectually stronger than the nation's forces and imposes its system upon it. Aside from these two cases, no systemic change occurs whatsoever.

Consequently, it was erroneous to assert that systems change because the world changes; it was fallacious to claim that systemic change is an inevitability; it was incorrect to state that fixed systems do not exist; and it was wrong to posit that the socialist system must replace the capitalist system. Through this, the error of the second point is exposed.

At this juncture, it might be posited that the inevitability of systemic change is a societal inevitability, rather than a natural fatalism. Societal inevitability is an inevitability that occurs through potentiality—that is, through action by an agent—and is

not mechanically autonomous. It exists in a state of latency, requiring human intervention. This means that the change in the system is latent within it, but it does not transform itself mechanically; rather, human intervention is required—meaning actions must be undertaken to effect this change. Accordingly, the failure of change to occur in a system in certain cases does not contradict the theory, for the theory does not posit mechanical change but change effected by an agent; however, the system's becoming susceptible to change is the inevitable matter. The rebuttal to this is that the communists assert that the disappearance of the old and the emergence of the new are a law of evolution; thus, the change of the old system and the advent of a new one are likewise the law of evolution in systems. As for the claim that this is merely latent and not transformed in actuality, and that human intervention is required for actual transformation, this is merely an interpretation of the "inevitability of evolution" they advocate. That is, they interpret the inevitability of evolution as rendering the system susceptible to transformation rather than being a transformation that has actually occurred. Even with this interpretation, the theory remains erroneous. Regarding the claim that change is latent in the system—meaning the system transforms from a specific state to a state possessing the susceptibility for change—observation confirms that several systems have remained exactly as they were from ancient times until the present. The system of war and the system of envoys and ambassadors between states are demonstrably ancient and enduring. Had change occurred inevitably by transforming into a state of susceptibility, it would have occurred in these two systems. Since it has not occurred in them, the inevitability of change being latent is incorrect; for latency of change does not necessarily exist in every system. There are systems in which change is not latent—that is, the susceptibility for change has not occurred. If societal inevitability—meaning the existence of the system in a stage of

latency for change—were a necessary occurrence because the disappearance of the old and the emergence of the new is inevitable, then the system of war and the system of ambassadors would have reached the stage of latency for change based on the societal inevitability they advocate. Since this latency has not emerged where it previously did not exist—neither in the system of war nor in the system of ambassadors—it follows that societal inevitability has not occurred.

Furthermore, a social system is comprised of either ideas intended to resolve problems or ideas that define the methodology for their application. Each category possesses an inherent susceptibility to modification at any juncture through human agency. A system is not a physical entity that attains a state of “latency for change,” analogous to water when its temperature is raised or lowered to a critical threshold. From its very inception, a system is susceptible to change via human intervention, rather than only upon reaching a specific state. The socialism currently implemented in Russia possesses the susceptibility to change; should its adherents embrace the ideas of Islam, they would undoubtedly alter it and establish Islam in its stead. Similarly, the capitalism implemented in West Germany would be changed and replaced by socialism were Russia to seize control of it. Thus, the susceptibility of a system to change is a natural phenomenon, but it does not occur through a deterministic necessity as cosmic flux does, nor does it occur inevitably upon reaching a specific degree as is the case with water. That is to say, change was not latent within the system previously only to become active upon reaching a certain limit; rather, the susceptibility to change in any system arises from the fact that it consists of ideas applied to realities—ideas which any human being can replace with others. Consequently, it becomes evident that "societal inevitability" is non-existent in the reality of life and the reality of systems.

Admittedly, when the corruption of a system becomes manifest, it necessitates change; likewise, if the reality it was designed to treat undergoes transformation, change becomes imperative. However, this does not fall under the rubric of what they term "societal inevitability." It is not a transition of the system from one state to another wherein it enters a "latent stage" of change. Rather, it stems from the fact that a system is adopted for the purpose of treatment—that is, to rectify a situation. If it becomes corrupt, the justification for its adoption vanishes and the justification for its replacement emerges. It also stems from the fact that it was adopted to address a specific reality; once that reality ceases to exist, the need for the system expires. The change necessitated by the condition of the system in this instance is a matter of the system's suitability or unsuitability for a given reality, not a matter of "evolution" or "societal inevitability." From this, it is clear that a system does not evolve until it reaches a stage of latency for change, requiring human intervention to "catalyze" this latency—thereby assisting the inevitability of evolution to move from latency to actualization. Instead, a system consists of ideas for treating a specific reality; if the corruption of these ideas becomes manifest, it necessitates their replacement with sound ideas—that is, a sound system. Similarly, if the reality being treated changes and a different reality emerges, the change in reality necessitates a change in ideas—that is, a change in the system and the introduction of alternative ideas or a different system to be applied to the new reality. Thus, the fallacy of the doctrine of societal inevitability is exposed, and consequently, the claim of the inevitability of evolution is invalidated. It is possible for an eternal system to exist without change if it is evidenced to be sound and no corruption occurs within it; conversely, it is possible for a system to change if its corruption becomes manifest. Therefore, the assertion of the inevitability of systemic change is an absolutely void proposition.

11

Regarding the application of the third point to society, the communists contend that if the transition from slow quantitative changes to sudden and rapid qualitative changes is indeed a law of evolution, then it follows that revolutions undertaken by oppressed classes are entirely natural and unavoidable events. Consequently, the transition from capitalism to socialism and the liberation of the working class from the capitalist yoke can be achieved not through simple, slow changes or reforms, but only through a qualitative change of the capitalist system—that is, through revolution.

This perspective is fallacious, as they employ a “holistic analogy” in this instance, applying the dynamics observed in certain physical bodies to the movements of the cosmos and, subsequently, to the movements of society. This constitutes the essence of a holistic analogy: much like a child who, upon finding one orange sour, concludes that all oranges are sour. The fact that water transforms into steam in one state and into ice in another is used as a metric for the entire universe and for human societies; this is the very definition of a holistic analogy. The error in measuring the universe and societies against the transformation of water into steam or ice lies in the fact that while water is a physical body affected by the heat applied to it, this does not imply that heat transforms all bodies as it transforms water, nor does it imply that agents other than heat transform things from one state to another in the same manner as heat. Furthermore, the fact that water transforms suddenly upon reaching a critical point does not mean that society transforms suddenly via revolutions upon reaching a critical point. Society consists of human beings and relations, and its transformation occurs through the transformation of ideas, not through revolutions and disturbances. It is erroneous to measure human nature against the nature of inanimate objects due to the

manifest divergence between them. Accordingly, there is no necessity for society to transition from one state to another suddenly, nor is there a necessity for such a transition to occur as a result of oppression. The capitalist system emerged in Europe and America gradually, not suddenly. Conversely, the system of Islam emerged in the Arabian Peninsula suddenly. The European oppression of Black people in Africa persisted for centuries without any transition occurring as a result of that oppression; indeed, no significant revolutions occurred despite the presence of oppression. What has been observed in Africa in recent times regarding attempts at so-called “independence” resulted from the influence of ideas from major powers like America and Russia, rather than from the people themselves. Both powers began to disseminate concepts of independence and liberation in Africa and undertook international actions against other colonialists. Therefore, the change that occurred in water does not necessarily occur in society if revolutions take place within it. The application of changes evidenced by natural sciences in certain physical bodies to society is erroneous because no similarity exists between them. Moreover, the reality of society has demonstrated that the methodology of change within it—meaning society—does not proceed according to a specific, fixed, and inevitable manner, as is the case with inanimate objects when they change or transition from one state to another. As long as this entire application is fallacious, change *per se* is not a necessity—that is, it is not inevitable. The occurrence of revolutions is not inevitable, nor is the transition—assuming revolutions occur—inevitable. Revolutions may or may not occur, and even if they do, the transition may or may not follow. Consequently, the conclusions drawn regarding the inevitability of transition based on "genesis and evolution" are not inevitable, due to the inapplicability of the laws governing physical bodies in natural sciences to the human society.

While it is true that the presence of ideas and sentiments within a people or a group, and the dominance of these ideas and sentiments over them, causes the society of that people or group to transition inevitably from one state to another and from one system to another, this does not occur as a natural event. Rather, it is an occurrence that has been intentionally and deliberately undertaken; thus, it is a purposeful or contrived event. For were it not for the dissemination of ideas and sentiments, and their reaching a point of dominance, the transition would not have occurred. Therefore, it is not a natural event, nor did it occur naturally; rather, it occurred through a purposeful—that is, contrived—movement. Inevitability does not lie in its occurrence itself, but rather in its occurrence if the dominance of ideas and sentiments over the people or group is achieved. However, the dissemination and dominance of ideas do not occur naturally or inevitably; consequently, the transition of a people or group from one state to another and from one system to another is neither natural nor inevitable. The communists do not claim that the transition of society occurs if the dominance of ideas and sentiments over the people is achieved; rather, they assert that the occurrence of revolutions undertaken by the oppressed classes renders the transition from capitalism to socialism inevitable and unavoidable. They do not say that the transition occurs if revolutions happen; they say that the occurrence of revolutions is an inevitable and unavoidable matter. Thus, in their view, the transition of society from one state to another and from one system to another is an inevitable and unavoidable matter. This is the error, for the occurrence of revolutions by the oppressed classes is not inevitable, and the transition of society from one state to another and from one system to another—even assuming the occurrence of revolutions—is not inevitable. Therefore, measuring society against nature and physical bodies—arguing that since the latter change inevitably, society must also change inevitably—is a fallacious analogy. This is because change in society is not

inevitable as it is in physical bodies and nature, and because the application of what has been evidenced regarding inanimate objects to man and his society is a flagrant error. For such a rule to be applicable to man or society, there must be a common denominator between man and his society and inanimate objects that serves as the subject of the rule, thereby validating the analogy or application.

From one perspective, and from another, the changes that occur in the universe do not constitute a progressive ascending movement or a transition from lower to higher; rather, they are mere change, which may be ascending or descending. Similarly, the changes that occur in societies are not inherently ascending or toward the better; they are mere change, potentially ascending or descending. It is true that it is a transition from an old state to a new state, but it is not necessary for this new state to be ascending, proceeding along the path of progress, or to be better than the old state. Indeed, the old state may be better, and it may be a transition backward instead of forward. Hence, the application of Darwin's theory of "Genesis and Evolution" to society is corrupt, because the subject of the theory is the physiological aspect of individual living beings. Thus, applying the theory to human society is the application of a physiological aspect to another, non-physiological aspect. The reality of society is one thing, and the reality addressed by the theory is another; therefore, the application of one to the other is undoubtedly void. Add to this that it is not necessary for the direction of change—meaning the transition from one state to another—to be toward the better; it may be toward the better or toward the worse. The communists themselves state, in the Marxist inquiry into so-called "reactionary reversal", that it is possible for a reactionary system to arise upon the ruins of a progressive system. The reality of societies in the world clearly demonstrates that the changes occurring in societies are not inevitably a transition from lower to higher or forward; rather,

they may transition upward or downward. The society in the Arabian Peninsula transitioned upward with the mission of the Messenger ﷺ, but when the application of Islam therein was corrupted, it regressed. When the system of Islam receded and the Arabian Peninsula became several states, it declined. Society in North America, while under the authority of colonialism, was a degenerate society, and when it was liberated from colonialism, the society rose; when knowledge increased therein, it rose further. Meanwhile, society in Latin America remained degenerate, preoccupied with revolutions and coups. Society in Iran during the days of the Abbasid Caliphate was in a state of elevation, but when Iran separated from the body of the Islamic State, it declined. Thus, dozens of examples from the reality of societies clearly articulate that changes in societies need not be ascending or toward the better; they may be toward the better or toward the worse. Accordingly, the movement of society in its transition from one state to another is not a progressive ascending movement, and the transition therein is not a transition from slow quantitative changes to sudden and rapid qualitative changes; rather, it is a mere transition from one state to another that may be ascending or descending. The transition may result from revolution, as occurred in North America when it was liberated from colonialism, and as occurred in Russia when it abolished Tsarism and brought about socialism. The transition may result from the increase of sciences and knowledge, as occurred in Russia and the United States after the Second World War. The transition may occur gradually, as happened in Europe, or it may occur suddenly, as happened in the Arabian Peninsula when it embraced Islam and carried it as a message to the world. Similarly, the transition downward may be gradual, as occurred in the Islamic society in the nineteenth century CE, or the transition to the worse may be sudden, as occurred in East Germany when it was occupied by the communists. Thus, the third point of the dialectical theory's tenets regarding nature is invalidated. If the transition of water

from a state of ice to a state of liquidity and then to a gaseous state is considered a progressive ascending movement, then the transformation of water vapor into water and then into ice is considered a reactionary descending movement. Since both movements proceed according to natural laws, the fortune of the progressive ascending movement in the universe is no greater than that of the reactionary descending movement. On what basis, then, did they decide that the direction of change in the universe is exclusively a progressive ascending direction?

Furthermore, the systems applied to events and objects by man are essentially ideas. Their quality—whether beneficial or deleterious—is not contingent upon their antiquity or novelty, but rather upon their truth or falsehood. The proposition that "one plus one equals two" is an ancient thought, yet its antiquity does not render it deleterious. Similarly, the practice of covering one's nakedness is an ancient concept, yet its age does not make it erroneous. Conversely, the establishment of savings funds is a modern idea, yet its novelty does not render it beneficial; indeed, savings funds hinder a nation's economy and cause it harm. Nudism is likewise a modern ideology, yet its novelty does not make it beneficial, and so forth. Even if we were to grant, for the sake of argument, that nature transitions in its movement from the simple to the complex and from the lower to the higher, this would not apply to society. This is because that which transforms society from one state to another is thought. Thought is beneficial only if it is correct and detrimental if it is erroneous. The state of a society—whether prosperous or wretched—depends upon the ideas implemented within it. Thus, there is no inevitable transition toward the better; there is only a transition from one state to another, which may be beneficial or deleterious. This further invalidates the application of the third point to society.

Consequently, the assertion that societal changes constitute a transition from the lower to the higher is erroneous, for they

are merely changes. The claim that these changes are necessarily sudden is likewise false, as they may be sudden or gradual. Furthermore, the assertion that revolutions are inevitable in cases of oppression is incorrect; the power of the oppressors may be too formidable for a revolution to withstand, as was the case in Hungary. Alternatively, oppression may be so severe and long-standing that it engenders humiliation and a despair of salvation, as observed in certain African nations. Accordingly, the transition from capitalism to socialism is not an inevitable occurrence. Oppression of workers may not reach a threshold that impels them toward revolution, as is currently the case in the United States. Moreover, oppression may exist without salvation being achieved, as seen in Iran, where the movements are not undertaken by the people but by foreign agents, and there is no evidence that the populace is contemplating a revolution. For these reasons, the application of the third point to society is fallacious.

12

Regarding the fourth point, they contend in its application to society that if evolution proceeds through the emergence of internal contradictions and the conflict between opposing forces based on these contradictions—and if the objective of this conflict is to conquer and overcome these contradictions—then it follows that the proletarian class struggle is an entirely natural and unavoidable event. Consequently, they argue that the contradictions of the capitalist system should not be concealed but rather highlighted and exposed. The class struggle should not be stifled but pursued to its ultimate conclusion. Therefore, they maintain that a firm proletarian class policy must be followed, rejecting any reformist policy that advocates for harmony between the interests of the proletariat and the

bourgeoisie, or any conciliatory policy that suggests the integration of capitalism into socialism.

This view is predicated upon their premise that all natural objects and events harbor internal contradictions. By applying this to society, they conclude that every society necessarily contains internal contradictions. Just as all natural objects and events possess a negative and a positive side, a past and a present, and contain elements that die and others that are born, so too does every society possess a negative and a positive side, a past and a present, and elements that perish while others emerge. They argue that just as the struggle of these opposites in all natural objects—the conflict between the old and the new, the dying and the born—constitutes the internal content of the movement of evolution, so too is the struggle of these opposites in society the internal content of its evolutionary movement. In their view, the struggle between opposites in society is inevitable, and the existence of contradictions is a certainty. The result of this logic is that there can be only one method for societal development: the exposure of these contradictions and the engagement in class struggle.

All of this is fundamentally erroneous. The claim that every natural object involves a process of birth and death is a void assertion contradicted by reality; it is a mere theoretical hypothesis. In nature, there are indeed things in which birth and death occur, such as a germinating plant or a youth. However, there are other things in which death or decay occurs without any corresponding birth, such as inanimate matter, light, and gravity. If water is left as it is, it may decrease, but it does not increase on its own; it experiences neither a negative nor a positive pole, and no contradictions occur within it. Sand, if left undisturbed, exhibits no observable contradictions. Even if we were to assume that a struggle exists between that which is born and that which dies, such opposites cannot exist in inanimate objects; thus, no contradictions can occur. This invalidates the

claim that all natural objects and events contain internal contradictions, and consequently, it invalidates the claim that every society contains internal contradictions. The clearest evidence of this is the non-Muslim society in India; it is a “dead” society devoid of any vital spark. Since the departure of Islamic rule and throughout the period of British rule until today, it has remained a stagnant, dead society that has neither changed nor moved, nor has any transformation occurred within it. Therefore, not every society contains contradictions, nor does every society experience the struggle of opposites. This alone is sufficient to refute this point from its very foundations.

Moreover, even if we were to concede the existence of contradiction in every natural object, such contradiction—if removed—would neutralize the effect of the contradictory process, thereby allowing for the avoidance of "inevitability" in the outcomes of such processes. A magnet attracts a piece of iron from any of its ends; however, if you magnetize the iron, the magnet can only attract it from the opposite pole. That is, if the magnet’s pole facing the iron is negative, it will not attract the iron unless the iron’s facing pole is positive, and vice versa. Similarly, if a snake bites a human, the effect of its venom in the blood is neutralized by an anti-venom serum. The acidic effect of acids is removed through their reaction with bases. Sulfuric acid, for instance, reacts with and dissolves zinc; however, if the acid reacts with a sufficient quantity of sodium hydroxide, it is neutralized and loses its acidic properties. Consequently, if you were to place a piece of zinc into sulfuric acid after it has been neutralized by sodium hydroxide, it would not dissolve. If you take blue litmus paper and dip it in acid, it turns red; if you then dip that red paper into an alkaline solution, it reverts to its original blue state. Thus, the base neutralizes the acid, and the acid neutralizes the base. Oil does not dissolve in water due to the contradiction in their solubility properties; however, if sodium hydroxide is added, the contradiction is removed and the

oil dissolves. Iron oxidizes (rusts) when exposed to moisture and oxygen; yet, if a specific proportion of carbon is introduced into the iron's composition, it becomes steel, which does not rust even when exposed to moisture and oxygen. In this case, the carbon neutralizes the oxidation process. The meeting of male semen with the female ovum leads to fertilization and pregnancy; yet this can be neutralized by introducing a substance into the uterus that obstructs fertilization or kills the sperm. In this manner, the contradiction between two things can be removed to achieve new results. Thus, inevitability can be avoided by generating different outcomes through a different process. Accordingly, the occurrence of contradictions in everything is not inevitable, for they can be removed before they become manifest.

Furthermore, the analogy between society and nature, and the application of natural laws to the social sphere, is a fallacious endeavor. Natural entities are physical bodies, whereas society consists of relations between human beings. The factors influencing physical bodies are distinct from those influencing society; thus, measuring society against natural objects is an erroneous analogy due to the divergence of the causal factors affecting each. Consequently, applying the phenomena of nature to society is a flawed undertaking, for natural occurrences result from the effects of heat and moisture, while social occurrences result from the influence of ideas and sentiments. The vast chasm and profound distinction between these two domains are manifest.

Moreover, the transitions occurring in nature from lower to higher states—such as the growth of a seedling into a tree or a child into a youth in a specific locale—are not influenced by the factors affecting surrounding seedlings or youths in another location, whether those factors delay or accelerate their transition. Society, by contrast, is affected by the transitions occurring in surrounding societies. While natural objects are

transitioned from one state to another by nourishment, water, air, and the like—factors that only affect what they directly touch—society is transitioned by ideas and sentiments, which are transmitted across societies in a remarkable fashion, penetrating all barriers. If ideas emerge in one society, they migrate to others with astonishing speed and extraordinary effect, potentially causing regression or impelling progress. Thus, the analogy between society and natural objects, and the application of natural influences to the social realm, is clearly a fallacious comparison and a misplaced application. Even if we were to assume that contradictions occur within natural objects, it is not necessary for contradictions to exist within societies. That is, if we assume that there is a struggle between that which is born and that which dies within the body of a seedling, a plant, or a youth, it is not necessary for a struggle to exist between workers and employers, buyers and sellers, peasants and landowners, or landlords and tenants. The physical body of a seedling or a youth is entirely heterogeneous to the relations existing between workers and employers or other social groups. There is nothing that necessitates the inevitability of contradictions in social relations merely because such contradictions occur in natural objects; this invalidates the claim that the proletarian class struggle is an inevitable matter.

Furthermore, even if we were to grant, for the sake of argument, that opposites exist within societies, it is not necessary for a struggle to ensue between these opposites, as a reconciliation may occur that removes the antagonism. Even if we were to accept that the interests of workers are opposed to those of employers, or those of buyers to sellers, or peasants to landowners, it does not follow that a struggle between every two groups is necessary. That is, it is not necessary for contradictions to arise in the relations between them, for systems can be established to organize these relations in a manner that removes conflict and harmonizes their interests, thereby preventing any struggle or contradiction. This was the condition prevalent in

Islamic society for over thirteen centuries; no contradictions arose from the opposition of interests in the relations between people, because the rulings of Islam that govern these relations remove conflict, and thus contradictions did not occur. Moreover, workers in capitalist countries, such as the United States, are in a better condition than those in the socialist Soviet Union, and the proletarian class struggle is absent there. How then can it be claimed that the occurrence of the proletarian class struggle is an inevitable matter when historical and contemporary reality refutes it? Indeed, the reality of human life negates this claim from its very foundation. Antagonistic tendencies, whatever they may be, do not result in contradiction if a reconciliation occurs that removes the antagonism—such as providing workers with more than their sufficiency, which prevents collision with employers. Therefore, the assertion of the inevitability of contradictions is an erroneous claim, for they are not inevitable within society.

The communists themselves articulate positions indicating that reconciliation between opposites is possible, thereby preventing contradictions. They assert that it is impermissible to follow a reformist policy that advocates for harmony between the interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, nor a conciliatory policy that suggests the integration of capitalism into socialism. This very assertion implies that a policy of harmonizing interests exists and could be followed, which would prevent the struggle of opposites and the occurrence of contradictions. This constitutes an admission that the occurrence of contradictions in society is not an inevitable matter. For if it were inevitable, it would be impossible to establish harmony between the interests of workers and employers. However, as long as the reconciliation of antagonistic tendencies is a possibility—and one that is realized in practice—contradictions do not occur in such instances, and thus a society free of contradictions can exist. Consequently, the claim regarding the inevitability of contradictions in society is invalidated.

A meticulous examination of communist discourse leads to this definitive conclusion, which admits no alternative interpretation. For this reason, they have taken precautions to prevent the removal of contradictions—that is, to prevent the existence of a society free of contradictions. They advocated for the avoidance of reconciliation between antagonistic tendencies so that a society without contradictions would not emerge. They did not stop there but urged the highlighting of contradictions whenever they exist, stating that the contradictions of the capitalist system should not be concealed but rather exposed and displayed, and that the class struggle should not be stifled but pursued to its ultimate conclusion. This position of theirs implies that the existence of contradictions in society is not an inevitable matter, but rather requires intentional actions to be brought into being. Thus, they must prevent their concealment or stifling; they must highlight and display them; and they must conduct the class struggle to its end so that contradictions may exist in society. This means that if they do not undertake these operations, contradictions would not exist in society. Consequently, the existence of contradictions in society is neither an inevitable nor a natural matter, but rather a contrived process brought about by the performance of specific actions, without which it would not exist. This suffices to invalidate their claims regarding the inevitability of the class struggle, the inevitability of the collision between workers and capitalists, and the inevitability of the civilizational clash between socialism and capitalism.

Furthermore, the ideological rift currently existing between the communist leaders in the Soviet Union and those in Communist China evidences that the occurrence of struggle between opposing tendencies is not an inevitable matter; rather, it invalidates their theory regarding the inevitability of contradictions within society. The communist leaders in the Soviet Union pursue a policy predicated upon the harmonization of interests between Russia and America and upon mutual understanding between them. This implies a reconciliation of

opposing tendencies and the prevention of contradictions within the international community. Conversely, the communist leaders in Communist China denounce and combat this policy, asserting the necessity of highlighting the antagonism between the interests of the Communist camp and the Capitalist camp to engender contradictions within the international arena. This disagreement between them signifies that they all concede that the existence of contradictions in the international community requires the undertaking of specific actions and the pursuit of a policy that generates struggle between the two camps and prevents reconciliation. Since the leaders of the Soviet Union do not wish to generate this struggle and instead work to render the international community a society devoid of contradictions through their attempt to harmonize socialist interests in Russia with capitalist interests in America, the claim regarding the inevitability of contradictions in society is invalidated.

Moreover, while conflict among human beings is an unavoidable matter due to the divergence of tendencies, this does not imply that contradictions must necessarily occur in everything, nor that they must inevitably arise between workers and employers—that is, between the employees and the hirers. Such contradictions may or may not occur. Their occurrence is neither a necessity nor an unavoidable certainty; consequently, what is termed “class struggle” resulting from contradictions does not occur naturally, let alone inevitably. If the concepts of struggle are present, it occurs; if they are absent, it does not. Accordingly, the claim that evolution proceeds through the emergence of internal contradictions is erroneous, both because what transpires is mere change rather than “evolution” in the sense of a transition to a superior state, and because these contradictions are not a necessary attribute of all things. Likewise, the assertion that the struggle of workers against employers is an unavoidable matter is false, for it may or may not occur, and because so-called “contradictions” are not an inevitable feature of society. Therefore, the fourth point, in its application to society, is an error that contradicts reality.

13

Through all the aforementioned, the error of the four points and the fallacy of their application to society become manifest. The cohesion of nature does not imply an inevitable, general interconnection of every element within it; for so-called “laws of evolution” are non-existent. Instead, what exists are the laws of the universe as a whole, and the specific laws pertaining to each part of the universe and to every individual entity contained therein. These general and specific laws are not laws of evolution. Furthermore, the fact that events and objects change does not imply that they transition from a lower to a higher state, nor does the change of objects necessitate a change in social systems. The fact that the change in water from quantity to quality occurs suddenly does not imply that societal change occurs suddenly, nor does it mean that revolutions are unavoidable. The fact that conflict among people is necessary due to their differing tendencies does not imply the necessity of contradictions within society, nor the necessity of contradictions between workers and employers. Consequently, the dialectical discourse regarding nature is erroneous, and its application to society is fallacious. Man does not proceed along a deterministic path in life or within the systems he inhabits according to the dictates of nature; rather, he proceeds along a purely volitional path, choosing the system he deems appropriate. He subjugates so-called "nature" to the system he chooses for himself, adapting it according to his will. There is no compulsion exerted upon his ideas, his life systems, his political views, or his political institutions; rather, he is possessed of absolute choice, and there is no power that deterministically subordinates him to any of these matters whatsoever.

This is the reality of the dialectical theory regarding thought and its application to society, and regarding nature and its application to society. It is entirely a series of errors, constituting nothing more than theoretical hypotheses and

holistic analogies. Its danger lies in its perspective toward man and society; for it renders man a mere part of the universe like any other part, disregarding the life within him and the faculty that distinguishes him from animals: the intellect. By defining the intellect as a mere reflection of reality upon the brain, and by rendering intellectual life a reflection of objective reality or a reflection of that which exists, it fails to establish any distinction between man and animal. It accords no weight to the superiority of the human brain over the animal brain in its capacity to link information to reality, and it disregards the human ability—through the correlation of information—to bring about realities that did not previously exist. It overlooks the fact that the hypotheses preceding theories and laws are ideas derived by man through the correlation of ideas with other ideas, without their reality being within the reach of his senses at the moment of derivation; or their reality may be something that does not yet exist but is intended to be brought into being, or something that will exist in the future. This is undoubtedly a devaluation of the mind's role in the totality of life, placing all value upon material reality rather than the intellect. Furthermore, dialectics has rendered man a being who proceeds in life solely within the laws of the universe, without regard for the fact that he possesses specific laws pertaining to him alone—to his existence and his life. It fails to recognize that, through tangible observation, man performs many actions by choice and refrains from others by choice; specifically, he chooses his way of life and mode of existence with absolute volition. Indeed, dialectics ignored this and made him subject to cosmic laws in everything, even in his way of life and mode of existence. This, beyond its contradiction of the observed reality of cosmic and human laws and the observed reality of human life, constitutes an annulment of human existence as an entity distinct from the universe and life. Instead, it considers him a part of the universe like any planet, or rather like any part of the earth such as iron or soil. Yet man is distinct from the universe and distinct from life; for

although his body is a part of the universe and his life is of the same nature as the life found in any living organism, he has—by virtue of the intellect and the unique characteristics bestowed upon him alone—become a third entity within perceived existence. For perceived existence is not merely the universe, nor merely the universe and life; rather, perceived existence consists of the Universe, Life, and Man.

This characterizes the dialectical perspective regarding man. As for its outlook on society, by rendering movement in nature a consequence of contradictions and the struggle of opposites, and by characterizing nature as a cohesive totality while positioning man as a mere constituent part thereof, and by asserting that natural movement is an evolutionary process transitioning from the lower to the higher, it has effectively forced man into a deterministic course within society, dictated by the trajectory of nature from which he cannot deviate. It has posited that nature is the architect of the society in which man dwells, rather than man being the originator of the society he desires. Furthermore, it has reduced human life to a mere struggle between opposites, claiming it is an unceasing transition toward the better. This is undoubtedly contrary to reality. Man inhabits two spheres: one that exercises dominion over him, and another over which he exercises dominion. The sphere that dominates him is that in which the systems of existence apply to him; he, the cosmos, and life proceed according to a specific, immutable order. Consequently, events occur within this sphere beyond his volition; therein, he is compelled (*musayyar*) rather than possessed of free will (*mukhayyar*). He entered this world without his consent and shall depart from it against his will, being incapable of transgressing the cosmic order. This sphere, however, does not constitute society, nor does it form society; thus, it is irrelevant to the subject of this inquiry. Conversely, the sphere over which man exercises dominion is that in which he proceeds by choice

within the system he selects. This is the sphere where actions originate from man or affect him by his own will; he walks, eats, drinks, and travels whenever he pleases, or refrains from doing so at his discretion. He acts by choice and abstains by choice. Society and its formation, systems and their modification, and life and its direction all fall within this sphere. Thus, it is man who dominates nature—that is, objects and their laws—subjugating them to his service; nature does not dominate him. He lives by choice according to his will, not by compulsion; rather, he selects the system he desires. He is the one who originates society; nature does not originate it for him. His life is a struggle between opposites and a harmony between concordants, not merely a struggle. It may transition toward the better, as occurred with the Arabs upon their conversion to Islam, or it may transition toward the worse, as occurred with the Muslims when they abandoned Islam in the arena of life. For all these reasons, Dialectical Materialism, in both its dimensions, constitutes a pure error.

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Such is Dialectical Materialism and its assertions when applied to societal life and history. Historical Materialism, conversely, denotes the application of dialectical ideas to the life of society. They contend that the material conditions of life in society—which ultimately determine the form of society, its ideas, views, political institutions, and the like—consist of nature (the geographical environment), population growth, and the mode of production. They argue that while the nature surrounding society, or the geographical environment, constitutes one of the permanent and necessary conditions for the material life of society and undoubtedly influences societal development, it is not the primary force that determines the form of society, defines the system by which people live, or dictates

the transition from one system to another. They assert that while the geographical environment is undeniably a permanent and necessary condition for society and certainly influences its development by accelerating or decelerating its pace, this influence is not decisive. This is because societal development and its fluctuations proceed at a much faster rate than the development and changes of the geographical environment. Therefore, the geographical environment cannot be the fundamental or decisive cause of social development. That which remains unchanged for tens of thousands of years cannot be the primary cause for the development of something subject to fundamental changes within a few centuries. Furthermore, they contend that population growth and density constitute one of the conditions of societal life, as human beings are an indispensable and fundamental element of the material conditions of society; without a minimum threshold of people, no material life for society could exist. However, they maintain that population growth and density do not constitute the primary force determining the character of the social order. They acknowledge that population growth influences social development, facilitating or hindering it, but it cannot be the primary force of social development, nor can its influence be decisive. This is because human growth, in and of itself, does not give rise to a higher or more advanced type of social system. This is evidenced by the fact that the population density in China is four times higher than in the United States, yet the United States occupies a higher level of social development than China. Similarly, the population density in Belgium is nineteen times higher than in the United States, yet the United States is at a more advanced level of social development than Belgium. Consequently, it follows that population growth cannot be the primary force of societal development—that is, the force that determines the character of the social system and the form of society. They assert that the mode of production, though it constitutes one of the conditions of societal life alongside nature

and population growth, is the primary force behind societal development and the force that determines the form of society. The method of obtaining the means of subsistence necessary for human life—that is, the mode of producing material needs such as food, clothing, footwear, housing, fuel, and the instruments of production, etc., which are indispensable for society to live and develop—is the method that determines the character of the social order and the form of society. They elaborate on this by stating:For life to persist, food, clothing, shelter, and fuel are indispensable. To obtain these material necessities, they must be produced, and production necessitates the instruments of production through which people generate these needs. Furthermore, the knowledge of how to utilize these instruments is required. Thus, the instruments of production, the individuals who employ them, and the technical knowledge of their use collectively constitute the "productive forces" of society. However, these productive forces represent only one facet of the "mode of production"—the aspect expressing human conduct toward natural objects and the forces utilized to produce material needs. The other facet of the mode of production consists of the relationships between individuals during the process of production, termed the "relations of production." Production, regardless of the material conditions of societal life, is inherently a collective rather than an individual endeavor. In their struggle with nature to exploit it for material needs, people do not act in isolation or as disconnected individuals; rather, they produce together within groups or associations. Hence, production is a social act. During production, people establish specific relations within the productive sphere, which may be relations of cooperation and mutual aid among individuals liberated from all forms of exploitation, or they may be relations of domination and subjugation, or transitional relations from one form to another. Regardless of the character of these relations—be they cooperative, hierarchical, or transitional—they remain, under all systems, an indispensable and essential element of

production, equal in importance to the productive forces themselves. Karl Marx states: “In production, men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations at one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature, does production, take place.”

From the foregoing, it becomes evident that the force determining the form of society is the mode of production. The mode of production is comprised of both the productive forces of society and the relations of production. Accordingly, the material conditions of society—which ultimately determine its form, ideas, views, and political institutions—are nature (or the geographical region), population growth and density, and the mode of production (productive forces and relations of production). Nevertheless, that which specifically determines the character of the social order and the form of society is the mode of production: namely, the people, the instruments, productive knowledge, and the relations established between people during the process of production.

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This constitutes the exposition of Historical Materialism regarding society, or what they term the “material conditions of societal life,” which is fundamentally erroneous both in its premise and in its characterization of the characteristics of production. The error stems from its foundational outlook on society. It posits that society is composed of the geographical environment, population growth and density, and the mode of production. While it identifies these three elements as the constituents of society, the theory subsequently negates the

influence of the first two, denying that either geography or population growth is the force that determines the form of society. Instead, it restricts this role to the mode of production alone, asserting that the primary force determining the form of society and the character of the social order—and deciding the evolution of production from one system to another—is the mode of production. Thus, society is viewed as having three elements, yet its form is determined by only one: the mode of producing material needs. This understanding of society is entirely fallacious and contrary to the reality of any society in existence. Society is composed of people, ideas, sentiments, and systems; the geographical environment and the instruments of production have no bearing on its essential definition. To clarify, society is a group of people among whom permanent relations arise. A mere aggregation of individuals equals a group; from this collection, a group emerges. If permanent relations are established among these individuals, they constitute a society; if no such permanent relations arise, they remain a mere group. They do not form a society unless relations are established. Thus, what causes a group of people to form a society is the existence of permanent relations among them. These relations arise driven by their interests; interest is what creates the relation, and without interest, no relation exists. To satisfy their interests, people require one another, and from the fulfillment of these interests, relations are born. However, these interests are defined as being either a benefit or a harm by man’s concept of interest. If an individual perceives a matter to be an interest, a relation arises; if he perceives it not to be an interest, no relation is established. For instance, a Muslim perceives that selling a cow to a Christian for profit constitutes an interest, and thus a relation arises between them. However, he perceives that selling a pig is not an interest; therefore, he will not sell it regardless of the price offered, and no relation arises. Thus, what determines whether a thing is an interest or not is the individual's concept of that thing. The concept defines the interest, and consequently,

the concept creates the relation. Since concepts are the meanings of ideas, it is ideas that create the relation. However, it is not sufficient for these ideas to exist in only one party; they must exist in both parties for a relation to arise. If they do not exist in both, no relation is possible. If one party views a matter as an interest and the other does not, a relation cannot be established. A relation only becomes possible when both parties perceive a shared interest; only then is the relation formed. Accordingly, a unity of ideas among people is indispensable for the existence of relations between them. Yet, unity of ideas alone is insufficient; it must be accompanied by a unity of sentiments. That is, both individuals must find satisfaction in this interest for the relation to exist. If one is pleased by it while the other is resentful, no relation arises. Their sentiments regarding the interest—be they joy, anger, sadness, or pain—must be unified alongside the unification of their ideas. Thus, the unity of both sentiments and ideas is essential for the existence of social relations. Furthermore, even the unity of ideas and sentiments is insufficient on its own; it must be coupled with a unity of the system by which these interests are managed. If one party believes an interest should be managed in a certain way, while the other believes it should be managed differently, no relation arises. A relation can only emerge if they agree on the method of management—that is, if they agree on the system by which they manage the interest. Only then is the relation established.

From the foregoing, it is manifest that society is an aggregate of individuals bound by permanent relations. These relations are engendered solely by the unification of ideas, sentiments, and systems among them. Consequently, society is defined by the people and the intellectual, emotional, and systemic bonds that unite them. Thus, society is composed of four components: human beings, ideas, sentiments, and systems. Although society appears in its outward reality as a group of people with permanent relations, its foundational composition

rests upon these four elements; for this reason, societies diverge based on the variation of their ideas, sentiments, and systems, even if they all consist of individuals bound by permanent relations. Society, therefore, must be defined as people, ideas, sentiments, and systems, as this constitutes its ontological basis and the criterion by which societies are distinguished. It should not be defined merely as a group of people bound by permanent relations, for while that is its apparent reality, it is not its true reality; relations are merely the result of the unification of ideas, sentiments, and systems. Thus, the ideas, sentiments, and systems constitute the true reality of society, whereas the relations are but a consequence. This is the reality of society as observed through direct perception, through meticulous scrutiny, and through an analytical decomposition into its constituent parts. Accordingly, the communist definition—positing that society is composed of the geographical environment, population growth, and the mode of production—is contrary to the reality of society and constitutes a pure error.

This pertains to the divergence of the definition from the actual reality of society. As for the fallacies inherent in the ideas contained within that definition, the communists, rather than presenting this as a definition of society, characterized these elements as the “material conditions of societal life.” They enumerated these conditions, asserting that they include, primarily, the nature surrounding society—or the geographical environment—which they deem a necessary condition for society. They further included population growth and density within the concept of material conditions, and placed the mode of production at the core of these conditions. This entire proposition is fallacious.

Regarding the natural environment and population growth and density, the error of regarding them as constituents or “material conditions” is sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that the communists themselves admit these elements do not

determine the form of society. This implies they exert no influence on the specific character of society, meaning they are neither a part of it nor among its essential components. A constituent part necessarily influences the whole, and the absence of an essential component necessarily affects the entity's existence. Since these elements do not determine the form of society nor influence that determination, they cannot be considered "material conditions of its life." Furthermore, what they term nature or the geographical environment exists naturally across the entire globe; it exists in Russia for Russia, in America for America, and in the uninhabited North Pole, regardless of whether a society exists or not, and whether that society is capitalist or socialist. In Russia itself, the geography remained identical during the Tsarist era and the era of Marxist socialism, yet the society underwent a total and radical transformation. This evidences that geography is not a part of the societal structure or its constituents. Similarly, population growth and density have no relation to the constituents of society; rather, it is the people themselves, *qua* human beings, who are related to and constitute a part of society, not their growth rate or density. Growth and density possess no causal role in this regard whatsoever. A village of two hundred people constitutes a single society if its ideas, sentiments, and systems are unified, just as a nation of two hundred million constitutes a single society under the same unification. Cairo constituted a single society when its population was one million, and it remained a single society when its population reached four million. Thus, the issue of population growth and density is empirically not a part of society; the constituent parts are the people as human beings, irrespective of their growth or density.

This concludes the critique regarding the geographical environment and population growth. As for the mode of production, they assert it is one of the material conditions of societal life, defining it as the people, the instruments of

production, and the technical knowledge of their use. These three elements, they claim, form one facet of the mode of production, while the other facet is formed by the relations of production. This assertion is erroneous. Regarding the people, they are undoubtedly the foundation of society's existence and its primary factor; however, they cannot be categorized as a "part" of a mode of production. It is the people who originate the instruments, who acquire technical expertise, and who establish relations among themselves. These things are not parts of the people, nor are the people parts of them, nor do they collectively form a material whole composed of these parts. The relationship of part-to-whole is non-existent here. Therefore, people are not a part of a mode of production; rather, they are the foundation of society, which is a group of individuals bound by permanent relations arising from the unity of their ideas, sentiments, and systems.

Regarding the instruments of production, they have no bearing on the existence or the specific character of society. A village may exist without any instruments of production if its inhabitants subsist on imports from abroad—as is the case in refugee camps—yet they still constitute a society. Furthermore, the instruments of production in Russia are identical to those in America in terms of factories and machinery, yet the society in Russia is fundamentally different from the society in America. This is tangible evidence that the instruments of production are neither constituents nor essential components of society; societal life can exist without them. Their presence does not bestow upon a society any distinguishing feature that differentiates it from others. Consequently, regarding them as constituents of society or as "material conditions of its life" is an error.

It is true that human societies have, since antiquity, required instruments of production for hunting, agriculture, industry, and the like; no society can dispense with them, yet they do not bestow upon it a specific character. For instance,

every human being respires air, drinks water, and consumes food; these are natural necessities for existence, yet they do not define one's personality or render one—through their features, traits, and form—an individual distinct from others. The same applies to the instruments of a society; they are common and permanent features across all societies according to their needs. Consequently, they are not the subject of inquiry when defining society or elucidating its essential components. Rather, research focuses on the elements that distinguish a specific society from others, which are not the instruments, but the ideas, sentiments, and systems. Thus, instruments of production have no bearing on the investigation of society insofar as it is a distinct entity from other societies. Although they are necessities of life and their existence is a natural matter dictated by human need, they are akin to water and air; just as water and air do not constitute a human being nor render him distinct from others, instruments do not form a society nor grant it a distinguishing character. Therefore, they are not a constituent part of society.

Regarding productive knowledge or the expertise required to utilize instruments, a cursory examination of the natural and technological sciences reveals the fallacy of regarding them as societal constituents. Their absence among a people does not prevent them from forming a society. Furthermore, this knowledge is identical in Russia and America, yet the society in Russia is distinct from that in America. Moreover, the sciences of production and all other sciences are universal forms of knowledge that do not vary from one society to another, nor do they differ between groups of people. Consequently, they have no relation to the formation or the specific type of a society, and thus cannot be considered among its constituents or essential components. This is why Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier, stated in a declaration: "It is necessary to seek assistance from capitalist methods in developing production," and went even further to say: "It is necessary to benefit from capitalist systems

in developing production." This indicates that reality has begun to dictate to the communists that they must concede that knowledge is not a constituent of society.

Concerning the relations of production, that which constitutes the components and essential elements of society is permanent relations in their absolute sense, not merely the relations of production. Relations exist between people during production just as they exist during the exchanges of buying and selling, leasing, agency, suretyship, gifting, pre-emption, partnership, and so forth. People establish relations whenever interests arise between them, whether those interests pertain to production, distribution, or matters of matrimony, filiation, neighborliness, compassion, and the like. Thus, relations are broader than the relations of production. For this reason, it is erroneous to consider the relations of production alone as a constituent of society; rather, all permanent relations must be included in this consideration. This is from one perspective; from another, regarding relations as a part of society is to view its outward reality, whereas its true reality is that relations are the result of the perspective toward interests. Therefore, that which is truly a constituent part is the factor that engendered the relations, not the relations themselves. This exposes the error of Historical Materialism in designating the relations of production alone as a constituent of society or, in their terminology, as one of the "material conditions of societal life."

This pertains to the definition of society or, as they term it, the "material conditions of societal life." Regarding what they term the "characteristics of production," these are entirely erroneous and predicated upon theoretical hypotheses. These three properties assume that production is in a state of perpetual change and growth, and that the change in the mode of production leads inevitably to the transformation of the entire social system, as well as the transformation of social ideas, views, and political institutions. Furthermore, the manner in

which this evolution and change occurs is that the development of production always begins with the change and development of the productive forces; specifically, the instruments of production change and develop before all else, followed by the relations of production. Initially, the productive forces in society are modified and developed, and subsequently—following these modifications and in accordance with them—the relations of production between people (i.e., their economic relations) are modified. In this manner, the transition to the new system occurs. However, in this process, the emergence of new productive forces and the corresponding relations of production does not occur outside the old society after its disappearance; rather, they arise within the heart of the old system. They appear spontaneously at first and remain spontaneous until the productive forces reach a stage of maturity, at which point violent conscious activity and revolution become inevitable. This is the summation of their "characteristics of production," which are undoubtedly erroneous and constitute mere hypotheses. To accurately perceive the error therein, it is necessary to address each property in detail:

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Communists assert that the first characteristic of production is its inability to remain stationary at a specific point for any significant duration; it is in a state of perpetual change and growth. This change denotes a transformation in the mode of production, which results in the transition of society from one system to another. A change in the mode of production leads inevitably to the transformation of the entire social system, social ideas, and political views and institutions. This is because a change in the mode of production leads to the wholesale forging of the social and political order into a new mold. People at different stages of development utilize different instruments

of production and thus live different lives. In Primitive Communism, there is one mode of production; in Slavery, another; in Feudalism, a third, and so on. Each mode differs entirely from the others; consequently, the social system, intellectual life, and political views and institutions of people differ in the era of Communalism from those in the era of Slavery, and those in the era of Slavery differ from those in the era of Feudalism. Thus, the social system, intellectual life, and political views and institutions vary according to these modes of production. Society itself, along with its ideas, theories, and political institutions, is fundamentally linked to the mode of production within that society. Every mode of living is matched by a corresponding mode of thinking. This implies that the history of societal development is, above all, the history of the development of production—the history of the modes of production that succeed one another through the ages, and the history of the development of the productive forces and the relations of production between people. Consequently, the key that allows us to uncover the laws of society must not be sought in the brains of men or in the views and ideas of society; rather, it must be sought in the mode of production practiced by society during each historical epoch—that is, in the economic life of society. Therefore, the primary task of historical science is the study and discovery of the laws of production, the laws of the development of productive forces and relations of production, and the laws of the economic development of society. Everything must be derived from the laws of the development of production and the laws of economic development. Accordingly, the primary source of ideas *qua* ideas, political views, the social system, and political institutions is the laws of the development of productive forces and relations of production—namely, the laws of economic development.

This constitutes the summary of their first property, the most salient aspects of which are three: **First,** that production—

by which they mean the “mode of production”—transforms from one state to another by way of an inevitable necessity, being in a state of perpetual flux and growth. **Second,** that the transformation of the productive forces—namely, the instruments and knowledge employed in production—coupled with the transformation of the relations of production, leads inevitably to a change in the social system, the prevailing ideas, and the political views and institutions. **Third,** that knowledge of the system implemented within a society is not to be sought in legal codes or the opinions of thinkers and legislators, but rather within the instruments of production, the technical expertise utilized therein, and the relations established between people during the productive process. These are the primary points within this property, and upon scrutiny, it becomes manifest that they are entirely erroneous.

Regarding the first point, the transformation of the so-called "mode of production" is by no means an inevitability; it may fluctuate or remain static. The simplest evidence for this is that the Islamic world, throughout the era of the Ottoman Caliphs—a period of approximately four hundred years—witnessed no change whatsoever in the instruments of production, the technical expertise employed therein, or the social relations existing between people. Had the so-called mode of production been in a state of inevitable and perpetual change, the Islamic world would have transitioned through various states during those four centuries, yet no such transition occurred. Similarly, Russia itself remained largely unchanged for several centuries during the Tsarist era, whether in its instruments, productive knowledge, or social relations. Even Europe, where the Industrial Revolution eventually took place, did not experience transformation in these two matters by way of an inevitable or even a natural necessity; rather, it remained in a state of extreme stagnation and uniformity for several centuries. It was only upon the advent of the scientific

revival and the emergence of inventions that the Industrial Revolution occurred and change was effected. All of this serves as conclusive evidence that the transformation of the so-called mode of production is not inevitable, nor is it in a state of constant flux and growth.

The error in the second point of this property lies in their designation of instruments, technical expertise, and relations of production as the fountainhead of the social system, ideas, political views, and institutions. They asserted that a change in the mode of production—meaning instruments, expertise, and relations—leads inevitably to a change in these matters. This is the source of the fallacy. In reality, instruments were brought into existence by ideas and information; it was not the instruments that engendered the ideas. Instruments do not inspire ideas; rather, knowledge is what facilitates their manufacture and invention. The European Renaissance did not arise from instruments; rather, the invention and manufacture of instruments were the products of the Renaissance. As for the technical expertise employed in production, it is not merely the result of mechanical experimentation or labor habits; rather, it consists of knowledge that may expose the errors of previous experiments and habits, arriving in a manner that contradicts them. Thus, it is independent knowledge that is not derived solely from the machine or its use; indeed, it may exist prior to the use of the machine or even prior to its existence. Such knowledge is specialized and has no bearing on the social system or political views. The clearest evidence of this is that nuclear physicists in Russia, America, and elsewhere, and natural scientists in any nation, have no connection to the establishment or origination of the political system, the societal ideas, or the political institutions of their respective countries. Neither they nor their specialized knowledge exert any influence upon the system or its ideas. This refutes the claim that technical expertise serves as the source of the social system or political

institutions. As for social relations, they proceed according to a system; they are not the source of that system. That is, they are the site of the system's application, not its origin. Relations in Russia proceeded according to a specific system until the Communists seized power and attempted to implement socialism, directing Russian relations according to their own system—a system derived from Marx, a thinker, rather than from the instruments or relations of production in Russia. Similarly, in the lands of ash-Sham (Levant) prior to the Islamic conquest, relations proceeded according to a specific system; when the Muslims conquered the region and implemented the Islamic system, they directed relations according to Islam. This system was revealed to Muhammad ﷺ in Makkah and Al-Madinah and was not derived from the instruments of production or the existing social relations in ash-Sham (Levant). Thus, relations are the object of the system's application, not its source. Consequently, instruments are not the source of the social system or its ideas, nor is technical expertise. Relations are the site where the system and ideas are applied. It thus becomes clear that the so-called mode of production is not the source of the social system, ideas, or political institutions; and since it is not their source, its transformation does not lead inevitably to their change.

Furthermore, the “mode of production” is, according to their definition, bifurcated into two components: first, the productive forces of society (people, instruments, and technical knowledge); and second, the relations of production. These relations of production constitute the system by which people conduct themselves, for relations must inevitably follow a specific system. Thus, the meaning of their claim—that a change in the mode of production leads inevitably to a change in the system—is that a change in the productive forces and a change in the system governing relations leads inevitably to a change in the system. To say that a change in the mode of production leads

to a change in the social system implies that a change in the mode of production leads to a change in the relations of production. Since the relations of production are a constituent part of the mode of production, their argument effectively states that a change in the relations of production leads to a change in the relations of production—meaning a change in a thing leads to a change in the thing itself. This is a confused and incoherent expression. Had they stated that a change in the productive forces leads to a change in the system governing relations, thereby transforming the entire social order (as mentioned in the second property), it would have been logically consistent, albeit still erroneous. It is logically untenable to claim that a change in the system of relations, coupled with a change in productive forces, leads to a change in the system. If it is argued that the intent is that the axe, the mill, and feudal relations vanish to be replaced by the tractor, the factory, and capitalist relations—resulting in a new system and new relations—the rebuttal is that the change in these relations *is* the change in the system, and their remaining static is the absence of systemic change. When factories produced individually as small machines, it was consistent for relations to be individualistic. When factories transformed into massive plants producing collectively, if the relations remained individualistic—as is the case in America—the system remained capitalist, reflecting the nature of those relations. If they transformed into collective relations—as in Russia—the system became socialist. How then can it be said that a change in the mode of production (productive forces and relations) leads to a change in the system (relations)?! Productive forces changed in both Russia and America, yet relations only changed from individualistic to collective in Russia. In America, they remained individualistic. Thus, their claim that a change in the mode of production leads inevitably to a change in the system is erroneous, for the system does not change by the change of relations; rather, relations change according to the system applied to them. This is in addition to

the fact that their proposition is logically incoherent. By all these measures, the second point of the first property is invalidated.

Regarding the third point, if their intent pertains to archaeology—namely, that it is possible to discern something of the culture, living systems, and ideas of a people from ceramic and pottery artifacts—then this is partially, but not exhaustively, correct. One cannot ascertain complete systems or the totality of a culture through such means; rather, one gains only a fragmented understanding commensurate with what the artifact itself yields. A comprehensive understanding can only be derived from works of jurisprudence and legislation, and from authentic, sequential accounts of ideas, laws, and systems. In other words, these cannot be fully known except through the intellectual legacy of a people and the views and ideas of their society—that is, from the ideas themselves and the thinkers who formulated them. However, this archaeological sense, in any case, has no bearing on the establishment of a system; it is merely a path toward historical knowledge. It is unlikely that this is what they intended. Rather, their intended meaning is that people derived their system from the mode of production they practiced, and when this mode changed, their system changed accordingly. They argue that this demonstrates that the economic life of society is the source from which systems are taken, as it is what indicated the systems people utilized. Herein lies the gross error. This fallacy arises from two perspectives. First, the fact that a human being utilized, for instance, a white or red clay plate, whether fired or unfired, does not indicate that his system of living and his ideas were derived from these tools. Rather, it indicates that his concepts were what dictated the creation of these tools. If tools indicate anything, they indicate the type of ideas and the nature of the system; they do not indicate that the system and ideas were taken from them. Indeed, any human being, whether in antiquity or modernity, thinks first and then manufactures the machine or utilizes the tool. It is not

the machine that dictates its own manufacture to him, nor is it the tool that dictates the manner of its use. A desert nomad who possesses no prior information regarding the use of specific implements would not distinguish between a plate intended for food and a vessel intended for waste. If provided with these two implements, he might use them both for eating or for milking a sheep; it would not occur to him to use one differently from the other unless he were provided with information. Thus, the tool did not provide the individual with the method of its use, even if it serves as an indicator of his culture and lifestyle. The machine did not grant the individual his way of life, even if it points to the mode of existence he maintained. There is a profound distinction between a machine serving as an indicator of culture and lifestyle and its being the source of one's system and ideas. Thus, the error of designating the economic life of society as the source of the system under which society lives manifests.

As for the second perspective from which the error arises, it is that tools and machines, regardless of their quantity or diversity, cannot provide a complete picture of the culture a people possessed or the system under which they lived. They yield only fragments of that culture, those ideas, and that system. Such fragments, no matter how numerous or varied, are insufficient to provide a comprehensive image. Consequently, it becomes clear that these archaeological remains do not indicate the totality of economic life, and by extension, they do not indicate the entirety of the prevailing ideas, the existing culture, or the system implemented at that time. Accordingly, the system under which a society lives does not have the instruments of production as its source, even if they serve as historical indicators of certain aspects of it. They do not indicate the system in its entirety; rather, they point to certain ideas and specific rulings. In any event, they are not its source, nor is the system derived from them. Instead, it is derived from books of jurisprudence and legislation and from authentic, sequential accounts of legislative ideas. This is the reality of the matter. No

one has ever deduced their system or legislation from historical ruins or from contemporary tools and utilized machinery, nor have they taken their ideas, views, or political institutions from them. Rather, all of this was taken from the ideas themselves and from the thinkers.

The Soviet Union itself, when it adopted socialist ideas and the socialist system, did not turn to archaeological remains to seek inspiration for its systems until it arrived at the tools currently in use to derive its ideas and order. Rather, it took its ideas from books and debates—that is, from thinkers and through the agency of thinkers. By this, the third point is invalidated, and consequently, the claim that economic life is the source of the system under which people live is nullified; it does not even provide a complete indication of the system people once inhabited. With the refutation of these three points, the first property is invalidated.

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As for the second characteristic of production according to the Marxist view, it posits that the development and changes of production always begin with the change and development of the productive forces, and with the change and development of the instruments of production before all else. Thus, the productive forces are the most dynamic and revolutionary elements of production. The conditions that define the form of society are: the people, the instruments of production, the knowledge of production (i.e., technical expertise), and the relations between people during the process of production. The people, the instruments, and the knowledge of production constitute the productive forces; it is within these that change begins, specifically starting with the instruments of production. Initially, the productive forces in society are modified and developed, and subsequently, following these modifications and

in accordance with them, the relations of production between people—that is, their economic relations—are modified.

However, it must be understood that the fact that change begins with the instruments of production does not mean that the relations of production do not influence the development of the productive forces, or that the latter are unrelated to the former. In reality, although the development of the relations of production is contingent upon the development of the productive forces, these relations, in turn, influence the development of the productive forces, either accelerating or decelerating them. Nevertheless, the initiation of change always resides within the productive forces, specifically the instruments of production, followed by the change in the relations of production.

Furthermore, the relations of production cannot lag behind the growth of the productive forces for a prolonged duration and remain in contradiction with this growth. This is because the productive forces—comprising the people, the instruments, and the technical knowledge—cannot achieve full development unless the relations of production correspond to the character and state of the productive forces, allowing them the scope to develop freely. Therefore, regardless of how much the relations of production may lag behind the development of the productive forces, they must eventually—and they indeed do—reach a state of correspondence with the level of development of the productive forces and adopt a character that harmonizes with them. Otherwise, the unity that binds the productive forces and the relations of production within the system of production would face the danger of disintegration. This would lead to a disruption in the totality of production and the destruction of the productive forces.

The two preeminent examples of the correspondence between the relations of production and the level of development of the productive forces—as well as the lack thereof—are the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the

capitalist nations. The socialist economy in the U.S.S.R.—where collective ownership of the means of production stands in total congruence with the social character of the production process, and where one consequently finds neither economic crises nor the destruction of productive forces—serves as an example of the perfect harmony between the relations of production and the nature of the productive forces. Conversely, in capitalist countries—where the private capitalist ownership of the means of production stands in manifest contradiction to the social character of the production process, i.e., the nature of the productive forces—economic crises serve as an example of the discord and disparity between the relations of production and the nature of the productive forces, and as an instance of the conflict erupting between them. Indeed, the economic crises that lead to the destruction of productive forces are the direct result of this discord. Furthermore, this very discord constitutes the economic foundation of the social revolution called upon to demolish current relations of production and create new relations that correspond to the nature of the productive forces. Thus, the productive forces—comprising the people, the instruments of production, and productive knowledge—are not merely the most dynamic and revolutionary elements of production, but are also the decisive factor in the development of production. This is because the development of productive forces necessitates a subsequent development in the relations of production; for as the productive forces are, so must the relations of production be. This inevitability—that the relations of production must follow the productive forces in their evolution—is what causes the discord between them to ignite the revolution that destroys the existing relations of production which contradict the productive forces, thereby establishing new relations congruent with the nature of the productive forces. From this, it becomes apparent how the development of the productive forces instigated the development of relations, leading to the revolution that transforms one system into another. Accordingly, in line with the

evolution and changes in the societal productive forces, the relations of production among people—that is, their economic relations—must change and evolve. If this change does not occur and a contradiction arises between them, revolution ensues, leading to the evolution of relations until they conclude in correspondence with the level of development of the productive forces.

History has recorded five fundamental types of relations of production: Primitive Communism, Slavery, the Feudal system, the Capitalist system, and the Socialist system.

In the system of Primitive Communism, the collective ownership of the means of production constitutes the basis of the relations of production, which fundamentally corresponds to the nature of the productive forces in that era. Stone implements, as well as the bow and arrow which appeared later, did not permit individuals to struggle alone against the forces of nature and predatory animals; thus, they were compelled to work together in a collective manner if they wished to gather forest fruits or hunt fish, lest they die of hunger or fall prey to wild beasts. Collective labor leads to the collective ownership of the means of production and the products themselves. Therefore, there was no concept of private property regarding the means of production, save for certain instruments of production that served as defensive weapons against predators; for this reason, there was neither exploitation nor social classes.

In the system of Slavery, the slave owner's ownership of the means of production and the laborers constitutes the basis of the relations of production. This relation of production fundamentally corresponds to the state of the productive forces in this epoch. People had acquired metal tools, and livestock breeding, agriculture, and various crafts emerged; labor was divided among these different branches of production. Likewise, the exchange of products between individuals and groups appeared, along with the possibility of wealth accumulation in

the hands of a small number of people, the actual concentration of the means of production in the hands of a minority, and the possibility of subjecting the majority to that minority. Here, free collective labor performed by all members of society during the production process ceased to exist; collective ownership of the means of production and products vanished, replaced by private property. Consequently, people became rich and poor, exploiters and exploited—some possessing all rights while others possessed none—resulting in an acute class struggle between the two of them.

In the Feudal system, the feudal lord's ownership of the means of production and his ability to buy and sell the laborer constitute the basis of the relations of production. Alongside feudal ownership existed the individual property of the peasant and the artisan, encompassing their instruments of production and their private economy based on personal labor. These relations of production fundamentally correspond to the state of the productive forces in this epoch. Improvements in cast iron were found, the processing of iron was mastered, and the use of the plow and weaving looms became widespread. Agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, and oil production evolved continuously. Manufactories emerged, the gathering of artisans under one roof to produce using tools provided to them, as did artisan workshops. These new productive forces required the laborer to display a degree of initiative, innovation in production, aesthetic sense in what they produced, and an interest in the work; otherwise, the feudal lord would abandon them for another who possessed his own private economy and instruments of production and maintained an interest in the labor. Here, private property continues its evolution, yet exploitation remains nearly as harsh as it was under slavery, hardly softening except slightly, leading to the struggle between the laborer and the feudal lord. Class struggle between the exploiters and the exploited is considered the fundamental characteristic of the feudal system.

In the capitalist system, capitalist ownership of the means of production constitutes the foundation of the relations of production. Wage laborers, though liberated from any form of personal dependency, are nonetheless deprived of the means of production. To secure their sustenance, they are compelled to sell their labor power to the capitalist and endure the yoke of exploitation. Alongside capitalist ownership, however, there exists the private property of the peasant and the artisan over their respective instruments of production. These relations of production fundamentally correspond to the state of the productive forces during this epoch. Massive factories and plants, equipped with advanced machinery, have supplanted artisan workshops and manufactories. Similarly, large-scale capitalist investments, managed on the basis of agricultural science and equipped with mechanical implements, have replaced the estates of the nobility, which were once cultivated using the rudimentary tools of the peasantry. These new productive forces demand a higher degree of culture and intelligence from the laborers, requiring the necessary competence to understand and master the machinery; otherwise, capitalists would discard them in favor of those possessing sufficient education to operate the machines appropriately. However, by producing ever-increasing quantities of commodities and reducing their prices, capitalists exacerbate and intensify competition. This drives masses of small and medium-sized owners into ruin and devastation, reducing them to the status of workers and diminishing their purchasing power. Consequently, the realization of manufactured goods becomes impossible. Furthermore, by expanding their productive enterprises and congregating millions of workers in colossal factories and plants, capitalists impart a social character to the production process, while the ownership of the means of production remains individual. Thus, the capitalists have themselves undermined their own foundation. The social character of the production process necessitates the collective

ownership of the means of production; yet, as long as ownership remains private and capitalist, it stands in contradiction to the social nature of production, thereby precipitating conflict and revolution. Because the relations of production—namely, private property—no longer correspond to the state of the productive forces—namely, collective production—an irreconcilable contradiction emerges. This reveals that capitalism carries within its core a revolution destined to replace current capitalist ownership with socialist ownership of the means of production. This implies that an acute class struggle, among the most intense known between exploiters and the exploited, is the defining characteristic of the capitalist system. Thus, the development of the relations of production proceeds in accordance with the development of the societal productive forces, and primarily according to the development of the instruments of production. It is this dependency that ensures that changes and developments in the productive forces lead, sooner or later, to corresponding changes and developments in the relations of production. Karl Marx states: “Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist.” He further asserts: “There is a continual movement of growth in productive forces, of destruction in social relations, of formation in ideas; the only immutable thing is the abstraction of movement.”

This is the summation of their assertions regarding the second property of production. These are entirely mere theoretical hypotheses, contradicted by both history and reality; they constitute a pure error devoid of any veracity whatsoever. Their claim that the development and changes of production invariably begin with the change and development of the

productive forces is a fallacious proposition. Upon its advent, Islam transformed the system governing the people—that is, it changed the relations—and only after the state grew powerful and the conquests occurred did material progress begin, leading to changes in the instruments of production and technical expertise (productive knowledge). Similarly, when the Communist Party seized power in Russia, the state began by transforming social relations, and only subsequently did it proceed to improve and alter the instruments of production. It is reported of Lenin that when he was asked to purchase tractors from the West to improve and modernize agriculture, he refused, stating: "We must manufacture the tractors ourselves, and then utilize our own industry to improve our agriculture." These two examples clearly demonstrate that change began within the relations, and the transformation of the productive forces followed. Likewise, their assertion that the relations of production, in turn, influence the development of the productive forces by either accelerating or decelerating them is a fallacious claim. The state of social relations does not influence the improvement or elevation of what they term the productive forces; rather, it is science and knowledge that improve and elevate them. Regarding man, it is his intellectual level—the ideas and knowledge he possesses—that transforms his condition from good to bad or vice versa. Regarding instruments, it is science, not the implemented system, that engenders industry and invention. As for productive knowledge, or technical expertise, it is evident that the relations of production have no bearing on its improvement; rather, the increase of knowledge and the continuity of scientific research are what enhance it. It is true that a system governing relations may obstruct scientific progress or provide the scope for its advancement; however, the system or the relations themselves have no causal role in the improvement of industry and invention, nor in elevating the level of productive knowledge. For instance, when the Christian religion dominated European

society during the Middle Ages—dominating social relations—it obstructed the progress of science and invention, thereby hindering the advancement of the instruments and knowledge of production. Yet, it was eventually defeated, science triumphed, knowledge and inventions advanced, and the Industrial Revolution ensued. Conversely, when Islam was applied to advanced peoples such as the Persians and the Romans, it provided the scope for science and invention, leading to the advancement of knowledge and the improvement of instruments; yet, as a system of relations, it did not influence science itself, neither accelerating nor decelerating it. When the Industrial Revolution occurred in Europe, the Muslims—at a time when factors of obfuscation had clouded their minds, leading to a misunderstanding of Islam—stood bewildered before scientific progress and the Industrial Revolution. Consequently, the advancement of their instruments and knowledge of production was hindered; however, this was not a result of social relations, the system, or the ideas of the system, but rather a consequence of intellectual decline. The ideas that treat social relations are heterogeneous and distinct from the ideas contained within the sciences and inventions; thus, they do not influence the productive forces, neither affecting the instruments of production nor productive knowledge. The simplest evidence for this is that the current progress of science and invention in Russia and America has not been influenced by the systems implemented in either—neither by improving them nor by delaying them; rather, it is the progress of science alone that has improved them in both nations. As for the claim that the development of the instruments of production must inevitably be followed by a change in the relations of production, it is a clear proposition but one that is contrary to reality and incorrect. They themselves contradict it in their own analysis. Their refutation of this claim appears in their analysis of the second property, where they state: “Productive forces cannot achieve full development unless the relations of production correspond to the character

and state of the productive forces. If correspondence between the relations of production and the level of development of the productive forces is not achieved, the unity that binds the productive forces and the relations of production within the system of production faces the danger of disintegration, leading to a crisis in production." This statement implies that it is not inevitable for the change in relations to follow the change in the productive forces. For non-correspondence may occur, resulting in the disintegration of unity; thus, the claim of inevitability is refuted by their own logic. Their argument implies that either the relations must catch up to the productive forces or a crisis ensues, which inherently negates absolute inevitability. Consequently, the notion that the relations of production follow the productive forces in change and development by way of a deterministic necessity is incorrect according to their own analysis. It cannot be argued that the occurrence of successive crises resulting from contradiction leads, in the end, to a transition to new relations, nor that their analysis does not contradict their claim. While they posit the occurrence of crises and believe that these crises, in turn, lead to an inevitable change in relations, this is fundamentally flawed. Their primary premise is that the development of production must be followed by a change in the relations of production; thus, the inevitability stems from the idea that development leads—without fail—to a change in relations. Yet, in their analysis, they state that if correspondence between the relations of production and the level of development of the productive forces is not achieved, a production crisis occurs. Here, they assume that these crises follow one another and that their succession leads to a change in relations. The logical conclusion would then be that the development of production leads inevitably to a change in relations. However, the assumption of successive crises is a mere theoretical postulation; for the contradiction may be removed, thereby preventing the succession of crises, or the crisis may not occur at all. Therefore, the assertion that the

development of productive forces leads to a change in relations is invalidated, as it is built upon the inevitability of successive crises, which is not itself inevitable. Consequently, that which is derived from it is likewise not inevitable. Their analysis—that the productive forces cannot develop except upon the achievement of correspondence between the relations of production and the level of the productive forces—means that it is not inevitable for the development of production to be followed by a change in the relations of production, as a crisis may occur without development following. Similarly, their analysis that the succession of crises leads to an inevitable change in relations implies that if the succession of crises does not occur, no change in relations transpires. Since the succession of crises is not inevitable and may be reconciled, it follows that it is not inevitable for the development of production to lead to a change in relations. Thus, according to their own analysis, the theory is incorrect. Regarding its invalidity due to its contradiction with reality, Muslims persisted in material progress alongside intellectual elevation for approximately six centuries, during which the instruments of production they utilized changed, yet their social system, social ideas, political views, and institutions remained unaltered. They remained as they were, which demonstrates that a change in the instruments of production does not influence the system. Furthermore, their social relations during their time in the Arabian Peninsula, when their tools were purely primitive, were identical to their relations when they conquered Persia and Byzantium and utilized tools that were in a more advanced civilizational stage than the primitive ones. Subsequently, the improvement of tools continued for centuries while the relations remained in their original state. Thus, the change and development of the instruments of production were not followed by a change in relations, nor did crises occur. Moreover, since the nineteenth century, the instruments of production in America began to change and grow, yet this did not alter America’s social system,

its social ideas, or its political views and institutions; rather, it remained a capitalist system with capitalist ideas and democratic views and institutions. Additionally, the change in the instruments of production, which advanced with broad strides in America, was not followed by a change in the relations of production; instead, the relations remained as they were and continue to be capitalist relations.

As for the hypotheses they posit—that history has recorded five fundamental types of relations of production wherein the instruments of production developed and the relations of production followed, leading to a transition to a new system, and that people transitioned from primitive communalism to slavery, from slavery to feudalism, from feudalism to capitalism, and from capitalism to socialism—these theoretical assumptions are belied by reality just as they are belied by history. In reality, the nations of Eastern Europe do not differ from the nations of Western Europe in terms of their instruments of production; however, the relations of production in Eastern Europe are different from those in Western Europe, and the social system in Eastern Europe is different from that in Western Europe. What, then, caused this change? Did the nations of Eastern Europe evolve from capitalism to socialism—or, more precisely in their terminology, to a "People's Democracy"—through the development of the instruments of production, or through the seizure of power by Communist Russia? In truth, the instruments of production in Russia are identical to those in England; nevertheless, the relations of production in Russia are different from those in England, and the social system in Russia is different from that in America. Why, then, did the relations in England not evolve in accordance with the development of the instruments of production? Did the instruments of production in Russia develop first, followed by the relations, or did the Communist Party seize power and change the relations, and subsequently begin to improve the

instruments of production, thereby changing the relations before the instruments of production had changed? This reality suffices to refute the second property; indeed, it suffices to refute all three properties. Relations between people have absolutely no connection to the instruments of production and, consequently, no connection to what is termed the productive forces. These forces improve from one state to another according to the progress of sciences and knowledge. As for relations, they change from one state to another according to ideas—that is, according to the viewpoint toward life. One who scrutinizes the state of the world since the conclusion of the Second World War until the present finds that scientific progress and modern inventions have advanced with broad strides, surpassing all the steps taken over thousands of years, and have leaped forward in this brief period—not exceeding eighteen years—with massive bounds. Had the relations of production changed and developed in accordance with the changes and developments in the societal productive forces, history would have recorded dozens of types of relations of production, by analogy to the five fundamental types it supposedly recorded during the period preceding the establishment of communist rule in Russia. This is because the change and progress achieved during this recent period are incomparable to any previous progress. Yet, the reality is that the relations of production—or, in other words, the systems governing those relations—have not changed at all. The socialist system in Russia has remained as it was, even though Russia transitioned from a state that did not even possess the atomic bomb to the position of the preeminent state in the realm of space. The capitalist system in America has remained as it was, even though America during the Second World War, while possessing the atomic bomb, was still in a primitive state regarding space exploration, yet transitioned to sending men to orbit the Earth and launching probes to Mars and Venus, attempting to catch up with and surpass Russia. This scientific progress in both states was not followed by any change or

development in the relations of production. This empirically belies the claim that, throughout history, the relations of production among people have changed and developed in accordance with the changes and developments in the societal productive forces. If it is observed that no change or development in the relations of production has occurred over eighteen years, despite a change and progress in the tools and knowledge of production—that is, in the so-called productive forces of society—that exceeds what occurred over thousands of years, then it means that such a phenomenon has never occurred in history. Hence, reality belies the claim that history recorded five fundamental types of relations of production and likewise belies the entirety of the second property.

The historical refutation of their claim that the world transitioned from primitive communism to slavery, then to feudalism, then to capitalism, and finally to socialism, is manifest in the transition of Russia—which was closer to feudalism than to industrial capitalism—directly to socialism, while industrialized, capitalist Europe has remained capitalist to this day. Similarly, feudal China transitioned to socialism, whereas industrial America has not. Furthermore, East Germany transitioned to socialism solely due to the Soviet occupation, while West Germany remained capitalist, despite both being parts of a single nation and both being industrialized, capitalist societies. This constitutes sufficient historical evidence to negate the second property of production. The instruments of production in Europe were in a state of constant improvement while Russia's had not yet advanced; the instruments of production in America were markedly progressing while China's were clearly lagging. Nevertheless, the relations of production changed in Russia but not in Europe, and in China but not in America. In Germany, the instruments and knowledge of production were advancing across the entire country, with no distinction between what is now termed East and West

Germany; yet, the relations of production changed in East Germany and remained static in West Germany. This confirms that there is no correlation between the alteration and improvement of the instruments of production, or the advancement of productive knowledge, and the relations of production. It further confirms that the transition from one system to another did not occur, as they claim, from one epoch to another based on the development of the instruments of production. Consequently, their assertion that history has recorded these five stages is a proposition built upon mere theoretical hypotheses—indeed, upon mere fictions. Thus, the second property of production is invalidated.

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Regarding the third property of production according to the communist view, it posits that new productive forces and the corresponding relations of production do not emerge outside the old society after its demise, but rather arise within the heart of the old system itself. Thus, they are not the result of conscious, intentional human action, but emerge spontaneously, independent of human consciousness and volition. This is attributed to two reasons: First, because people are not free to choose their mode of production; every new generation, upon entering life, finds ready-made productive forces and relations of production created by the labor of previous generations. Consequently, every new generation is initially compelled to accept and adapt to whatever is ready-made in the field of production in order to produce material necessities.

Second, because when people improve this or that instrument of production, or this or that element of the productive forces, they do not perceive the social consequences that these improvements must entail; indeed, they do not

understand them, nor do such consequences even occur to them. They think only of their daily interests, the facilitation of their labor, and the attainment of immediate, tangible benefits.

For instance, when Russian capitalists, in agreement with foreign capitalists, vigorously established modern large-scale industry equipped with machinery in Russia without challenging Tsarism—while leaving the peasantry as easy prey for the great landowners—they were undoubtedly ignorant of the social consequences that this immense growth in the productive forces would entail; they gave it no thought. They did not perceive or understand that this formidable leap of the productive forces in society would lead to a new regrouping of social forces, and that this regrouping would allow the proletariat to unite with the peasantry and achieve the victory of the socialist revolution. Their sole aim was to expand industrial production to the utmost, secure their dominance in a vast domestic market, monopolize production, and extort the greatest possible profit from the national economy. Thus, their conscious activity did not transcend the boundaries of their purely pragmatic, daily interests. Karl Marx states: "In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces." However, this does not mean that the change in the relations of production and the transition from old to new relations proceed in a linear fashion without conflict or upheaval; on the contrary, this transition usually occurs through a revolutionary overthrow of the relations of production and the establishment of new relations in their stead. While the development of the productive forces and the changes in the field of relations of production proceed spontaneously and independent of human will during a certain stage, this does not last indefinitely; it continues only until the emerging productive forces reach a sufficient degree of maturity. When the new

productive forces reach this point of maturity, the existing relations of production and the classes they represent transform into a formidable barrier that cannot be removed from the path except through the conscious activity of the new classes and their violent action—that is, through revolution. At that moment, the role played by new social ideas, new political institutions, and the new political authority called upon to abolish the old relations of production and erase them by force is magnificently revealed. On the basis of the conflict between the new productive forces and the old relations of production, and on the basis of the new economic needs of society, new social ideas are engendered. These new ideas organize and mobilize the masses, who then unite into a new political army and create a new revolutionary authority, utilizing it to abolish the old order in the field of relations of production, erasing it by force and constructing a new system therein.

Thus, conscious human activity replaces the course of spontaneous evolution, violent upheaval replaces peaceful evolution, and revolution replaces gradual development. Karl Marx states: “In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property

relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed."

This constitutes the summation of the communists' assertions regarding the third property. Upon meticulous examination, it becomes evident that their position is an error that contradicts reality, a fact further refuted by the historical events within Russia itself. The crux of the error lies in the evidenced absence of a causal link between the instruments of production or productive knowledge and the "productive forces"—that is, there is no inherent connection between what they term the societal productive forces and the system that governs human relations. One is neither linked to nor contingent upon the other, nor does a change in one necessitate a change in the other. Relations may transform and improve without any corresponding change or improvement in the societal productive forces. Indeed, the system of life governing social relations may transition to a superior state in the total absence of any change or improvement in the instruments or knowledge of production. This was precisely the case with Islam, which overturned the life of the Arabs, radically and comprehensively transforming their relations in a formidable leap forward, despite the fact that no change had occurred in their instruments of production or their technical knowledge. There exists neither correspondence nor non-correspondence between these two domains; therefore, it cannot be claimed that productive forces and relations of production arise within the heart of the old system before its demise. Such a claim is contrary to reality. The new Islamic relations did not emerge within the old *Jahili* society; rather, they originated outside of it, arrived to confront it, and subsequently erased it from existence. The question of whether these relations corresponded to the instruments or knowledge of

production was never a consideration, nor was it relevant in the slightest. Furthermore, human beings are free to choose the instruments of production they desire and are free to select their productive knowledge. They are not compelled to accept the legacy of their ancestors, nor are they forced to adopt the instruments, knowledge, or systems they find before them. Instead, they possess the freedom of choice, which is the very reason material progress occurs in instruments and knowledge; had they been compelled to accept the status quo, no progress or improvement would have been realized. Thus, they act by choice, not by compulsion. Moreover, their improvement of the instruments and knowledge of production is a conscious and deliberate act; they perceive the inadequacy of existing tools and work to enhance them. As for their awareness—or lack thereof—regarding the impact of these improvements on social relations, it is because relations have no place in this specific subject, not because people are oblivious or incapable of understanding. In other words, the communist claim that people do not perceive the social consequences necessitated by the improvement of production instruments is incorrect. The improvement of tools does not stem from ignorance or a lack of understanding, as the communists suggest, but rather because the change of systems is a non-issue in the context of technical improvement. There is no correlation between the two: the enhancement of production and knowledge is one matter, while social systems or relations of production are another. The former is tied to science and invention, while the latter—the relations—is tied to ideas and the fundamental viewpoint toward life. Consequently, when people improve a particular instrument or an element of the productive forces, such as technical expertise, it does not occur to them that this has any bearing on the system under which they live, for in reality, there is no connection or link between the progress of one and the state of the other. It is, therefore, entirely natural that such a thought would not occur to them. As for the communist assertion that the introduction of

metal tools constituted a revolution in production that inevitably led from primitive communalism to the system of slavery—and that the members of the communal society, while improving their tools and seeking the transition from stone to metal, were unaware of this and did not comprehend it—this is a purely theoretical postulation. Indeed, it is a mere fiction to imagine that the system of slavery arose from the improvement of stone tools and their transition to metal. Metal tools have existed for millennia, yet the system of slavery remained prevalent throughout the world until only a few decades ago. Slavery was not abolished due to the transition from stone to metal; rather, at the time of its global abolition, the world was already enjoying the fruits of the Industrial Revolution and large-scale industry. It was abolished based on new ideas that advocated for its termination. Those who worked to abolish it globally were the colonial states, and they did so not to liberate the enslaved, but to transform the nature of subjugation from the enslavement of individuals to the enslavement of entire peoples. Thus, the claim that people in primitive communalism did not understand that improving their tools from stone to iron would result in the social consequence of slavery is a statement contrary to reality and is nothing more than a hypothesis and a fiction. Similarly, their claim that Russian capitalists, while establishing large-scale industries, were ignorant of the social consequences—namely, the gathering of workers and peasants to conduct a socialist revolution—is a statement contrary to reality and a mere assumption. The establishment of large-scale industry does not inherently result in the unification of workers and peasants for a socialist revolution. This is evidenced by the fact that large-scale industry was established in Europe and America long before Russia, yet it did not produce a unification of workers and peasants, nor a socialist revolution, nor a transition from capitalism to socialism. The revolution that occurred in Russia was not a product of large-scale industry, and industry had no connection to that revolution or to the creation of socialism in

Russia. Through all of this, it becomes clear that the communist claim—that the transformation of productive forces and instruments occurs within the old system and emerges independently of human consciousness, yet is driven by the improvement of those forces—is an error contrary to reality, belied by contemporary facts and historical events. Furthermore, it is refuted by the actual events in Russia. What transpired there was that the communist rulers sought to change the relations of production not by changing the instruments of production, but through the forceful eradication of the old system. The instruments of production prevalent in Russia during the pre-revolutionary years, when the system was feudal, remained the exact same instruments in the years following the revolution—the very years during which the old relations were transformed into new ones. What truly occurred in Russia was a revolution that toppled the old rulers and brought in new rulers with specific ideas, which they proceeded to implement through the power of "iron and fire." From this, it is manifest that the change in relations preceded the change in the instruments of production, that it occurred through force, and that it took place after the implementation of the new system began, not during the existence of the old system. This conclusively evidences the fallacy of their hypotheses.

As for their claim that the transformation of the relations of production and the transition from old to new relations occurs spontaneously at first, followed by violence and revolution, it is refuted by the history of the Communist Revolution itself. Communist ideas began spreading in the first half of the nineteenth century, accompanied from the outset by calls for violence. The 1905 Revolution failed, as did the February 1917 Revolution; only the October 1917 Revolution succeeded. Prior to the success of the Communist Revolution in October 1917, no spontaneous change in the relations of production had occurred. Rather, what transpired was the dissemination of revolutionary

ideas that incited failed uprisings, which in turn effected no change in the relations of production. It was only after the success of the October Revolution and the seizure of the reins of power by the Communists that the relations of production were transformed—not through spontaneity, but through the authority of the state and the exercise of “iron and fire.”

Furthermore, Japan established large-scale industries prior to the Second World War, witnessing a massive growth in its instruments of production. Despite this, no transformation in the relations of production occurred there, whether spontaneously or through violence; rather, its relations of production remained static. This refutes the claim that the emergence of modern large-scale industry in Russia led to a spontaneous regrouping of productive forces which then transitioned into violence. Had such a process occurred in Russia as a result of changing relations of production, it would have manifested in nations other than Russia, such as Japan. Its total absence there evidences that the Russian experience was not a product of the emergence of large-scale industry, but rather the result of ideas adopted by a party that consolidated its power and seized governance. This is the reality of the matter, exposing the fallacy of these hypotheses.

All of the aforementioned demonstrates that the alteration and improvement of the instruments of production do not lead to a change in relations, whether by way of an inevitable or non-inevitable necessity; the two are simply not interconnected. The historical evidence lies in the experience of the Muslims, whose instruments of production changed over several centuries while their social relations remained constant. Contemporary evidence is found in the instruments of production in America, Japan, and European nations, where technical change was not followed by a transformation in relations. If this point is negated—and its negation is decisively clear—then the entirety of Historical Materialism and the “characteristics of production” collapse, for

they are built upon this very premise. In their view, change begins in the instruments of production, which then necessitates a change in the relations of production to achieve correspondence; non-correspondence creates contradictions, leading to the struggle of opposites, which finally effects the transition to achieve harmony between relations and instruments. This is their prescribed course of development. If it is evidenced that instruments of production have no relation to the relations of production, then the entire edifice of correspondence, contradictions, and the struggle of opposites becomes mere fiction and illusion, having no basis in reality, and the theory in its entirety falls. Since it has been definitively established that instruments of production neither influence nor are influenced by the relations of production in terms of the social system, Historical Materialism is revealed as a fallacious theory consisting of mere hypotheses—indeed, mere delusions and imaginings.