A delegate from Hizb ut Tahrir/ Scandinavia went to the Pakistani Embassy in Copenhagen and handed a letter from the Hizb to condemn acts of brutality and kidnappings practiced by the Pakistani regime towards the Muslims who work towards implementing Allah's Shariah especially toward Engineer Naveed Butt, spokesman for Hizb ut-Tahrir/ Wilayah Pakistan, where his whereabouts are still unknown till today.

Wednesday, 3 Shaban 1434AH corresponding to 12 June 2013

Speech by Brother Nadeem Ahmed in front of the Pakistani Embassy in Denmark

The war on terror continues to be the most important and polarizing debate in Pakistan. Yet, it continues to this day with the most fundamental question still unanswered, is it our war or not? Although since the start of this war, Pakistani public has consistently rejected it as an American war, a section of the Pakistani intelligentsia has been consistently trying to change the overwhelming consensus against this war so as to change public opinion in favor of it. With the idea of peace talks with the Pakistani Taliban doing the rounds, a fresh attempt is being made by this segment of the intelligentsia to establish a narrative which favors military operations and continual war against Islamic militants. Arguments like protecting the monopoly of the state on physical aggression and deploying state power to defend the idea of democracy are being presented to present this war, as a just war. What follows is the rebuttal of such a narrative.

It should be understood that the state and its institutions are in origin political institutions, which are based on a comprehensive idea about the organization of the society. The legitimacy of the state does not merely come from it being the competent authority and hence enjoying complete monopoly on physical aggression. The legitimacy of a state and its institutions come from the idea upon which it stands and its ability to organize the people's affairs successfully based on that idea. A state which is unresponsive to the needs and demands of a segment of the society would naturally face a challenge to its authority from that particular segment. In such a scenario the state needs to first and foremost review as to why a segment of the society chose to physically challenge it .This essentially means that the state should accept its failure to integrate that segment in to mainstream society. So why was that segment marginalized? Is it because of weak state infrastructure which was unable to cater for the needs of that segment of society denying it access to the resources of the state? Or was it the state's refusal to protect that segment from foreign aggression? Is it because a new idea has taken root in that segment of the society which contradicts the idea on which the state stands? Is it because the state deliberately chose to ignore the aspirations of that segment of the society for the sake of foreign interests? Such a detailed analysis needs to be carried out by the state to win the hearts and mind of the rebellious segment of the state.

Any physical aggression aimed at the state, from within a segment of the society over which it governs, has political origins and political motivations. It is known throughout history that rebellions take route upon an agenda or an idea. The fact that such physical aggression was aimed at a political entity, the state, which has its own idea and agenda, goes on to show the political nature of such physical aggression. Faced with such a scenario, is the state justified in blind use of force as retaliation to such a physical aggression insisting that its monopoly on physical aggression be accepted at all costs whatever the political considerations? Not necessarily so. The state can deploy its extraordinary power to suppress a physical challenge to its authority, but such a power cannot transform the rebellious segment of the society, it may rather incite it further. Rebellions are not suppressed or quelled by force rather the motivations behind them should be addressed through political discourse and engagement. Ignoring the political dimension of sedition and treason is a flawed approach.

Thus, a state will only be able to subdue a rebellious segment under its authority if it is materially and intellectually superior to it. Material strength alone is not enough unless of course the state plans to physically eliminate the whole rebellious segment. A political solution is an attempt to integrate the rebellious segment of the society in to mainstream society under the authority of the state. What this really means is an attempt at integrating the rebellious segment of the society through either of the two approaches. Either the state would have to reform itself to accommodate the demands of the rebellious segment of the society or the rebellious segment would have to give up its demands. So in reality a political solution is an attempt at intellectual integration.

To suggest that such negotiations are an abdication of the state's monopoly on physical aggression is in reality oversimplification of the problem. The state does not exist to jealously guard its monopoly on physical aggression; it rather seeks such an exclusive monopoly on physical aggression to use it in the interests of the people it governs, not to use it against them. So this is not really a debate about how institutions function, for such a debate is academic. It is rather a debate about how a political entity functions.

The liberals have previously used the institutional argument to oppose the Taliban militancy and they use it still. The idea that a state should insist on its monopoly on physical aggression, or what is more commonly referred to as the writ of the state emanates from a viewpoint which views the state as an institution which is a function of predefined set of principles based on a historical analysis of state behavior. Such an approach towards the conception of a state's behavior often results in its proponents divorcing the institution of the state from its real function. It is an institution which derives its legitimacy from the people and hence exists to look after their affairs. An executive authority which does not enjoy legitimacy with a section of the population within its domain should act to establish its legitimacy because it cannot function without such legitimacy. What it means is that state need to be compassionate, not ruthless, in its response towards a crisis or a challenge to its authority and legitimacy. Interestingly liberals argue on similar lines with regards to the Baloch insurgency which they see as secular and nationalist, but do not believe in applying this approach towards the Taliban insurgency which they revile as having Islamic origins.

Recently the liberals have attempted to bring the ideological angle to this debate. The argument is that the Pakistani state is built on democratic principles and the ideals of secularism. As the Taliban oppose these ideals, state power should be deployed against them to defend the idea on which the state is built. Moreover as the Taliban are not willing to accept a democratic state and adopt secularism, no political reconciliation with them should even be attempted.

There are three fundamental problems with this viewpoint. Firstly and the most worrying is the vagueness in the liberal narrative, its objective and its seriousness in addressing the problem of an insurgency. It appears that such a narrative is being developed to keep liberal thought relevant in Pakistan by packaging it as an alternative to the Taliban's version of Pakistan. As the Muslim World as a whole has marched towards Islamic revival and demanded a more prominent rather central role of Islam in politics and has in fact started demanding political institutions as envisioned by Islam, liberals have felt increasingly marginalized and irrelevant within Muslim societies. It is clear that the Muslim World has rejected secularism with surveys and polls pointing to the increasing demand of Shariah law, such as the recent Pew survey. Even the recent Pakistani elections brought right leaning parties to the fore and despite liberal arguments to the contrary these elections only serve to prove further the society's march towards Islam. The Taliban phenomenon has given the liberals an opportunity to make liberalism relevant to the Pakistani society. So they have worked hard to build a binary narrative of Taliban versus liberalism in the hope that they would be successful in inciting the population against some practices of the Taliban and as an alternative sell liberalism and democracy to them. So the liberals are relying not on the strengths of secular democracy but the fear of the Taliban to sell their ideology. It can be argued that the liberals need the Taliban and they are not actually interested in ending the cycle of physical aggression, they are rather interested in using this physical aggression to build a narrative which can help transform Pakistan in to a secular state. So the question which needs to be asked is whether the liberals are actually interested in addressing the insurgency problem or using it for their ideological needs?

Secondly, employing state power in defense of an idea has only real meaning and effectiveness if the masses support that idea. The Pakistani public at large does not support secularism and democracy and it rather wants Pakistan to be an Islamic state. The contention that their participation in the recent elections is an expression of their support for secular democracy is deliberately trying to twist the argument. The Pakistani electorate at large doesn't see the electoral exercise and secularism as being one and the same; they rather see no contradiction between elections under democracy and the demand for Shariah law. For them the two can go side by side. Moreover their participation in the system does not come from their conviction in democracy and the idea of sovereignty of the masses; they rather see these elections in terms of personalities and not a comprehensive system of governance. Moreover the voting patterns in recent elections were inspired by a fear of what more harm democracy could bring, rather than a loyalty and conviction in democracy. This translated in to a drive to vote based on voting for the lesser evil or the smaller thief.

The idea that Islam should be the basis of the governance model in Pakistan has been the founding idea of the Pakistani state and has continued to enjoy support within the society since then. Although the conception of an Islamic state has developed from the early years of a pragmatic struggling for a democratic Islamic state to a comprehensive and radical vision of establishing the Islamic caliphate, the idea of Islam playing a central role in politics never lost its centrality in the Pakistani society. So how can the liberals argue for deployment of state power to protect the idea of democracy, when that very idea is being challenged politically and intellectually throughout Pakistan? Are the liberals any different from the Taliban if they try to impose their idea of the state on the society through the use of force? The only difference between the two being that one is using the resources of a group, the other the resources of the state. The argument that the institution of the state is generally considered to be legitimate and hence any exercise of power in the name of the state is legitimate does not apply here. We have had regimes in Pakistan which were considered to be illegitimate by the liberals themselves, like the Zia regime. In fact the liberals have attacked Zia for using state power to defend and propagate Islam or a version of it. How can they then be justified in advocating the use of state power to defend democracy and secularism which is after all a political idea? So the argument that Taliban don't subscribe to democracy and hence should be crushed is a flawed argument, it is flawed because the question of the idea of Pakistan has not been settled. Or to be more accurate, it has been settled at the level of the masses who want Pakistan to be an Islamic state, but it is still unsettled at the state level where a select liberal minority is using state power to resist the demands of the society.

Thirdly, and most importantly of all, the liberal narrative is flawed in its entirety because they have based it on the wrong premise. The Taliban phenomenon is not about Islamic militants wanting to overthrow the state to impose their version of Islam on the society. It is rather a rejection of Pakistan's pro-American foreign policy in which the Pakistani state is trying to protect foreign interests by deploying material force to stop Islamic militants from going to Afghanistan to fight the American occupation. Restlessness in Pakistan's Pashtun belt is directly associated to geopolitics. This is because in origin this war started for purely geopolitical reasons when the Pakistani regime led by Pervez Musharaf sided with America. It was argued by the Musharaf regime that not siding with America would result in the destruction of Pakistan at the hands of the US. Although Musharaf's assessment was disputed by some as based on his pro American leanings rather than actual geopolitical reasons the absence of the argument that Islamic militants are planning to overthrow the Pakistani state was quite obvious.

Moreover the international narrative on the war on terror within Pakistan is also overwhelmingly geopolitical. The West has accused Pakistan for providing safe havens to Islamic militants in FATA who use these havens as a launching pad to challenge the American occupation in Afghanistan. The accompanying debate about violation of Pakistan's sovereignty by US drones and attacks on Salala and Abottabad, the continuation of NATO supply line through Pakistan, American financing for Pakistan's war efforts and the arrest of American spies in Pakistan point to a direct American link to this War within Pakistan so much so that American policy makers consider the Afghan and Pakistan territories as a joint War Theatre. The US has a direct interest in ensuring that Islamic militants in Pakistan's tribal areas do not target its forces in Afghanistan and rather clash with Pakistan's security forces resulting in continuation of its presence in the region without any major threats to it. It has therefore ignited the war between Islamic militants and Pakistan both physically as well as intellectually and has supported the development of a narrative in Pakistan where the War on Terror is seen as Pakistan's war, for such a narrative helps her strategic objective.

The direct US support for this war within Pakistan makes a strong case for the War on Terror to be viewed in geopolitical terms. Even in the intellectual debate regarding this War the US has involved itself by funding political forces like the Sunni Itehad Council which openly opposed the Taliban. Therefore anyone who is serious in ending the chaos and anarchy which has gripped Pakistan in the last decade should forcefully argue for the termination of this war by challenging the main source behind it, the US presence in the region. Nothing else will end the cycle of chaos and anarchy.

By Moez Mobeen

Islamabad, Pakistan

Question:

As-Salaamu Alaikum,

I have read a question and answer about the inadmissibility of relying upon astronomical calculations to confirm the start of the month and Baarakallahu Feekum. However one point remains that I would like to be explained. It is that some have taken the use of astronomical calculations to negate the validity of a moon sighting meaning that if the correct calculation states that the Hilaal (new moon) will not be born and then someone appears giving witness to having seen it, then they will not take his testimony and witness and consider that he has imagined something that he thought was the new moon and as a result his testimony is rejected. And I have read a story from the Islamic history about similar situations in which the testimony and witnessing was rejected. This is the opinion stated by the Imaam and Qaadi (Judge) Taqi ud Deen Ali Bin Abdul Kaafi As-Sabki Ad-Dimashqi (the author of the book: Al-Ibhaaj Fee Sharh Al-Minhaaj Fee Usool il Fiqh) and this opinion has been quoted along with some situations or incidents in his book: Al-Alam Al-Manthoor Fee Ithbaat Ash-Shohoor. And it has happened in preceding years that the astronomers have announced the new moon has not been born until sunset and then announced the confirmation of the beginning of the month in the evening of the same day. I ask you to benefit us in this matter, Baarakallahu Feekum and let the victory proceed upon your hands.

Answer:

Wa Alaikumu assalaam Wa Rahmatullahi Wa Barakaatuhu,

My previous answer about relying upon the (actual) sighting (of the new moon) and not relying upon astronomical calculations is clear and comprehensive in dealing with the Mas'alah (issue) by the permission of Allah. However you say that you have read this and as such I say:

Dear brother, in regards to the fasting and the breaking of fast then the evidences are clear in indicating that the Ru'yah (sighting) is the Sabab (cause) for the fasting (Sawm) and the breaking of the fast (Fitr):

((صُومُوا لِرُؤْيَتِهِ وَأَفْطِرُوا لِرُؤْيَتِهِ))

"Fast at its sighting and break the fast at its sighting."

This is just as we made clear in the answer that we issued previously.

As for the use of calculations for negation, then Allah (swt) has resolved this matter for us by making the witnessing of the month the Sabab (cause/reason) for the fasting and the Messenger of Allah (saw) has made clear to us that this witnessing is the Ru'yah (sighting)...

As for confirming the validity of the statement of the witnessing then this is the task of the Qaadi (Judge). Therefore he asks the witness and discusses with him and makes sure of the soundness of his eyesight and his vision in addition to those who were around him. I.e. he uses all that it is possible to confirm the validity of the testimony according to his human capabilities. And the story of that Qaadi (judge) who discussed with the witness after having given testimony to the sighting... Then the Judge through examination saw that the witness had a hair upon his eye and so he removed it and then asked the witness where the Hilaal (new moon) is, but he was no longer able to see it!

As for including the calculation into the subject of the birth of the month (new moon) or the non-birth of it, then the matter is not understood in this way. This is because we do not fast based upon the reality of the month but rather in accordance to its sighting and the Saheeh Ahaadeeth in regards to this are many including the Hadeeth recorded by Al-Bukhaari who said: Adam told us, Shu'bah told us that Muhammad bin Ziyaad said: We heard Abu Hurairah (ra) saying: The Prophet (saw) said, or (he said) Abul Qaasim (saw) said:

((صُومُوا لِرُؤْيَتِهِ وَأَفْطِرُوا لِرُؤْيَتِهِ، فَإِنْ غُبِّيَ عَلَيْكُمْ فَأَكْمِلُوا عِدَّةَ شَعْبَانَ ثَلاَثِينَ))

"Fast at its sighting and break the fast at its sighting and if it is obscured (from your sight) then complete thirty days of Sha'baan."

This means that the new moon could be present but it is concealed by the clouds so that we do not see it and as such we complete the period of thirty days.

Therefore my dear brother, it is obligatory to stop at the text which has specified the sighting.

In regards to this issue I am reminded of the story of that meeting which was held by the ‘Islamic Conference' or the ‘Ulamaa of Muslims' or something similar, in Morocco some years ago. In this meeting some suggested that they should fly on a plane in the thirtieth night so that it is possible to see the moon without the obscurity of the clouds and so that there would be no obstacle in the way that would prevent the sighting of the Hilaal (new moon)!

Verily Allah (swt) has put down Asbaab (reasons/causes) for the acts of Ibaadah (worship) so commit to them and we should not make the matter more complicated upon ourselves and as a result make it difficult. Allah (swt) has intended ease for us:

((يُرِيدُ اللَّهُ بِكُمُ الْيُسْرَ وَلَا يُرِيدُ بِكُمُ الْعُسْرَ))

"Allah intends ease for you and does not intend hardship for you."

And the ease comes through following the Shari'ah rules as presented in Islam.

Additionally there is another matter to be mentioned and that is that the astronomers differ in regards to the number of hours that need to pass by upon the birth of the new moon until it is seen after the sunset. As such it could be said according to calculations that it is not possible to see it or that it can be seen in this place but not another or that it could remain for two minutes here after the sunset whilst in another place it could remain for 15 minutes and so on...

Therefore involving calculations whether to affirm or negate the sighting of the new moon represents a complicating of matters that Allah (swt) has not commanded us with. Indeed, rather the texts are explicit and clear and do not accept alternative interpretation.

Your brother,

Ata Bin Khalil Abu Al-Rashtah

The link to the answer from the Ameer's Facebook page.

Question:

As-Salaamu Alaikum to our honourable Sheikh may Allah keep you safe and sound.

I want to know the extent of the involvement of the Islamic State's authority in economics as a whole and then the extent of its authority in the enforcement of taxes (Daraa'ib). (And how are taxes regulated in general according to the Fiqhi understanding?)

Answer:

Wa Alaikum Assalaam Wa Rahmatullah Wa Baraakatuhu,

Your question regarding the involvement of the State in the Economy and taxation...

1. In relation to the involvement of the State in the economy accordingly the Economic System in Islam has specified the obligations of the State and its rights in addition to the obligations and rights of the people according to the Shari'ah rules which regulate the responsibilities or powers of both the one responsible for the people's affairs and those being cared for (the people). And because the Islamic Economic System has a major affect in relation to properties in terms of the means of ownership and expenditure. Therefore Islam has specified (or defined) these properties, maintained and safeguarded them from any aggression. So there are individual properties, State properties and public properties and none of these infringe upon another. Therefore, the design of state involvement displayed in the current day where private property is seized and turned into public or state property, or the public property is turned into private property like the giving of petroleum and mineral concessions to the local and foreign private sector, all of the above is not permitted in Islam. Rather each remains within the limits of its ownership: The individuals in their private ownership, the state in regards to its ownership like those of the Ghanaa'im (spoils) and Kharaaj, and the Ummah in regards to its ownership like those related to petrol, minerals and energy resources... As such the pattern of state involvement that is known within the economic systems in our current age does not exist in the Islamic State.

2. As for taxes (dara'ib) then in accordance to Islam there are no taxes that are taken from the people as the Prophet (saw) used to manage the affairs of the people and it has not been proven that he (saw) enforced taxes upon the people and there are no reports whatsoever to indicate that he ever did. And when he (saw) learnt that those on the borders of the State took taxes upon the goods that entered the lands he forbade that. It has been reported from ‘Uqbah Bin ‘Aamir that he heard the Messenger of Allah (saw) saying:

"لا يَدْخُلُ الْجَنَّةَ صَاحِبُ مَكْسٍ"

"He who imposes maks (custom duty) would not enter paradise" recorded by Ahmad and verified as Saheeh by Al-Haakim.

The Saahib Al-Maks is the person who takes taxes upon trade. This indicates the forbiddance of taking taxes according to the connotation defined by the West. In addition the Messenger of Allah (saw) said in a Hadeeth that is agreed upon narrated by Abu Bakrah:

"إِنَّ دِمَاءَكُمْ وَأَمْوَالَكُمْ وَأَعْرَاضَكُمْ عَلَيْكُمْ حَرَامٌ كَحُرْمَةِ يَوْمِكُمْ هَذَا فِي بَلَدِكُمْ هَذَا فِي شَهْرِكُمْ هَذَا"

"Verily your blood, wealth (property) and honours are Haraam (to infringe upon) like the inviolability (Hurmah) of this day of yours, in this land of yours in this month of yours..."

And this Hadeeth is ‘Aamm (general) and it includes within its meaning every person which includes the State and the taking of taxes means the taking of the wealth (monies) of the Muslims against their will which indicates its inadmissibility.

However there is an exclusive case in which the Shar'a has approved of them and permitted to take wealth according to its measured requirement without excess and it is only taken from the wealthy from the surplus of their wealth.

This case is when spending has been obliged upon the Bait ul-Maal (State Treasury) and the Muslims and there are not sufficient funds in the Bait ul-Maal and as such is taken from the surplus wealth of the rich in accordance to the amount that needs to be spent in order to meet it.

However if the spending is obliged upon the Bait ul-Maal alone and not upon the Muslims, then money is not taken for this from the Muslims if the funds in the Bait ul-Maal are insufficient, rather the need is (still required to be) spent upon it from the Bait ul-Maal.

So for example fulfilling the fundamental (basic) needs of the poor in terms of food, shelter and clothing, this is obligatory upon the State to be taken from the Bait ul-Maal just as it is Waajib (obligatory) upon the Muslims. He (saw) said:

"وَأَيُّمَا أَهْلُ عَرْصَةٍ أَصْبَحَ فِيهِمْ امْرُؤٌ جَائِعٌ فَقَدْ بَرِئَتْ مِنْهُمْ ذِمَّةُ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى"

"In any local community, if a person becomes hungry amongst them then Allah has nothing to do with them." (Recorded by Ahmad and narrated by Ibn ‘Umar (ra))

So if there are insufficient funds to meet the basic fundamental needs of the poor in the Bait ul-Maal, then the amount required to meet these needs is taken from the rich without any increase above that.

And in the case of Al-Jihaad for example, it is also Fard (obligatory) upon the State and the Muslims due to the saying of Allah (swt):

((وَجَاهِدُوا بِأَمْوَالِكُمْ وَأَنْفُسِكُمْ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ))

"And make Jihaad with your wealth and lives in the way of Allah."

And His statement (swt):

((وَالْمُجَاهِدُونَ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ بِأَمْوَالِهِمْ وَأَنْفُسِهِمْ))

"And those who make Jihaad in the way of Allah with their wealth and their lives."

Therefore meeting the needs of Al-Jihaad is treated in the same manner (as described in the first example).

And in this way it is understood that taxes are non-existent in Islam with the exception of this case in which it is obligatory for two conditions to be met:

First: That it is obligatory upon the Bait ul-Maal and upon the Muslims established by explicit (Sareeh) Shari'ah evidences.

Second: That there are not sufficient funds in the Bait ul-Maal to meet their needs.

So in this circumstance alone is the amount required to meet the need taken from the surplus wealth of the rich without any increase. And in regards to the surplus (faa'id) we mean that which is above the typical food of the rich, his clothing, housing, servants, wives and what he rides/drives to meet his needs, and all that is like this in accordance to the typical situation of those like him. This is because Allah (swt) said:

((وَيَسْأَلُونَكَ مَاذَا يُنْفِقُونَ قُلِ الْعَفْوَ))

"And they ask you what they ought to spend. Say: "That which is beyond your needs" [Al-Baqarah: 219]

Al-‘Afwa means that which does not require effort to spend which means what is over his requirements according to what is known to be typical from those like him. And the Messenger of Allah (saw) said:

"أفضلُ الصَّدَقَةِ مَا كَانَ عَنْ ظَهْرِ غِنًى"

"The best Sadaqah is that which is spent from the back of the richness (Zhahri Ghina)." Agreed upon by way of Hakeem Bin Hizaam and Abu Hurairah. And the meaning of ‘the back of the rich(ness)' (Zhahri Ghina) is any increase upon his known (typical) requirements of what is known (bil-ma'rouf).

And in conclusion there are no taxes in Islam except for this case and it can only be taken to meet the amount required to meet the need without any increase and it is not taken except from the back of the richness and this case rarely occurred throughout the Islamic history because the permanent resources of the State that Islam has explained were sufficient. However if required it is permitted to take the taxes according to the explanation provided above.

Your brother,

Ata Bin Khalil Abu Al-Rashtah

The link to the answer from the Ameer's Facebook page.